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Abstract 
This thesis is about discourse, risk, and the management of blame. It examines the 
case study of `economy class syndrome', the risk of developing a blood clot after a 
long-haul flight, and analyses accounts of it from four different interested groups. To 
do so, the epistemological and methodological principles of discourse analysis have 
been adopted. These principles are reviewed in depth, and difficulties applying them 
to research considered and addressed. 
Four themes are apparent in discourses about risk; that risks do not `just happen'; the 
frequency, seriousness and very existence of a risk is highly contested; risks can be 
predicted, managed and prevented; and responsibility and blame for them can be 
attributed. Some conclusions are also drawn about the discursive features that are 
used to construct these versions of risks. It is suggested that both these themes and 
features have wider application beyond this case study. 
The study of the research topic, the management of the difficulties in applying 
discourse analytic methods, and the generalisability of the conclusions are all 
reflexively considered. This research is therefore a substantive contribution to 
understanding the constructions of risks through discourse; and it is also a 
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Introduction: 
The 'Risk' of Economy Class Syndrome 
This research is about risk, discourse, and the management of blame. It considers 
how risks are constructed through the language that is used to describe them, how 
successful constructions are maintained, and how responsibility and blame for risks 
are ascribed. 
We are bombarded with information and advice about risks. We are presented with 
ever more evidence of the dangers of everyday life, advice on how we can and should 
protect ourselves and who we can blame if a risk does manifest itself and an accident 
occurs. Media stories are couched in terms of risks increasing in number and 
magnitude. It is impossible to pick up a paper or turn on the television without being 
inundated with accounts of hazards, accidents and disasters. But what is interesting 
about these stories is the way that they are increasingly being constructed not as 
random incidents that could happen anytime, anywhere, but as predictable, 
manageable, and therefore ultimately avoidable events. 
Recent news coverage highlight this. Different stories report a train crash; floods 
devastating much of the country; a child kidnapped; all of these, although seemingly 
very different, appear to be constructed along similar lines. While at first the event or 
situation may be described in terms of fate, chance or accident, attention soon turns to 
questioning how and why it happened, what could be done to prevent it happening in 
the future, and who was to blame. 
This phenomenon does not appear to be restricted to news coverage. The idea that 
risks and accidents are now increasingly perceived to be manageable is evidenced in 
risk assessments, prescriptions of safety measures and appropriate behaviour - for 
example, the `common sense' of accident prevention literature presents responsibility 
for the avoidance of such risks. 
This research aims to address a number of issues about the contemporary 
constructions of risk. How are risks constructed? How are they presented in such a 
way as to make them seem manageable? If they are, what effect does this have, both 
on those who construct the risks, and those whose position in relation to the risk is 
described? And what are the wider implications of a risk construction that maintains 
that risks can be prevented and someone held responsible for them? In this thesis I 
will explore features of the language that is used to construct risks; for how else is it 
possible to receive information about risks if not from the language through which 
they are communicated and constructed? I will illustrate this by reference to a 
specific risk, before highlighting the observations and findings by considering their 
relevance for other hazards. 
While there are innumerable risks that could be considered, I will focus on `Economy 
Class Syndrome' (ECS), also known as `Deep Vein Thrombosis' (DVT), and then 
consider whether this case study provides an empirical framework to examine other 
kinds of risk. ECS is the risk of suffering a blood clot or thrombosis from sitting on 
an aeroplane, and attention has been paid to the apparent increased risk of developing 
this in the economy class section, rather than business or first class where increased 
leg room is available. There are several terms used to describe the issue, and which 
one is used, and why, is itself analytically interesting (the issue is also known for 
example as `Traveller's Thrombosis' and `inflight DVT'). For the present however, I 
will refer to it as `ECS' for simplicity, and return to this issue again. 
The term `ECS' was first used in a research report in The Lancet, the journal of the 
British Medical Association, in August 1988. It was not the first report to raise the 
possibility of a link between long haul flights and thrombosis', but it was the first to 
turn the possible connection into an issue that demanded attention. The report also 
explicitly warned of the dangers of the risk to passengers, and by stating that the 
airlines did little to inform them added an air of a `conspiracy of silence' to it, 
implicitly blaming the airlines for their lack of action in failing to prevent the 
condition. Subsequent attention to the issue has presented more information about it. 
Remaining seated for long periods may lead to the formation of a clot, usually in the 
legs. These are often painless and may go unnoticed. However, they may result in 
cramp and swelling, and can be recognised and treated. This treatment can last for 
many months, and involve blood thinning drugs such as warfarin and dramatic 
changes to lifestyle. In even more serious cases, clots may move to the lungs, causing 
a pulmonary embolism. Such cases have often proved fatal. Symptoms may occur 
during a flight, immediately afterwards, or some weeks after as a previously painless 
clot dislodges itself. A number of risk factors are highlighted as increasing the risk of 
a clot occurring, such as the lack of leg movement, but also poor cabin air quality, 
previous experience of clots or conditions such as heart disease, pregnancy, taking the 
contraceptive pill or smoking. Of course, the importance and relevance of many of 
these factors are hotly contested by the different groups who have an interest in the 
matter. 
Indeed, ECS is a topical and fiercely debated issue. At a time when airline security is 
under the microscope, claims are being made about ECS in the national and European 
courts that will have significant ramifications for the whole of the industry. News 
headlines report on passengers who have collapsed in dramatic circumstances 
following a flight, a wide variety of merchandise is marketed as preventing an attack, 
and scientific research on the topic receives a high profile. Passenger groups and 
media commentators argue that there is a conspiracy over the existence of ECS and 
that the lack of information given by the airlines has been responsible for incidents of 
inflight thrombosis occurring. In contrast, some representatives from the airline 
industry maintain that the responsibility for ECS rests with passengers and their 
behaviour during a flight. Research from the medical community has been mixed, 
with no agreement reached about the existence or frequency of ECS. The issue is 
therefore made more contentious by the lack of any established scientific facts that 
can be appealed to. It is clear from the controversy around the issue that ECS is not 
something that can be easily explained or that `just happens'. It is a risk that can be 
assessed and accounted for, and for which blame can be apportioned. What is 
interesting is that each of the groups who have an interest in the issue do so quite 
differently. 
' An earlier article appeared in The Lancet in February 1985 for example. 
2 
It is precisely the contested nature of the issue that makes it so interesting and 
valuable to study; the current debate offers an opportunity to study `facts' in the 
making. Without any agreement about the issue, it is the claims that groups make that 
I am studying in this research. Burningham (1998) for example argues that studying 
the construction of social problems may be the most valid approach to take, given that 
the existence and character of these problems is often contested. In the absence of 
established evidence to refer to, each of the protagonist groups make competing 
claims, hoping these claims will be seen as factual, accurate and compelling. I am 
studying how they do so, through a focus on the discourse used. 
1.1 The Structure of this research 
Therefore, in this research I am investigating discursive constructions of ECS, and the 
claims-making activity undertaken by different groups who have an interest in it. I 
examine the versions of the issue that are presented by different groups. I highlight 
how such things as the existence, frequency and responsibility for the risk are 
constructed and managed, and how the accounts are structured to appear factual, 
accurate and true. I analyse the information presented by these groups to illustrate 
this. The chapters that follow will therefore briefly be outlined. 
Chapter Two: Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method 
This chapter is a description and discussion of discourse analysis (DA), the method 
used to analyse the different claims made. As will be detailed in this chapter, DA is 
more than just a method, and represents a different epistemological approach to other 
methodologies. I describe how this applies to this research. 
Chapter Three: Research on Risks. Reality and Rhetoric 
In this chapter I discuss previous research on risks, social constructionism, social 
problems, and studies of discourse, and outline how they have been drawn on in the 
development of this research. 
Chester Four: Dilemmas and Difficulties in Conducting Discourse Analysis 
This chapter continues some of the themes highlighted in Chapter 2, and presents a 
critical consideration of DA. Previous DA research raises a number of issues about 
the methodological principles and theoretical foundations of the approach. In this 
chapter I document these and highlight how they have been resolved or managed for 
the purposes of this research. 
Chapter Five: Potter and Wetherell's Ten Steps 
I explain in this chapter how DA has been used in this research. I highlight the 
principles of the methodology, as developed by Potter and Wetherell (1987), and how 
they have been used, adapted or developed. 
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Chapter Six: The Ethics of Using Discourse Analysis on Interviews and the Internet 
I have adopted a particular ethical position in this research, which has had significant 
implications for the shape of it. In this chapter, I document how DA on interview 
texts may be deemed unethical, what options this allows, and how I resolved these 
and other ethical issues to conduct this research. 
Chapter Seven: The Actions of the Passengers and the Management of Stake: 
Airlines' Responsibility for Economy Class Syndrome 
What follows are analytical chapters which each focus on a particular group with an 
interest in the issue of ECS. The first of these is the airline industry. In this chapter I 
detail the constructions of the issue used and developed by airlines, how they present 
themselves, and the position of passengers. 
Chapter Eight: to Prevent and Needlessly Tragic: Campaign Groups' 
Construction of Economy Class Syndrome 
I highlight some of the observations made in the previous chapter by comparing them 
to the constructions used and maintained by campaign groups. The human tragedies 
associated with ECS have generated several organisations campaigning for increased 
recognition of ECS, its causes and prevention, improved air safety standards, and for 
airlines to concede their culpability. 
Chapter Nine: Subjectivity, Surprise and the Nature of Science: Analysis of Medical 
Reports in The Lancet 
In this chapter I consider the role of science and medicine in the issue of ECS. I focus 
on The Lancet, the journal of the British Medical Association. All the articles relating 
relation to ECS are analysed, and constructions of the issue and consistency and 
variability in accounts examined. Analysis of these articles is interesting for 
considering the presentation of the risk, and also the workings of medical research 
more generally. 
Chapter Ten: Facts in the Making: Debates and Discussions in Internet Forums 
A final source of information are Internet discussion forums on topics relevant to 
ECS. These constitute a fascinating insight into the ongoing construction of the issue. 
The data here are not a final `polished article', but the controversy in the making, as 
messages hotly debate and contradict each other on questions of whether the risk of 
ECS exists, what can or should be done about it, and who is to blame. 
Chapter Eleven: Conclusions, Comparisons and Constructing a `Model of Risk' 
This chapter is a reflection on some of the findings of the analysis from these different 
groups. In it I consider what can be concluded about ECS, and about the 
constructions of risks. I then assess the potential applicability to another case study 
and consider more broadly how constructions of risk, blame and responsibility are 
managed and maintained. 
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Chanter Twelve: Discussion - Discourse Analysis as a Theory and a Method 
Revisited 
Finally, in this chapter I re-consider some of the issues raised throughout this 
research, particularly regarding the practicalities of carrying out DA, and how I have 
addressed them. I discuss how issues highlighted in Chapters four to six were 




Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method 
This research is about the construction of risks. This chapter describes discourse 
analysis (DA), the methodology being used to achieve this. I discuss the principles of 
DA and the focus on language. I then consider the value of using DA, and how it has 
been applied in this research. 
2.1 Discourse analysis: the turn to the text 
This research is about the claims made by different groups about ECS. I am studying 
their differing constructions of the risk, by considering the language used. 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt argue that the language of accounts should not be treated 
as passive, but rather is "a medium through which social acts are accomplished" 
(1995: 2); in this case shaping the risk of ECS. Following Horton-Salway, this means 
that rather than examining the accuracy of descriptions, they are treated as "discursive 
accomplishments" (2001b: 252); how accounts are made to seem factual and authentic 
is therefore the object of study, not judging whether they are or not. Factuality and 
authenticity are treated as the participants' concern, not the analyst's. To do so, I am 
using discourse analysis (DA). DA is an appropriate method because it focuses on 
language. Indeed, language is the subject of study, and is not merely a way of getting 
to the data; it is the data. I will now consider what DA is and what using a discourse 
analytic approach means. 
In its broadest sense, DA can be understood as the study of talk and texts (Wetherell 
et al., 2001: i), and the search for patterns in language use within them (Taylor, 
2001 a: 10). It is a set of methods and theories for investigating language in use, but 
more than that, it represents a different epistemological and ontological approach to 
traditional forms of research. I will consider the features of DA approach that lead to 
this; in brief these are that language is functional; that language is not neutral; and that 
language is constructive and oriented to action. These understandings are a move 
away from a cognitive conception of language as representing an inner reality. They 
also encompass an understanding of language as contingent and variable. Each of 
these principles will be considered. 
It should also be noted that the term `DA' is used for a number of different 
approaches; while they all focus on language, they differ significantly (which I will 
consider at the end of this chapter). It is DA from a social psychological perspective 
that I am using, and it is to this that the following points refer. 
2.1.1 Language as social practice 
In DA, discourse is the data. Studying language means considering it as social 
practice, not a neutral means for the transmission of information. As Te Molder says, 
it is a strongly but often implicitly held view that language reflects "what is really the 
6 
case and what people really think" (1999: 246). DA differs from this, and does not 
presume that discourse represents mere description of an event or interaction. 
Because discourse is the topic rather than the resource (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 13), 
there is a focus on how events are described and explained, how factual reports are 
constructed, or how cognitive states are attributed to people (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 2). DA considers how `objects' in accounts (be they people, actions, feelings, 
incidents, and so on) are actively constructed through discourse, even while presented 
in a way which implies an independent existence from the speaker (McGhee and 
Miell, 1998: 63). In this way, what discourse is doing, and how versions of the world 
are presented as factual and authentic, are the primary focuses, and not their 
relationship to reality (Horton-Salway, 2001 a; Wiggins and Potter, 2003). 
2.1.2 Language as action oriented 
Moving away from considering language as a passive means of information 
transmission leads to a focus on its function and `action orientation' (Heritage, 1984). 
Each time language is used, it is doing something. This may seem obvious with such 
things as invitations, accusations, orders, and so on. However, as Edwards and Potter 
(2001: 13-14) emphasize, "actions are pervasively being done even in ostensibly 
factual, descriptive discourse". All language is functional, and all words used `do' 
something; it is not possible to somehow escape from this. Schegloff s (1972: 81) 
example illustrates this. He points out that there are multiple ways of describing the 
world; therefore, any word or phrase that is used has been chosen from myriad 
possibilities. This choice decision reflects the use, effect, and function that a 
particular piece of language has. As Auburn et al. point out, descriptions are 
constructed by selecting particular actions or features and presenting them in ways 
which allow for inferences about those involved to be made (1999: 47). 
It is furthermore the case that a seemingly neutral, factual description of an event has 
be to made to seem so; it does not just appear, it could have been described in other 
ways, and each of these would have had a different effect. Indeed, Potter points to the 
`epistemological orientation' that language has, the way that a description will build 
its status as a factual version. In giving an account, for example, participants will 
attempt to produce descriptions that will be seen as "mere descriptions, reports which 
tell it how it is" (1997: 108, emphasis in the original). What DA studies is how they 
do this, rather than judging how well their account reflects what it describes. It 
therefore focuses both on the actions achieved in language use, and the way accounts 
are put together in particular ways in order to achieve such effects. As Potter 
(1997: 176) argues, "descriptions are not worked up as factual just for the sake of it. 
Rather, descriptions are built in this way because of their role in activities". This may 
be to perform rhetorical functions, such as persuading (McGhee and Miell, 1998: 69); 
to manage particular dilemmas (Te Molder, 1999); to create a particular impression of 
events and ascribe motive, blame, innocence or responsibility (Wowk, 1984: 144); or 
to counter the views of others and engage in self presentation (Billig, 1991: 20). For 
both participants and analysts therefore, the primary issue is the social actions, or 
interactional work, being done in the discourse (Potter and Edwards, 2003: 169). 
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2.1.3 Language as constructive 
Following from this, an approach that considers the action orientation of language 
encompasses a view of language as `constructive'. This may seem somewhat 
counter-intuitive; how can language `construct' things? As Wetherell (2001b: 392) 
points out, saying that `reality is discursively constructed' does challenge many 
common-sense assumptions. She argues however that it is important to consider 
"the notion that what is most real for humans is created through human 
actions. Reality is a constructed social product. We actively co-operate to 
sustain the phenomena of our world such as schools, economies, pastoral 
landscapes, families, meaningful relationships and so on, and these represent 
the sedimentation of human activities over time. The processes involved in 
bringing these phenomena into being are deeply rooted in our societies and 
cultures. What is most real for us are social phenomena which have involved 
human construction". 
This construction work takes place through the language that is used to communicate, 
to participate in, and to describe these practices. Accordingly, Edwards et al. (1995) 
argue that what may seem independent from discursive construction cannot be 
separated from the processes that give them their meaning. There are examples of 
this. Lawes (1999: 14) indicates that legal institutions are built up from a variety of 
practices, including interaction in courtrooms. Rather than thinking about such 
contexts as external, they can be considered as "something endogenously generated 
within the talk of the participants and, indeed, as something created in and through 
that talk". It is not just social contexts and institutions that may be thought of as 
constructed through language. Potter discusses the strength of the construction 
metaphor, and argues that whilst it may seem ridiculous to suggest that the world 
literally springs into existence as it is talked about or written about, reality enters into 
human practices 
"by the way of the human categorizations and descriptions that are part of 
those practices. The world is not categorized by God or nature in ways that 
we all are forced to accept. It is constituted in one way or another as people 
talk it, write it, and argue it... to judge whether a description was mirroring or 
constructing reality requires the description to be compared to the reality. Yet 
reality (or `reality') cannot enter this debate except as another description, 
which would beg the question of whether this new description is itself 
descriptive or constructive" (1997: 98). 
Potter makes it clear that he is not engaging in philosophical discussions about what 
exists, but instead `clearing the way' for a focus on practical and analytical issues. He 
argues that it is not possible to gain access to the world except through language; if 
our access to the world is through constructions in texts and talk, these texts and talk 
therefore construct our world (Potter et al., 1990: 207-8). 
Language may be seen as constructive in three ways (Wetherell and Potter, 
1988: 169). First, it provides the `building blocks', linguistic resources that any piece 
of discourse is formed from. Second, it encompasses the notion of the inevitable 
selection that takes place, as only some linguistic resources are chosen at any time. 
The necessary choices made about language present the world in a particular way, and 
has implications both for what they describe, and for whoever is doing the describing. 
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In this way, Moloney and Walker (2002: 314) argue that language constructs the 
nature of objects and events as they are discussed, and Taylor (2001 a: 6-7) points out 
that language "is the site where meanings are created and changed". An example of 
this is Potter and Wetherell's research on New Zealanders' attitudes to Maoris. They 
state of one of their interviewees that "he is not working with a neutral description of 
an object and then saying how he feels about it; he is constructing a version of the 
object. It is in this way that evaluation is displayed. His version of the object carries 
off his evaluation. " (1987: 51). And thirdly, stating that language is constructive 
emphasizes the "potent, consequential dealings with events and people which are 
experienced only in terms of specific linguistic versions. In a profound sense, 
accounts `construct' reality" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 34). 
2.1.4 Context and variability in accounts 
Language will therefore be selected for the particular effects that it has in a specific 
piece of interaction'. In this way, language may be seen as `indexical' (Garfinkel, 
1967), and contingent on its context. Authors may perceive changes in context and 
alter their language use - between different accounts they produce, or even in the 
same one. Considering context is important because, as Wetherell and Potter 
(1988: 169) argue, "the meaning of an utterance is not a straightforward matter of 
external reference but depends on the local and broader discursive systems in which 
the utterance is embedded". Therefore, as Taylor (2001a: 6-7) argues, to understand 
what action is being achieved, "it is necessary to consider its situated use, within the 
process of ongoing interaction". Edley and Wetherell's (1999: 182) work on identity 
illustrates this, as "speakers construct different accounts, or versions, of the world 
(including themselves) as they move across various interactional settings". Their 
study regards identity not as something static, but as actively accomplished within 
particular rhetorical contexts. A focus on the indexicality of language also highlights 
the different meanings that words can have; these are not ascribed by definition, but 
vary according to the context and who is using them. For example, Speer and Potter 
(2000: 563) cite calling somebody a `goof' or `queen'. They argue that such terms are 
not inherently negative, but have to be worked up as such. In different contexts, they 
might have different meanings, in an affectionate conversation between friends, or a 
heated accusation for example. 
Of course, considering variability does not mean a recourse to considering which 
account or which part of an account is `true' (Edley, 1993), and it is not an attempt to 
arbitrate between accurate and rhetorically produced accounts. Analysis is focused on 
how accounts are made to seem accurate, and how they orient to their particular 
context. For example, a seemingly straightforward account of events at a party may 
vary if the recipient is an elderly relative, a friend unable to attend, or a police officer. 
It is not possible for the analyst to decide which one of these versions is more 
`accurate', even if there is considerable variation between them (and even if the 
analyst was there). They are being constructed for the particular situation in which 
they are being given, and Gilbert and Mulkay describe the "contextually appropriate 
ways" in which language is used (1984: 14). The analytic focus of DA is therefore on 
this indexical nature of language use. 
1 Issues about how active this selection will be more fully considered in Chapter Four. 
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Considering that language is constructive, oriented to action, and used to achieve 
particular effects in particular contexts, brings a new perspective to considering 
variability in accounts. In contrast to more traditional approaches, DA does not 
consider variability to be a `problem'. Burningham (1995: 107) points out that "the 
extent of variability within accounts clearly poses a problem for conventional forms 
of analysis which seek to provide a definitive account of action or belief'. DA does 
not seek to provide such an account, and does not presuppose that it might be 
possible. Instead of attempting to explain variation away, or to get the `gist' from a 
text, the focus is on what a particular piece of language is doing. Variations in 
accounts may therefore become perfectly sensible if the action of each piece of 
language use is considered. This leads Gilbert and Mulkay to argue that using DA 
turns the "intractable methodological liability" of participants' interpretative 
variability into a "productive analytical resource" (1984: 13). In other words, 
examining the variability in accounts highlights the constructive nature of language, 
and the functions that it is being used for (Wetherell and Potter, 1988: 171). 
This is also a different way to consider consistency in accounts. More traditional 
research may presuppose that descriptions given by different people of the same event 
will be the same. If so, this consistency leads to a conclusion that the event happened 
in the way described. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 34) highlight two problems with 
this. First, a focus in research on finding consistency often leads to variation being 
ignored, and the consistency being over-emphasized. Second, just because 
descriptions seem the same does not necessarily indicate descriptive reality: "this 
consistency may be a product of accounts sharing the same function; that is, two 
people may put their discourse together in the same way because they are doing the 
same thing with it". 
2.1.5 Participants' orientations 
A focus on language means a focus on participants; analysts do not presume to have 
an elevated or more valid grasp of the interaction than those taking part in it. For 
example, Potter and Wetherell (1987: 170) state that they are "not interested in the 
dictionary definitions of words, or abstract notions of meaning, but in distinctions 
participants actually make in their interactions". This focus on participants is an 
imperative in discursive work (Edley, 2001: 190), where attention is focused on what 
is going on for the participants themselves within any given interactional sequence. 
Wetherell (1998: 392) cites ScheglofFs plea for the "foregrounding of participant 
orientation and the backgrounding of analysts' concerns and categories", and in doing 
so Horton-Salway (2001b: 247) notes that she examined how "sufferers themselves" 
made sense of their medical condition. Antaki (1994: 4) considers how this might 
work in practice: "to keep all options open I have used the phrase `hearably is', rather 
than the balder `is', under the influence of the maxim that it is less profitable for the 
analyst to track down the (given) meaning of an utterance than it is to watch for how 
it is responded to by those to whom it is addressed, or more generally, to read its 
significance from its surrounding context taken at some grain of fineness". Analysis 
is only concerned with how participants orient to their context. So for example, a 
sentence such as `I went to a party last night' could be an answer to an interested 
query, a way of avoiding an accusation about having been somewhere else, or an 
explanation for poor health the following day. How the analyst treats this depends on 
how the participants treat it. So if the following response was `you shouldn't have 
drunk so much', it might be possible to conclude that it was being used as an 
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explanation (for a discussion, see Gill, 1996). DA embodies this approach to 
understanding accounts and interaction. 
2.1.6 Methodological relativism 
DA focuses on the participants' accounts, but does not judge or rank them as being 
truthful or accurate; analysts remains agnostic about such matters, maintaining a 
position of `methodological relativism'. Accounts are studied without privileging one 
over another; the analyst has no ability to do so (Wooffitt, 1992: 53), and remains 
"indifferent to the correctness, accuracy or whatever of what people are saying" 
(Potter and Edwards, 2003: 173). A parallel position is adopted in the sociology of 
knowledge. As Cooper (1999) discusses, this it not a denial that anything is real, but 
means that, for analytic purposes, beliefs about the truth or falsity of a knowledge 
claim are sidelined (following Bloor, 1991). Similarly in DA, methodological 
relativism is not an attempt to "deny the objective reality of phenomena" but to 
consider the role of those phenomena "in terms of people's glosses, categories, 
orientations and so on" (Potter and Edwards, 2003: 171). In terms of being agnostic, 
Edley (1993: 398) for example states in his study of newspaper coverage that he "will 
not be playing the role of arbiter, attempting to sort out the truth from the fabrication". 
The role of the analyst is instead to understand how participants present their accounts 
of the truth and discredit others as fabrications. 
2.1.7 Epistemology 
DA is different in many ways to more traditional research approaches. As Potter 
(1996: 5) says, DA is not just a method but "a whole perspective on social life and its 
research". Tuffin and Howard (2001: 197) describe the "alternative philosophical 
underpinnings" that a discursive approach has, and point out that its methods are 
"inextricably linked to underlying assumptions concerning ontology and 
epistemology", a point reiterated by Phillips and Hardy (2002: 3). DA is not focused 
on traditional concerns of the way social and intergroup relationships are conducted, 
but has instead an epistemological concern "with the nature of knowledge, cognition 
and reality: with how events are described and explained, how factual reports are 
constructed" (Potter and Edwards, 2003: 169). This is expanded upon by Wetherell et 
al. (2001b: 5) who argue that "to enter into the study of discourse is to enter into 
debates about the foundations on which knowledge is built, subjectivity is constructed 
and society is managed. These are debates about the nature of meaning... [A]t the 
heart of discourse studies are some complex but potent discussions on what it means 
to be human, what counts as `real' and what the `social' is". 
For example, Taylor (2001 a: 11) outlines that DA identifies patterns in language - and 
makes epistemological claims about them. These claims differ from a positivist view 
of the knowledge gained through research as generalisable; as value free and 
objective; and providing neutral information about the world in a cumulative manner 
towards universal truths. Instead, analysts "offer an interpretation which is inevitably 
partial" and aim "to investigate meaning and significance rather than to predict and 
control" (2001 a: 11). Because DA studies people and their perceptions, no one truth is 
possible: "there are multiple realities and therefore multiple truths" (2001 a: 12). As 
Taylor states, this is not just an epistemological position, but an ontological one, about 
the nature of the world itself. It also applies to the texts that are produced in a 
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discourse analysis, a point that will be referred to again later. The significance of an 
approach that does not consider there to be one truth about a situation will now be 
considered. 
2.2. The value of discourse analysis 
DA focuses on participants and discursive constructions; this means it is of 
"enormous value to social scientists whose concerns include the circumstances and 
experiences of people's everyday lives" (Lawes, 1999: 17). The phenomena under 
study have "genuine consequences for peoples' social lives" (Potter and Wetherell 
1987: 170) and represent the nature of social practice: "in very basic ways, to `do' 
social life is to `do' discourse" (Wetherell et al., 2001b: 3-4). The focus of study are 
the "procedures through which some part of reality seem stable, neutral, and 
objectively there" (Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 50). DA is often described as 
`interesting' and `exciting' (for example by Gill, 1996: 156; Potter, 1997: 230) because 
it "interrogates the nature of social action - the fundamental building block of social 
life and social science" (Wetherell et al., 2001b: 5). What could be more valuable 
than that? 
This is not to ignore the criticisms of DA. Often it is criticised for a preoccupation 
with language at the expense of matters of `greater importance'. It is assumed that by 
doing so, DA denies the reality of the world. The most eloquent portrayal of these 
arguments is by Edwards et al. (1995), where they describe how `self evident' 
realities of the world, such as death and furniture, are used to discredit an approach 
that seems not to acknowledge their existence. There are several points to be made 
about this. First, a DA approach is not denying `reality'. This is not the aim. What it 
does is highlight how different versions of what this reality is are produced and made 
to seem accurate. Second, such a division between the `real' and the `constructed' or 
`discursive' is not a neutral or natural division (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 181). It is 
a rhetorical device used as part of the formulation of the issue. Potter and Wetherell 
argue that using it makes the world and things in it seem ready completed, with little 
alternative but to accept them as they appear. However, DA seeks to explicate the 
constructive activity involved in the creation of a `world out there', and does not take 
any such dichotomy for granted. Rather than become embroiled in philosophical 
debates about existence and reality, DA asks how speakers or authors that use points 
such as these authorize their accounts. 
Third, in response to the criticism that DA ignores pressing issues such as death and 
suffering, Potter (1997: 230) argues that it is not necessarily impossible for work on 
fact construction to have a critical potential. It may provide practical help: "an 
explicit account of some of the procedures involved in building [a description], and 
the relations between the nature of the description and how it is used, might well 
assist a critical examination of what is going on in that setting by both participants 
and analysts". It may also be used in conjunction with theoretical and historical 
analysis on the demystification of established descriptions of social arrangements 
(1997: 231). This is a point echoed by Morris and Chenail (1995: 1), examining how 
speech is used in therapy and medicine, when they describe a concern to "illuminate, 
and in some cases, to reform clinical practices". Potter does however warn of too 
strong an emphasis which can "easily turn into arrogance where researchers assume 
that they know what is wrong in some domain, and research can become a device for 
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passing off that assumption as a research finding" (1997: 230). Further consideration 
will be given to the critical potential of DA shortly, in comparison with other 
`discourse analysis' approaches that take a much more proactive stance on this issue. 
2.3. The foundations of DA 
In order to understand the DA being described here, I will briefly consider the 
foundations of the approach. Speech act theory, social constructionism, and 
ethnomethodology have all been influential in the development of DA. From John 
Austin's (1962) How to Do Things with Words came the origins of an action 
orientated approach to language, and was a reaction to the "formal logical systems for 
representing linguistic statements which could be found to be true or false" (Smith, 
2000: 43). Tuffin and Howard (2001: 199) describe the influence on discursive 
approaches of a social constructionist ontology, which "argues for examining the 
ways in which language contributes to our shared understandings of how categories 
are put together in particular ways, with particular effects. Such categories are not 
treated as ontological givens, but are regarded as topics for analysis in their own 
right". Potter (1997) cites Berger and Luckman's The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966) as being particularly significant because they emphasised taking a symmetrical 
position towards knowledge that is treated as true and false. Finally, Garfinkel's 
(1967) exposition of ethnomethodology was extremely influential because it aimed to 
consider the ways that people construct accounts of the world to make them seem 
reasonable, appropriate and justifiable. 
2.4. Same term, different approach: other styles of `discourse analysis' 
I have mentioned that there are a range of studies called `discourse analysis'. I will 
therefore briefly consider some of these in order to exemplify the approach used here. 
Hook (2001: 521) describes the "growth industry" around discourse analysis and the 
proliferation of various models. Any attempt to categorise them will of course be a 
constructed one2 and there are overlaps between approaches (Taylor, 2001 a). 
However, it is useful to give an overview, and Wetherell et al. (2001 a) detail five 
methods that may be classified under the broad umbrella of discourse analysis: 
conversation analysis (CA); sociolinguistics; discursive psychology (DP); critical 
discourse analysis (CDA); and Foucauldian analysis. Each of these has a different 
definition of discourse, level of engagement with the data, aims, and theories of social 
action, subjectivity and social relations. Some detail of this will now briefly be given. 
In very stark terms, CA developed from ethnomethodology and focuses on naturally 
occurring spoken interaction as the site where meaning is formed and actions 
performed, aiming to uncover the organisational principles. Sociolinguistics 
identifies patterns in language use by considering the vocabulary, linguistic features 
and technicalities of it, and the structure and functions employed. Discursive 
psychology (DP) is the basis of the approach that is being used in this research (and I 
2 Billig (1999b: 576), for example, refers to the different ways in which the approaches and the parallels between them might be characterised when he states that, for his purposes, he "would prefer the distinction between conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis to be drawn differently". This implies of course that there are different ways in which it might be drawn. 
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have elsewhere termed it `discourse analysis'). It is a move away from social 
psychology and a transparent, neutral view of language as a means of accessing and 
understanding underlying cognitive states. Critical discourse analysis and 
Foucauldian analysis are often conflated, and examine patterns in discourse to 
understand social relations in society. The focus is on the social situation, and 
understanding it through discourse. 
There are difficulties of course in defining exactly what is meant by these different 
approaches, and there may be differences within each of these broad categories3. 
However, there are links between them. Gill describes how all of these perspectives 
reject a conception of language as merely a means of describing the world, and 
emphasise "the central importance of discourse in constructing social life" 
(1996: 141). Similarly, Potter (1996: 6-7) describes that CA maybe relevant to 
discursive approaches through the understanding of "the delicate way in which 
actions are embedded in sequences of discourse". He states that a basic practical 
understanding of CA is a prerequisite for DA and that it "capture[s] precisely the level 
of consequential detail that often falls through the cracks" (Potter, 1997: 124). 
There are links to more critical approaches. Although he was writing about CDA, 
when Gee (2000: 2) describes its focus on the action orientation of language, the 
construction of institutions through language use in interaction, and that "when we 
speak or write, we always take a particular perspective on what the `world' is like", he 
could have been describing DP. Similarly, Phillips and Hardy (2002: 2) argue about 
CDA that "the things that make up the social world - including our very identities - 
appear out of discourse.. without discourse, there is no social reality, and without 
understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or 
ourselves", which has clear parallels to DP. 
However, there are differences between all these approaches. Potter (1997: 105) for 
example describes how DP has a broader concern with talk and texts as parts of social 
practices than the CA concern with talk-in-interaction. Edwards and Potter (1992: 2) 
go on to outline that in contrast to CA, DP has an epistemological foundation, and a 
concern with the nature of knowledge and reality. 
There are a number of key differences between DP and CDA. The first is the focus 
on participants. Edley and Wetherell (1997: 205) describe `top down' approaches 
such as CDA, where researchers study how people are positioned by and affected 
3 For example, although they might be included in the category of DP, Edley and Wetherell state that 
the "social world is not constituted in every conversation. We want to acknowledge that some 
mobilizations of discourse become more stable and pervasive than others, both at an individual and 
cultural level" (1999: 182). This would seem to be a move away from a focus purely on participants' 
orientations and considering the site of each interaction as constructive, and this may in part be due to a 
call by Wetherell in earlier research for greater synthesis between different influences into a "viable 
approach for discourse analysis for social psychological approaches and topics" (1998: 388). There 
may be further contradictions within approaches. For example, despite outlining that they are in part drawing on Billig's (1988) ideas about the role of rhetoric in argumentation and citing Potter and Wetherell (1987), Moloney and Walker (2003: 306) suggest that "social representations that are 
expressed within discourse would be directed towards the patterns of thinking underlying the discourse, 
and not to characteristics of particular individuals producing the discourse". DP has of course argued 
against conceptualisations of what might be 'underlying the discourse' and such things as mental states that can be referred to through it, instead focusing on the action orientation of language itself. 
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through discourse. In contrast `bottom-up' approaches such as DP foreground 
people's activities, "highlighting the remarkable subtleness and sophistication of 
ordinary people's talk and its designed features". In CDA, dominant structures and 
power relations can be evidenced in particular discourses that are used to normalise 
these relations (Hobson, 2002). In contrast, DP focuses on participants' orientations 
within a text, and does not attempt to describe a world beyond that. 
Second, this prescribes different roles for analysts (Edley and Wetherell, 1997: 205). 
From their privileged position, CDA researchers assume a greater understanding of 
social situations than `ordinary' people. In contrast, discursive researchers are 
sometimes almost in `awe' of the sophistication with which people put together their 
accounts, and view the analyst as "having something to learn from ordinary people's 
talk". Analysis is only possible because of the shared discursive competencies, so the 
analyst is in no way superior to those whom they research. Third, a crucial difference 
is that in CDA there is an "impetus to criticise and change social practices" as much 
as there is to describe and understand them (McHoul and Rapley, 2001: xii). Indeed, 
Fairclough (1995: 1) explicitly states that "this framework is seen as a resource for 
people who are struggling against domination and oppression in linguistic forms". 
DP clearly does not espouse such a view. 
A final theme in CDA is the problematising of some, and not all, discourse. In CDA, 
Fairclough describes how "the power to control discourse is seen as the power to 
sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in 
dominance over other alternative (including oppositional) practices" (1995: 2). In DP, 
no language use is neutral, nor the features used in ideological discourses the domain 
of certain albeit powerful groups only. In an interesting comparison, Hook (2001) 
contrasts the approaches of Foucault with Parker (1992), and Potter and Wetherell 
(1987). He does not however devote much space to explaining what these latter two 
approaches consist of, and he appears to critique their methods from a Foucauldian 
point of view, without seeming to appreciate that they are not attempting the same 
things as Foucault4. For example, he states that while "Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
are rightly explicit about the fact that attaining truth is not the goal of discourse 
analysis.. it appears that they do not expend enough energy on showing how certain 
discourses operate as truthful, on demonstrating the bases of power that underpin, 
motivate and benefit from the truth-claims of the discourse in question" (2001: 525). 
This misses the point that they are not attempting to do this, and indeed, deliberately 
do not endorse an approach that starts with preconceived ideas or has a political 
agenda. The emphasis in DP is on the constructive and constructed nature of texts, 
examining them without a priori ideas about social relations, and orienting to the 
constructions used by the speakers and writers themselves. 
2.5. Discourse Analysis and ECS 
How does all of this relate to this research? 
Firstly, I am adopting the view that language is not neutral. I do not consider the 
accounts produced about ECS to be just a factual description of the situation; I argue, 
° It is of course appreciated that such an accusation might be levelled at the review that is being 
provided here. However, this critique of CDA is being presented in order to highlight what a DA 
approach does and does not include, rather than solely to criticise CDA perspectives. 
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and demonstrate in the subsequent chapters, that the language used constructs the 
issue in a particular way. The existence of the risk, its seriousness, frequency, cause, 
prevention, and management are all constructed through the language used. 
I do not presume in this research that by examining these accounts it is possible to sort 
out the factual from the inaccurate or constructed ones. I have no privilege or ability 
to do so. Any information about ECS to assist such a decision would also be 
constructed and functional and oriented to action; even if it were ostensibly factual 
data. It may be interesting to draw on an example from Green's (1997) work on the 
sociology of accidents to illustrate this point. She examined the log books of 
mountain rescue teams, which documented such details as the number of climbers 
involved in an incident, how they were dressed, how experienced they were and so 
on. As Green points out, even the inclusion of such seemingly factual data constructs 
the responsibility for the need to be rescued in a particular way. Taking note of what 
climbers were wearing for example implies that this is something that may be relevant 
in the occurrence of an incident, and implies a possibility that the climbers may be at 
fault for being improperly dressed for the conditions. Similarly, any account of ECS 
incidence could be examined for the implicit constructions within it. 
Extreme variability in accounts also means that it is not possible to uncover the `truth' 
about ECS. Following DA, rather than aiming to get a general understanding of the 
issue, I am acknowledging and focusing on this variability. Doing so is a way of 
highlighting constructive work; where two texts or two incidents within the same text 
appear to be in contradiction, examining the context in which they are situated gives 
an insight into the function of that language use. Texts produced by different groups 
may be seen to be different. Equally of course there may be some commonalities. I 
am examining where, how, and why these occur. 
Lastly, it is also important to stress that I am not aiming in this research to resolve or 
even address philosophical debates, or engage in questions about whether things exist 
or not. As Potter (1997: 6) says, considering the factual construction of accounts does 
not require an answer to the philosophical question of what factuality is, and as he 
goes on to say, "need do no more than consider reality construction a feature of 
descriptive practices; the concern is with interaction, such that philosophical questions 
of ontology can be left to the appropriate experts" (Potter, 1997: 178). This is not to 
say that this research is `ignoring' the seriousness of the topic. What I am doing is 
examining how the seriousness and drama of ECS is built up or undermined. As 
Antaki (1994: 7) argues, "the job of the discourse analyst is to discover, by inspection 
of the vocabulary and its arrangement, what claims speakers are making about the 
world, and how they are grounding them", and this is just what I am doing. 
In this chapter I have outlined the principles of DA being drawn on; in the next 
chapter I consider of some of the literatures used in the development of this research; 
and Chapter Four is an evaluation of some of the principles detailed here. 
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Chapter Three: 
Research on Risk, Reality and Rhetoric 
In this review I describe some of the literature relevant to this research. As has been 
discussed, I am using DA to understand a risk, but place this study much more firmly 
within the discourse analytic tradition, both methodologically and epistemologically, 
than within the vast and divergent theorising on risk. I therefore give a brief review 
of some of this work on risk, and on social problems, highlighting where it was 
influential in the design of this research. I then outline the previous DA research that 
I am drawing on, and how some of these concepts are relevant here. 
3.1. Risk 
There is a huge body of work on risk, both from within and outside sociology. Some 
of the work was useful in the development of this research, and this will be briefly 
detailed. 
3.1.1 `Real' risk? 
There is considerable debate in research on risk over whether such a thing as `real' 
risk exists. Lupton (1999: 1-2) for example notes a common technico-scientific 
approach in psychology, economics, and medicine, where risks are taken-for-granted 
objective phenomena. The focus is then on identifying them, and building 
prescriptive models of avoidance. That `risks exist' is also apparent in some 
sociology. For example, Furedi (1998: 19) states that "those who are at risk face 
hazards that are independent of them". Indeed, he notes a divergence between the 
"public fear and the actual incidence of the danger" (1998: 16). 
Other work highlights a more subjective character to risks. Dean (1999: 131) for 
example states that "[t]here is no such thing as risk in reality. Risk is a way - or 
rather a set of different ways - of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable 
form". Slovic concurs and argues that "risk does not exist `out there', independent of 
our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured. Human beings have invented the 
concept `risk' to help them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of 
life" (1992: 119). Similarly, Adam and van Loon (2000: 2) point to the essentially 
"constructed nature" of risks, manufactured through the application of assessment 
measures. According to Beck, risks cannot be observed as "a thing-out-there", and 
exist only in terms of the knowledge about them, open to "social definition and 
construction" (1992: 23). 
However, I have no wish to become embroiled in a debate about real and subjective 
risks; instead, I am seeking to understand how such a distinction may be used in the 
debate about the particular risk of ECS. The research highlighted here indicates 
differences in conceptualisations of risk. Whether the risk of ECS is real or not is key 
for groups to establish; I am examining how they do. Moreover, defining `risk' is 
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difficult and complicated (Lupton, 1991: 5; Furedi, 1998: 17). I do not wish to do so, 
but to understand how such terms are used. So for example, when Beck (2000: 4) asks 
"who is to define the riskiness of a product, a technology, and on what grounds in an 
age of manufactured uncertainties? ", these are exactly the questions that I wish to 
address. 
3.1.2 Risks as cognitive or social? 
Just as there are different conceptualisations of risks as objective or subjective, so 
there is debate over their mental or social basis. For example, Renn (1998: 49) argues 
that "risks are always mental representations". Others have focused on the social and 
political factors shaping risk perceptions and responses (for example, Adams, 1995; 
Thompson et at, 1990; Otway, 1992; Jasanoff, 1999; Horlick-Jones, 1998; Singer and 
Endreny, 1993; Ruston and Clayton, 2002; Rowe et at, 2000). A major contributor to 
this field has been Mary Douglas (1985). She argues that cultural assumptions shape 
notions of risk, which reflect shared norms and expectations rather than individual 
judgements. In collaboration with Aaron Wildavsky, she makes the point that "public 
perceptions of risk and its acceptable levels are collective constructs" (Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982: 186), and that the risks chosen for attention are consequential for 
societal beliefs and processes. Indeed, Franklin points out that "the way that we 
interpret risk, negotiate risk, and live with the unforeseen consequences of modernity 
will structure our culture, society, and politics for the coming decades" (1998: 1). 
Similarly, however, I do not intend this research to explicitly contribute to this 
debate'. When thinking about the topic of risks, and particularly ECS, notions of the 
cultural dimensions to risks, their social construction, and their reflection on society 
were influential. But I am focusing on how this construction takes place, and how 
groups use ideas about the cognitive or social nature of the risk. A notion as 
fundamental as `does the risk exist? ' is very much up for debate with ECS, and I have 
aimed to understand how different groups have done so. The discursive approach 
taken in this research precludes documenting social factors that affect perceptions of 
the risk; but I have drawn on this research to highlight factors that the groups analysed 
present as relevant. 
3.1.3 Lay and expert knowledges 
Another distinction in risk research is between lay and expert knowledges. For 
example, Kasperson's (1992) social amplification of risk theory was designed in part 
to explore the disjuncture between technical and social understandings of risk. 
Further, Slovic's (1992: 120) results show the varied meanings `risk' has, and he notes 
the wide range of factors that lay people tend to include in their assessments, a point 
echoed by numerous studies (see for example, Masterson-Allen and Brown, 1990; 
Wynne, 1992; 1989; Okrent and Pidgeon, 1998; Shaw, 1999; Franklin, 1998). 
Indeed, Plough and Krimsky comment that "it has been difficult to find common 
ground between the social world of risk perceptions guided by human experience and 
1 It may be the case, and it is of course in many ways hoped that this research may be of interest to 
those working in these areas; the point is that I have no explicit or implicit aim to become involved in 
these debates, and feel that this research is more fruitfully carried out if it acknowledges but remains 
distinct from them. 
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the scientists' rational ideal of decision making based on probabilistic thinking" 
(1987: 4). When Slovic (1992: 121) notes that "many conflicts about `risk' may result 
from experts and lay people having different definitions of the concept", I have 
aimed to explore how these different definitions are constructed and used. Lupton 
(1999: 2) describes an increasing focus on "the ways in which different perspectives 
on risk tend to create conflict between social groups based on differing aesthetic, 
moral and political assumptions". I have examined these different perspectives, and 
the conflict caused by them. 
This relates to issues of trust in experts and scientific decision making. As well as 
differences existing between public and expert understanding of risks, the knowledge 
that the public receive from experts is increasingly being met with scepticism 
(Freudenburg, 1992; Franklin, 1998). Indeed, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1998) argue 
that the high stakes and increasing uncertainties over risks in contemporary society 
need a new kind of science to provide useful answers. According to James and 
Thompson (1989: 87), individuals faced with a risk consider not only the probability 
of harm but also the credibility of whoever generates the information. In this research 
I am exploring how claims to authority are made, and how they are brought into 
question. 
3.1.4 Voluntary or imposed risk 
Studies have considered whether risks are imposed or voluntary, and the implications 
this has. Yearley (2001) highlights research that people differently assess risks they 
expose themselves to, and those they believe others subject them to. Slovic, drawing 
on Starr (1969), found that people would accept risks that were a thousand times 
greater if they were voluntarily assumed, rather than being imposed upon them. 
Further, hazards rated as voluntary also tended to be rated as controllable (Slovic, 
1992: 121): if people assume a risk, they feel in control of the consequences of it. 
Similarly, Benthin et al. (1993) found that when people voluntarily engage in `risky 
behaviour', they report greater knowledge, less fear and more personal control over 
the risks. I have drawn on such research to highlight how different groups use these 
ideas in their presentation of ECS. The categorisation of ECS as voluntary or 
imposed is a key feature of the construction of the issue, and a focus of analysis. 
3.1.5 Blame and control 
Whether risks are voluntary or imposed relates to whether they can be controlled and 
responsibility for avoiding them. Research in this area informed the design of this 
research, and this is one of the key themes highlighted by analysis. 
Risk management has been described as a key characteristic of modem society. 
Yearley (2001) documents a trend towards taming risk, brought about by confidence 
in progress and control over nature; an example is advances in medicine which allow 
control of some diseases. However, he notes that such advances have been 
consequential, and lead to new and increased hazards as well as greater security. This 
is of course exemplified by the work of Ulrich Beck. 
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Beck (1992: 13) describes the risks and consequences of modernisation, epitomised by 
the concept of `the risk society'. At his most succinct, he expresses this as "the stage 
of modernity in which the hazards produced in the growth of the industrial society 
become predominant" (1996: 28-29). This new form of society is characterised by the 
minimisation of the consequences of modernity (which Beck terms `bads') assuming 
central significance over the distribution of societal `goods', and he says that "the gain 
in power from techno-economic `progress' is being increasingly overshadowed by the 
production of risks" (1993: 12-13). The point, as Beck makes clear, is that these are 
dangers that "we have created for ourselves" (2000: 6). 
An emphasis on increased risk as a consequence of (post/late) modem society has 
been well documented (see for example, Giddens, 1990; Jasanoff, 1999: 136; Fox, 
1999: 13; Okrent and Pidgeon, 1998; Slovic, 1998: 73). The point is that risks are 
perceived as increasingly controllable; while at the same time new ones are emerging 
(Crouch and Kroll-Smith, 1991; Davidson and Baum, 1991). What has been useful to 
consider is the notion of controlling risks, and how this incorporates blame and 
responsibility. As Green (1997: 93) says, "[a]ccidents have been transformed from 
random misfortunes, which can only be understood in aggregate, into preventable 
misfortunes". Singer and Endreny (1993: 104) build on this to argue that "[i]n a 
society like ours, the need to fix responsibility, to locate a cause, and preferably an 
agent, is pervasive" (1993: 104). This may be because, as Davidson and Baum (1991), 
Crouch and Kroll-Smith (1991), and Marris (1996) point out, unpredictable events 
threaten our sense of control, so assigning responsibility for them becomes a way of 
coping. If blame can be apportioned, it should be possible to avert similar events in 
the future. Furthermore, Lupton (1999: 4) comments that "[r]isk is primarily 
understood as a human responsibility, both for its production and management, rather 
than the outcome of fate or destiny, as was the case in pre-modem times", and that in 
late modem society, there has been increasing attention to how blame for risks is 
ascribed. In the development of this research, I considered how risks are presented as 
controllable. As Beck (2000: 8) says, "risk always involves the question of 
responsibility". In this research I consider how this question is addressed, and 
avoided, by the groups involved with the risk of ECS. 
3.1.6 Blaine on individuals. organisations or society 
Any blame for risks can be levelled at individuals or organisations, and this can have 
significant implications. For example, van Vuuren (2000: 31-32) notes that while 
previous research focused predominantly on human error as the cause of accidents, 
work now considers incident causation in its social and organisational context. 
Indeed, Perrow (1984) says that accidents are an unavoidable consequence of the 
design of complex technical systems, and Reason (1991) points to the importance of 
organisational and management factors as causes of incidents. Similarly, Vaughan 
(1996) suggests that the wider culture of an organisation (with the social forces and 
contingencies that impinge upon it) is crucial when considering risks and accidents. 
However, research highlights that it is still very often individuals who are held 
responsible when an incident occurs. Bennett (2001) describes the `need' to 
apportion blame after an air crash, and points to the usual focus on pilot error. He 
argues that this hinders reflection of the underlying causes of a disaster. Blaming an 
individual avoids having to ask wider questions about the organisation and its 
structure and management; or make changes to them. This is significant in this 
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research because of the implications of blame being apportioned at an individual or 
organisational level. If passengers can be presented as responsible for ECS, then it is 
up to them to modify their behaviour to avoid the risk. If airlines are presented as 
responsible, this may have huge legal, financial and organisational ramifications for 
the industry. It is clearly crucial for groups to establish where blame for ECS should 
be apportioned, and defend themselves against counter-accusations. In this research, I 
examine how this is done. 
Also relevant here is an interesting literature on illness distribution and health 
promotion, which has included a focus on whether individuals or wider society are 
responsible for ill health. The influential Black Report (1980) cited individuals' 
behaviour as the main cause of health inequalities between different social classes. 
Since then sociological work has demonstrated both that this behaviour has to be 
considered in its social context, and the influence of social factors (see for example 
Williams and Calnan (1994) on the social factors that GPs could not address when 
treating chronic heart disease; and Graham (1977) who documents that stress 
prevented working class women giving up smoking during pregnancy). Research has 
also noted that individuals do not see behaviour as the main determinant of ill health 
(Pill and Stott (1982) note that the most frequently cited cause of illness is `germs'; 
these are seen as an external agent for which people cannot be blamed); and that 
individuals undertake their own assessments of the `sort of people' and the `sort of 
lifestyles' likely to be at risk of poor health (Davidson et al., 1991). Finally, research 
in this area has considered illness prevention as a `moral enterprise'. Graham (1989) 
for example notes that health promotion messages reinforce the guilt and confusion 
women feel; especially because they make parental responsibility equate to sacrifice 
and culpability for mothers. Indeed, according to Oakley (1989), health promotion 
messages construct appropriate behaviour. I am seeking to understand how 
participants orient to these issues. Do groups construct blame for the ill health caused 
by ECS as an individual's concern, focusing on their behaviour; or do they present 
wider influences as being dominant? Is ECS prevention presented with a moral 
responsibility to care for oneself or for others? I explore these questions in this 
research. 
3.1.7 Language and risk 
So far, I have outlined aspects of risk research that highlight key issues in the 
construction of ECS. In this research, I am examining how the groups studied orient 
to these issues. My work differs in fundamental ways from much of this previous 
research. I do not presuppose that risks can be measured; rather, I examine how other 
people do so. Furthermore, I am not adopting the common view of discourse as 
neutral. Fischhoff (1998: 63) for example uses a referential view of language, and 
argues that risk communication can be made more or less accurate, and more or less 
effective. In this research I argue that all language has an effect and a function, that it 
does not merely reflect what it describes but actively constructs whatever that is. 
This point about the referential nature of language also differentiates my research 
from one other key text that should be acknowledged here. The edited collection by 
Dorothy Nelkin (1985) does address the issue of language and risk. Nelkin points out 
that disputes over risk engage and polarise a variety of groups, who approach the 
issue with their own sets of assumptions, modes of analysis, and ideological 
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frameworks. These structure their definition of the problem and responses to it 
(1985: 13). Each chapter describes how participants in a risk approach the issue 
through a `frame' or set of assumptions. These are grounded in cultural, institutional, 
or situational factors, and are expressed through language (1985: 20). Nelkin states it 
is possible to address the different descriptions and solutions that groups give of risks. 
However, the book seems to take a somewhat realist view. Nelkin states that 
perceptions may differ from the "actual extent of the risk" for example (1985: 15). 
Correspondingly, the view of language presented is not always consistent; some 
language is seen as important in shaping and presenting ideas, but not all. Also while 
language is an important factor in the construction of the issue, there are others: a 
summary of one of the chapters states that it examines "the language, the concepts, 
and the procedural rules.. " (1985: 22), as if these latter two categories can somehow be 
distinguished from the first. In this research I am aiming to understand how such 
things as `frames' are constructed and invoked in discourse. I am presenting a 
systematic and detailed approach, absent from Nelkin's book, to examine the 
discursive constructions of risk. 
3.2. Social construction and social problems 
In this chapter I will now briefly consider other useful literatures. I have already 
documented the contribution of social constructionist perspectives in the development 
of DA. It is not my intention to begin to summarise the vast amount of work carried 
out under this banner; for even what the term means is in debate (Burningham and 
Cooper, 1999: 298). Social constructionists differ significantly on the extent to which 
there is a `real' basis to issues. There is much debate about how tenable such a view 
is both within social constructionism, and between this view and a more realist 
perspective (see for example Archer, 1995; Nightingale and Cromby, 1999; Butt, 
1999; and Sobal and Brikmont, 1995, for presentations of a `realist perspective', and 
Herrick and Jamieson, 1993; Grieder and Garkovich, 1994; and Holstein and Miller, 
1993, for a deeper social constructionism). I acknowledge however that it is difficult 
to categorise researchers as either `realist' or `constructionist'; there are too many 
overlaps, different uses of the terms, and to depict a two-sided debate with (all) 
realists on one side and (all) constructionists on the other would be a necessarily 
constructed conceptualisation of it (see Chouliaraki, 2002: 83; Gergen, 1994,151; 
Parker, 1999: 2-3). 
I do not wish to become embroiled in any debate of this kind. I am adopting a stance 
of `methodological relativism' towards the existence of ECS. I do not wish to make 
claims about its existence. I am instead concerned to understand how others do, and 
how they substantiate their view. This is despite (or because of? ) what Collins and 
Yearley (1992a: 308) describe as the "rejection of any kind of foundationalism and its 
replacement, not by permanent revolution, but by permanent insecurity" that such a 
stance implies. But as will be considered in more depth in Chapter Four, in this 
research I am following Woolgar (1992) and do not view such a position as a problem 
or a failure, but an opportunity. 
There is also interesting research on the construction of social problems, which 
highlights how DA (and therefore this research) can avoid becoming involved in a 
`realism versus social constructionism' debate. For example, Hoban (1995) describes 
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the process by which issues may take on characteristics of `social problems', but 
seems to imply that there is a difference between the perceived and actual issue. It is 
not clear how this might be assessed, and how he has access to the information about 
the `real' problem. Research in this vein led Woolgar and Pawluch (1985a; 1985b) to 
term it `ontological gerrymandering', whereby some claims are rendered problematic 
but the supposed conditions on which they are based are not. However, a DA 
approach does not have to become involved in whether real risk exists or not. It 
leaves aside such debates, and instead concentrates on how such differences are 
drawn upon in language. Indeed, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985a: 224-5) note that a 
way to move beyond "the current impasse between proponents of objectivism and of 
relativism" is to focus on "close examination of the rhetorical strategies which 
constitute social problems explanation.. further examination promises to provide 
intriguing insights into this fundamental feature of the way we make sense of our 
world". Further, other research has explicitly highlighted the value of studying 
language. Indeed, Maynard (1988: 311) suggests that by doing so it is "possible to 
transcend or step outside the terms of the debate between objectivist and 
constructionist approaches to social problems". This is emphasised by Marlaire and 
Maynard (1993: 173) who point out that "delineating the rhetoric of the social 
problems language game allows us to move away from single social construction 
centred analyses to a more comparative approach by seeking and identifying 
commonalities at the level of members' discursive practices". This is exactly what I 
have aimed to do. 
Having outlined the previous work on risk, social construction and social problems 
that has been drawn on in this research, I will now consider the relevant DA literature. 
3.3. Discourse analysis: previous research 
There seem to be very little (if any) DA research that has specifically addressed risks2. 
There are however a number of relevant themes from previous DA work, which I will 
briefly discuss. 
The first of these is an appreciation of the value of studying purportedly `factual' 
accounts. As Billig (1996: 3) says, "so called `plain' or `unadorned' styles are 
themselves styles, which demand as much authorial skill as more floridly verbose 
styles". Such texts are not somehow above discursive practices, and, as has been 
indicated in Chapter Two, can be examined in terms of their function and effect. I am 
therefore adopting Potter's (1997: 108) distinction between the action orientation and 
the epistemological orientation of factual accounts. He emphasises that questions can 
be asked of texts, such as; how are descriptions produced so that they will be treated 
as factual? How are they made to appear solid, neutral, independent of the speaker, 
and to be merely mirroring some aspect of the world? And how are these factual 
descriptions put together in ways that allow them to perform particular actions? I am 
therefore focusing both on how ECS is constructed in texts, and how they are 
2 The most relevant study found is that by Horton-Salway (2001a; 2001b) who analysed competing 
accounts in the construction of M. E. Her work does not examine constructions of risk, and does not 
cover the same themes as this research, but is similar to this in that she considered the different groups 
who had an interest in this controversial and contested issue. Horton-Salway's work has therefore been 
drawn upon in relevant places throughout this research. 
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presented as factual, authoritative accounts of it; for as Wooffitt (1992) argues, the 
factual status of an account is inextricably a product of discursive practices that make 
it seem so. Using such an approach is particularly relevant for the study of ECS 
because, as Edwards and Potter (1993: 36-37) highlight with reference to Pomerantz 
(1984), `factual' accounts tend to be produced in situations where accountability is in 
question, and when they face an implicit or explicit challenge: "where there is an 
issue, conflict, or dispute" (1993: 24). In this research, I am focusing on factual 
accounts produced by groups involved in a particularly contentious debate. 
This leads into the second theme I have drawn on: the rhetorical organisation of 
accounts (see Speer and Potter, 2000: 545; Horton-Salway, 2001b: 247; Puchta and 
Potter, 2002: 347; Te Molder, 1999: 246; and Simons, 1989: 11). Edwards and Potter 
(1993: 24) for instance argue that "accounts are likely to be described in ways that 
anticipate their possible refutation or undermining as false, partial, or interested and 
that they are likely to be designed to undermine, in turn, alternative versions". That 
is, they can have both a defensive and offensive rhetoric (Potter, 1997). Michael 
Billig has written extensively on this topic, and argues that because opinions are 
offered where there are counter-opinions, "the meaning of an `opinion' is dependent 
on the opinions which it is countering" (1991: 17). Similarly, the meanings of 
statements are derived both from what is being supported and what they are implicitly 
or explicitly oriented against (1996: 2), and in this way "affirmation and negation are 
intertwined" (1991: 143). This is particularly significant for this research, as Billig 
states that "attitudes are stances on matters of controversy [and] we can expect 
attitude holders to justify their position and to criticise the counter position" 
(1991: 143). I therefore considered accounts in this light, examining the offensive and 
defensive rhetoric used. As Billig points out, cases where an attack was implicit, 
rather than actual, can be highlighted as well, and texts can be seen be employing 
defensive rhetoric even where there did not seem to be any direct accusation. Indeed, 
as Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue, accounts are designed to counter real or 
potential alternatives, a point reiterated by McGhee and Miell (1998). This research 
therefore followed Potter's appeal to study both the procedures through which factual 
versions are built up, and the ones through which they are undermined (1997: 107). 
A third theme is the management of stake and accountability; examining how texts 
have been made to seem definitive and incontrovertible (see for example Heritage 
1984; Watson and Sharrock, 1991 on the value of this). Potter (1997: 111) argues that 
`stake' is one of the central features of the production of factual accounts. It concerns 
the interest that authors have in the production of a particular account and attempts to 
distance themselves from it. Ensuring that accounts are not discounted as a product of 
an interest amounts to what Potter (1997: 110) describes as a `dilemma of stake'. 
McGhee and Miell (1998: 65) argue that "accounts often contain attempts by the 
writer to show themselves to be separate from the claims they are making and hence 
disinterested, while the claims made by others are presented as motivated by self 
interest or other forms of bias.. people are seeking to make their claims appear to be 
natural and to almost have a life of their own". Alternatively, authors may build their 
stake through the presentation of entitlements to have certain knowledge (Potter, 
1997: 114). As McGhee and Miell point out, "rather than distancing themselves from 
their analyses (in order to show impartiality), individuals may seek to construct 
ownership of their relationship analyses (in order for example to show involvement 
and the authenticity of the analyses)" (1998: 65, emphasis in original). Finally, stake 
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may be used "as a resource" for those wishing to undermine the facticity of accounts 
(Potter, 1997: 114). Pointing out the stake that an author has in the production of an 
account is a means of discrediting it. 
Considerations of stake are of particular interest in this research. Firstly, as Potter 
(1997: 111) points out, stake is not just attributed to individuals, but also to social 
groups, nations, and ethnic groups and so on. In this research I am considering how 
stake is managed both by individual authors, and also on behalf of groups represented. 
Secondly, two groups have a very clear (and different) stake in the issue (airlines, and 
passenger groups), and another purports to be neutral (the medical research 
community). For example, airlines have a commercial interest in playing down the 
seriousness of ECS but do not want their presentation of it dismissed because of this, 
and I am examining how they work to counter this. Similarly passenger groups 
emphasise their involvement in the issues to stress both their proactive role and the 
seriousness of the issue. Emphasising `knowledge entitlement' is one way of doing 
so. Scientists have to be seen to have no stake in the topic for their research to be 
taken seriously. I consider how they attempt this. All these types of stake have to be 
differently managed, and I am examining how this is done. 
A fourth theme in DA work is on the actions that are accomplished through discourse; 
of particular interest is how accusations and blame are managed. Edwards and Potter 
(1992: 5 1) for example argue that "what is ostensibly mere `description' of actions and 
events can be constructed to generate specific implications concerning the 
speaker/actor's involvement with regard to attributional issues of responsibility and 
blame". I am seeking to understand how this is achieved; as MacMillan and Edwards 
point out, consideration of how "causality and accountability of actors in events, and 
of speakers/writers of texts" in factual accounts is a fruitful area of study (1999: 153). 
This may be by examining blaming and exoneration (Horton-Salway, 2001: 159); or 
how "admissions" may be managed (MacMillan and Edwards, 1998: 329). I am 
exploring how risks are presented as avoidable and manageable, and how blame for 
them can be apportioned, and am drawing on this literature to understand how this is 
achieved. 
Finally, I will be drawing on work that has specifically addressed scientists' 
discourse. In this research, I am analysing reports in The Lancet, the journal of the 
British Medical Association. In doing so however, I am not intending this research to 
be a contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). What I am doing is 
drawing on issues that SSK has raised, and showing how scientists orient to them in 
their discourse. Overviews of SSK have been given by Martin and Richards (1995), 
Ashmore et al. (1995), Potter (1997), and Nelkin (1995), on the different themes and 
focuses of work. The aspect of SSK that I have drawn on is distinction between the 
"idealised view of science" and "the conclusion that scientific practice is much more 
creative and contingent" than this (Woolgar, 1996: 15-16); but what I have focused on 
is how participants orient to these ideas. Indeed, I am using this work to demonstrate 
how scientists draw on the received view of science to substantiate favourable claims 
and dismiss unfavourable ones. As Mulkay et al. (1983: 198) point out, "scientists.. 
regularly present correct belief, which is almost without exception taken to be 
identical with their current views, as arising unproblematically from the experimental 
evidence; whilst incorrect belief is explained by reference to the distorting effect of 
personal, social, and generally non-scientific factors". I am showing how they do this 
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in their discourse, and drawing on work that has examined the tools that scientists use 
to present their accounts, particularly Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), and also Fahrestock 
(1989), Potter (1983), and Yearley (1981) to do so. 
In this chapter I have considered the previous research that is relevant to, and has been 
drawn on, in this research. The next chapter is a more thorough consideration of the 
DA methods used to carry it out. 
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Chapter Four: 
Difficulties and Dilemmas in Conducting Discourse Analysis 
In this chapter, I consider some apparent difficulties in carrying out DA. I argue that 
some of the principles of DA either may not be feasible in practice, or that 
consideration of them presents a challenge to the approach. I describe these 
difficulties, discuss how I have addressed them, and the effect they have had on this 
research. 
4.1. Potential difficulties and dilemma 
The starting point for thinking about some of these issues was a paper by Charles 
Antaki, Michael Billig, Derek Edwards, and Jonathan Potter (2003), entitled 
"Discourse Analysis Means Doing Analysis: A Critique of Six Analytic 
Shortcomings". In it they describe a number of ways in which research purporting to 
be DA falls short of the standards required. I will consider in depth some of the 
points that they raise', and then consider other issues with a DA approach, and how 
they may be managed in order for (this) research to proceed. 
4.1.1 Under-analysis 
Antaki et al. state that discourse `analysis' means attention to the details of utterances, 
showing the effect of the features identified, how they are used, and how they are 
handled sequentially and rhetorically (2003: 16). The first problem they identify is 
`under-analysis through summary', where the `gist' of data extracts is given by the 
analyst, but no or little actual analysis is carried out. As Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), 
Potter and Wetherell (1987), Potter (1988), and Gill (1996) point out, producing a 
simple summary and ignoring areas of contradiction and vagueness is a principle 
taught in academic training. Not only is this "precisely the wrong spirit in which to 
approach analysis" (Gill, 1996: 145), but it is problematic if it does not analyse the 
features of the text. It also implies there is a reality `beyond the text' that can be 
described, rather than concentrating on the construction of the text itself. Taylor 
(2001b: 320) notes that material on sensitive topics may be so powerful that a novice 
researcher is tempted to let it speak for itself: "however, this does not constitute 
academic analysis... analysis must involve more systematic investigation" Similarly, 
McGhee and Miell (1998: 67) argue that the act of summarising risks losing the 
"subtle nuances and connotations of specific words used, particular turns of phrase 
and idiomatic vocabularies". 
I agree that this is indeed a shortcoming when it occurs. However, it may be harder to 
avoid than perhaps it seems. Indeed, even those who highlight such a shortcoming 
may be seen to engage in a form of it themselves. For example, in one passage Potter 
(1997: 5) lists examples of where the phrase `economical with the truth' is mentioned 
1 Following Barman's (2003: 1) consideration of Antaki et al. 's paper, similarly I wish to offer these 
comments "in a general sense of sympathy and agreement with their arguments". 
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in a search of newspaper articles. The examples are not analysed but are taken at face 
value to make an analytical point about their occurrence and frequency. Furthermore, 
Potter (1997: 174) can also be seen to be summarising and rephrasing what is being 
said, as this extract from his text, including the data extract, shows: 
"A newspaper article about the poet Philip Larkin's meeting with Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher illustrates a more complex use of the same idea: 
He had been introduced to her once before, at a reception in 
Downing Street in 1980, and liked to tell the story that as she 
welcomed him she said: `Oh Dr Larkin, I am a great admirer of 
your poems. ' `Quote me a line then'. [... ] Larkin says that Mrs 
Thatcher misquoted the line: `Her mind was full of knives'. 
`I took that as a great compliment' [... ] `I thought if it weren't 
spontaneous, she'd have got it right' (Independent on Sunday, 
3'd July 1994 - emphasis added). 
Note the way that Larkin is reported to have used Mrs Thatcher's failure to 
get the quote precisely right as an indication that she actually knew the poem, 
but was having to recover it from memory. " 
Is it the case that Potter is summarising and not analysing in this sentence? There 
may well be many instances that Antaki et al. are referring to that are much more 
problematic than this, and I do not doubt the validity of their claim. But is this sort of 
sentence as used by Potter needed to move the text along, make it readable and 
present a flowing argument? This touches on what is a key part of many of the 
dilemmas considered in this chapter - the constraints of academic writing. A text 
must be coherent, and that may mean summarising to help the argument along. This 
is not to say that summary alone is enough; clearly it does not constitute analysis. But 
it might have a role to play. 
To summarise data is to lose the crucial detail in it, and in this research I have made 
efforts not to do this. It may be useful at times, however, to introduce data with a 
brief description of it. This has been done as rarely and as conscientiously as 
possible. It is also noted that a way of `getting to grips' with the data is to read it, get 
a gist of what it is saying, and then analyse it closely to understand why a particular 
reading has been gained from it2. I would therefore argue that while brief and careful 
summary certainly does not constitute analysis, as long as analysis follows, then it 
may be acceptable. This is what I have done. 
ides 4.1.2 Takin sides 
A second shortcoming that Antaki et al. identify is "under-analysis through taking 
sides" (2003: 4). Remaining agnostic towards accounts is key in discursive 
approaches (see for example Wooffitt, 2001: 49). In her work on patients with M. E. 
(myalgic encephalomyelitis), Horton-Salway says that "rather than taking up a 
position on the debate and offering my own explanations and definitions of M. E., my 
analysis of the data will focus on how the participants (mostly doctors and sufferers) 
make sense of its causes and definitions" (2001 a: 147). Antaki et al. state that 
2 Potter (1988: 48) for example says that "the analyst constantly has to ask: why am I reading the 
passage in this way? And what features of the discourse allow me to produce this reading? " 
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inclusion of a moral, political or personal stance towards the quoted text does not 
constitute DA (2003: 9). Taylor (2001b: 320) agrees and argues that DA " should be 
coherent, depending for its persuasiveness on argument, rather than, say, emotional 
impact. " Antaki et al. (2003: 4) point out that taking sides may sometimes be subtle or 
implicit, and give examples such as an analyst saying that: 
"the speaker `realises' or `appreciates' how relationships need hard work. Or 
the analyst might add that the respondent `takes seriously' the idea of marital 
commitment and `sees the problems' of divorce". 
Antaki et al. argue that this indicates that "the analyst is aligning himself or herself 
with the position taken by the respondent", and that crucially, this support alone does 
not constitute analysis of the discourse. They do acknowledge the debate within 
different forms of DA about this point, and even amongst themselves; those working 
in CDA might specifically align themselves with a particular text. The point is that 
alignment on its own does not constitute analysis. I agree; but the likelihood of 
remaining agnostic needs to be considered. Can an analyst remain calm and distant in 
receipt of a harrowing account? I have no wish to `bang on the furniture'3 to stress 
that some things, such as accounts of violence or abuse are `obviously harrowing'; but 
if a participant presents their account as upsetting or traumatic, then the analyst may 
be able to understand it in this way. Can they then remain detached from it? I think it 
is essential to be agnostic, and I have attempted to be impartial to the accounts 
analysed; indeed, where I felt that agnosticism might not be possible, I abandoned this 
element of the research (this is fully considered in Chapter Six). 
4.1.3 Over-quotation 
A third point that Antaki et al. make concerns "under-analysis through over- 
quotation", where a large amount of data are presented with little analysis of them. 
(2003: 4). However, there are instances where those who highlight this shortcoming 
appear to engage in it - MacMillan and Edwards (1999: 155-6) for example list eight 
extracts from newspaper articles in order to make their point, without individual 
analysis or deconstruction of them. Antaki et al. say that over-quotation is not a 
substitute for analysis, and I agree that a collection of extracts showing the same 
feature is not DA. But again, the practical conditions of carrying out DA have to be 
considered. It is tempting to list instances of a phenomenon to substantiate the claim 
about its existence and significance. This relates to academic credibility and peer 
approval. It is also a function of the nature of DA, where generalisations or statistical 
associations cannot be produced in the same way as other quantitative or qualitative 
approaches. In this research, I have attempted analysis of all extracts of data rather 
than merely listing several as examples of a phenomenon; where two are given, a 
comparison is being made. 
There are other points that Antaki et al. make that I agree with and which I have 
followed in this research. For example, they point to the danger of "circularly 
identifying mental constructs", and an interpretation of discourse as the expression of 
some "underlying realm of thoughts, ideas, attitudes or opinions, where the nature of 
those underlying thoughts and opinions is given in the talk itself" (2003: 13). This is 
3A reference to the Edwards et al. (1995) paper previously discussed, in which they describe how 
critics of their approach accuse them of ignoring what is real, and may bang on a table to `prove' that it, 
and other things, exist. 
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of course problematic, as it has been convincing argued that language is not a 
reflection of an inner cognitive state4. I have attempted to avoid implying that 
discourse is representative of a mental realm. Furthermore, Antaki et al. point to the 
problem of "under-analysis through isolated quotation, where a single quote is 
selected and allowed to `stand for itself as if it required no further comment" 
(2003: 11). As they point out, "quotation, like summarising, is not discourse analysis 
in itself". Again, I have analysed all data extracts to understand how they make a 
particular impression, rather than leaving that impression to speak for itself. I have 
similarly tried to avoid what they describe as "under-analysis through false summary" 
(2003: 15), implying that the data are representative of a (section of) the world at 
large. Antaki et al. argue that DA means doing analysis; and I have tried to 
demonstrate this throughout. 
I have so far drawn on the critiques of DA research made by Antaki et al.. I will now 
discuss the other issues that have arisen in the course of this research. 
4.2 Intention 
The first point may be one of clarification. It concerns whether participants 
deliberately construct their accounts. For example, Potter (1997: 174) states of his 
data that "we can see that it is highly selective and carefully organised". This 
certainly implies intention, as does the description of a participant who is stated to 
"cleverly use this requirement.. as a resource" (Speer and Potter, 2000: 553). 
However, this may be more a product of the research style, rather than necessarily 
meaning to imply that people do intentionally construct their discourse in particular 
ways. Indeed, Potter (1997: 46) points out that the form of analysis can imply 
conscious planning. Instead, it is possible to consider "utterances being fitted to 
contexts in ways that perform actions without necessarily involving the speaker in 
thought-out, strategic planning". He points out that we are "familiar and skilled" at 
everyday conversation. Even when analysis of such conversations has revealed their 
complex organisation, he argues that it makes sense to describe this skill and design 
"without implying planning and strategy" (1997: 46). As Wetherell and Potter 
(1988: 171), and Gill (1996: 142) point out, people may just be `doing what comes 
naturally' or saying `what seems right' for the situation, rather than be strategically 
planning, or self consciously adjusting their discourse. 
Potter (1997: 64) therefore states that it may be "most analytically fruitful" to remain 
agnostic about whether speakers intentionally and strategically design their discourse. 
While it is not inconceivable that they plan the effects of their interaction, he states 
that it is doubtful that this happens most of the time. The point is that is it not 
possible for the analyst to distinguish between the two. It seems the aim is to analyse 
how a particular effect may be achieved, and not to be concerned with whether it was 
deliberate. This is relevant for this research where it may be presupposed that the 
groups planned at least some of the texts studied here. Press releases for example are 
4 For example by Potter and Wetherell (1987); Edwards and Potter (1992); Antaki (1994); Wetherell 
(1998); Moloney and Walker (2002); Seymour-Smith et al (2002); and McGhee and Miell (1998). 
SLawes (1999: 5) points out the danger that implying a deliberate construction risks implying 
underlying cognitive processes at work. As she says, this is incompatible with the focus that DA has 
on language, which does not suppose that certain mental attributes can be measured. 
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likely to be carefully written. Indeed, the planning of texts can be seen from the 
chan ges made to them, and I highlight where these occur and the effects that they 
have . In doing so, it does not matter whether these were intended or not. 
4.3 Generalisation 
A second point of clarification concerns the degree to which DA research can be 
generalised. There seems to be some disagreement about this. For example, Gill 
(1996: 155) highlights that DA does not aim to uncover "universal processes", and 
moreover points out that "discourse analysts are critical of the idea that such 
generalizations are possible". She states that discourse is always constructed from 
particular interpretative resources and always designed for specific interpretative 
contexts: "In short, all discourse is occasioned; there are no trans-historical, trans- 
cultural, universal accounts". Results from DA and other approaches will therefore 
differ: analysis identifies "normative patterns" rather than aiming for "statistical 
generalizations" (Puchta and Potter, 2002: 351; Te Molder, 1999: 249). 
On the other hand, there are instances where it is implied or stated that DA findings 
can be generalised. Findings may be offered as generalisable from one account to 
another within a particular group. Wetherell and Potter (1988: 173) for example state 
that they chose a "relatively large sample by DA standards because we were 
particularly interested in the generality of our conclusions across a wide group". 
Taylor (2001a: 25) notes that patterns observed in one account may be repeated in 
further examples, and Potter et al. (1990: 213) state that "one of the striking things 
about studying the talk of fifty or so interviewees on a particular topic is the restricted 
and indeed stereotypical set of terms and tropes that occur again and again". 
Moreover, the possibility of generalisation across different contexts as well as within 
them is suggested. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 16 1) note that an effect described in 
one text may have relevance for other diverse areas. Potter seems quite adamant 
about this, depicting the "generality" of questions concerning the production of 
factual discourse (1997: 2). He describes how he draws on a wide selection of 
materials because of his "conviction that there are general features of fact 
construction" (1997: 8). Potter identifies a number of themes used in constructing 
such discourse, and argues that they are "persuasive and recurrent" (1997: 205). He 
even argues that DA is a valuable method of study because, "although the details of 
what is talked about may be endlessly varied, the sorts of procedures for constructing 
and managing descriptions may be much more regular, and therefore tractable in 
analysis" (1997: 112). Furthermore, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984: 39) suggest that the 
ability to generalise findings can be tested by collecting further data: "Evidence will 
be required from many more research papers and from other research areas in order to 
establish any degrees of generality for our conclusions". 
There seems to be a contradiction between the principle that all interaction is 
dependent on context, and the assertion that themes and processes can be generalised 
6 It could be argued that written accounts are more likely to have been deliberately constructed than 
spoken ones. Potter's comments here, as in the majority of DA theory and empirical studies, relate to 
interaction, and not directly to written texts. While much of the theoretical debate can be related to 
documents, this seems to be a something of an omission in the literature. So for example, while this 
point about intention has some validity for written texts, there are clearly vast differences between 
impromptu conversations and situations where it is possible to extensively plan texts. 
31 
across different contexts. Can it be that while discourse is not generalisable and it 
cannot be claimed that a particular effect is in general use, it is possible to illustrate 
other occasions where it is? It could be that the different conceptions of the ability to 
generalise reflect different approaches to DA. Edley and Wetherell (1999: 182) imply 
this when they state that their analysis is "grounded in that strand of discourse theory 
which pays attention to the more global patterns in collective sense making". But 
other discursive researchers also apply the same concepts to different situations, 
meaning attention is focused on whether certain themes or processes are present in the 
data. This relates to whether concepts are imposed on the data or generated from 
what participants say. I will now consider this. 
4 .4 Participants' orientations 
A key principle in DA is the primary importance of `participants' orientations'. This 
is an "imperative" in discursive work, where attention is directed at what is going on 
for the participants themselves, within any given sequence of interaction (Edley, 
2001: 190). Antaki (1994: 4) describes how this might work in practice. Analysts 
consider how participants use words and meanings because "it is less profitable for 
the analyst to track down the (given) meaning of an utterance than it is to watch for 
how it is responded to by those to whom it is addressed, or more generally, to read its 
significance from its surrounding context taken at some grain of fineness"7 . It is 
stressed that analysts should try to understand both the meanings that language has for 
participants, and the way that they use language. As Psathas states, he ".. make[s] 
every effort to use only those terms which members might or could use" (1990: 6). 
However, it seems this principle is not always followed. For example, Wetherell and 
Potter (1988: 169) seem to suggest that analysts can discern things about the use of 
language by participants that they themselves may not be aware of: "discourse.. has 
wider repercussions of its own which may not have been formulated or even 
understood by the speaker or writer". They go on to state that "choice of terminology 
can have subtle effects which may be overlooked by speakers", and that "neither users 
or receivers of this discourse need be intentionally aware of these consequences when 
formulating their description" (1988: 170). Can it be that the `analyst knows best'? 
These questions may be usefully illustrated by extracts from a debate in the journal 
Discourse and Society between Michael Billig and Emmanuel Schegloff. It addressed 
various matters about approaches to language, and some of Billig's points in 
particular are relevant here (even though mainly oriented to conversation analysis 
(CA)). Billig (1999a: 543) argues that CA uses a specialist rhetoric which is literally 
not participants' own terms. Schegloff et al. 's (1990: 3 1) previous CA work gives an 
example of this; they describe a concern with ".. the phenomena of `correction' (or, as 
we shall refer to it, `repair').. ". As Billig points out, such use of analysts' 
classifications contradict the aim in CA of "taking seriously the object of inquiry in its 
own terms" (Schegloff, 1997: 171, emphasis in original), and imposes categories upon 
peoples' interaction. As he says: 
1This of course accounts to a certain extent for the preference for interactional data rather than written 
texts noted earlier. 
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"There is no doubt that CA uses a highly technical vocabulary. This creates 
a paradox. Although participants are ostensibly to be studied `in their own 
terms', they are not to be written about in such terms. The speakers, 
conventionally studied by CA, do not talk of `adjacency pairs', `preference 
structures', `receipt designs', `self-repairs', etc. Instead, analysts use their 
own terms to accomplish this observation of participants' own terms [.. ] 
The difference between the analyst's rhetoric and the vernacular of the 
participants is more than merely a difference in vocabulary. Analysts are 
attending to matters that the speakers do not. " (Billig, (1999a: 546): 
Billig (1999a: 547) considers whether this use of specialist terms is a necessary feature 
of CA. He cites Sharrock and Anderson, who argue that analysts do not focus on 
features of talk that `are readily observable' by speakers, with the result that CA 
"necessarily disattends to what actors may see as the business of their talk, in favour 
of the activities which actors engage in solely by virtue of their character as operators 
of a speech exchange system' (1987: 246). 
But is it necessary for analysts to move beyond the data in order to analyse it, and is a 
focus purely on participants' orientations an impossible ideal? Antaki (1994: 161) 
certainly seems to think so, and argues that "to make claims about the rhetorical 
effects of what people are up to in their conversations, one needs to make inferences 
which necessarily take some steps away from the information given. " 
Although Billig was referring to CA, his points are applicable to DA. It not only uses 
some CA terms and concepts8, but has others of its own, such as `interpretative 
repertoire'9. It seems doubtful whether any participants would state that they had 
been using an "interpretative repertoire" in their account. While the meanings that 
participants use may be addressed, their texts are examined for features that they may 
not consider to be the most pertinent, and are described in terms that they certainly do 
not use and that may not be understood by them. 
45 Imposition or unmotivated looking? 
This relates to a further debate about whether analysts engage in `unmotivated 
looking' at a text or have preconceived ideas about what might be there. If the 
orientations of participants take precedence in DA, what does this mean for the 
process of analysis? 
Firstly, the stress on this as a principle is clear. Psathas (1990: 3) states that "the first 
stages of such research can be characterised as `unmotivated looking'. No particular, 
pre-selected topics or phenomena are being searched for". He goes on to state that 
"we are seeking to discover phenomena, not validate prior conceptualisations and 
interpretations about phenomena" (1990: 7). The data should not be examined for pre- 
existing ideas, nor categories imposed upon on it. Taylor (2001a: 38) reiterates this: 
"the researcher is looking for patterns in the data but is not entirely sure what these 
8 After all, Potter (1996: 6-7) has argued that a basic grasp of CA is necessary to undertake DA. 
9 Drawing on definitions from previous research, this may be described as a culturally recognised set of 
related resources including terms, descriptions, and tropes that are drawn on by speakers to construct 
versions of a phenomena (see for example Potter, 1996: 4; Seymour-Smith et al, 2002: 255; Lawes, 
1999: 6; Wooffitt, 1992: 61). 
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will look like or what their significance will be. She or he must therefore approach 
the data with a certain blind faith, with a confidence that there is something there but 
with no certainty about what". Indeed, Wiggins and Potter (2003: 518) explain that 
analysis should "identify and highlight phenomena that have not previously been 
subject to empirical study". 
But to what extent is this possible? Antaki (1994: 138) describes how features of 
language use are not simply apparent but require identification by the analyst. In 
order to do this and to persuade readers about the effects of genre, positioning and the 
effects of conversational sequencing, analysts are obliged to "do homework in 
stylistics, pragmatics and conversation analysis". This implies that analysts do not 
come to the data with an `open mind', but with ideas, tools, and techniques not only in 
mind, but rehearsed and ready to apply. For example, MacMillan and Edwards 
(1999: 153) state that they use "technical analytical categories", which are drawn from 
CA, rhetoric, linguistics, and other literature on discourse, "in so far as they help to 
explicate analytic claims". Indeed, Wetherell (2001b: 395-6) points out that looking 
at data without preconceptions is impossible because analysis always takes place from 
a position of prior assumptions and theorising. This seems particularly pertinent in 
DA, where experience and apprenticeship are an appropriate way to learn (I expand 
on this in section 5.1). 
The aim of `unmotivated looking' also has to be balanced against the need for 
research to build on existing studies. Potter makes this quite explicit: "my hope is that 
these themes will provide an analytic start point and stimulus for researchers to take 
the topic of descriptions further" (1997: 206). There seems to be a parallel here to the 
nature of scientific work (Collins, 1985). Is it the case that while the real credit comes 
from discovering something `new"°, the established discoveries still have to be 
acknowledged, so their authorship is recognised, there is no danger of reinventing the 
discursive wheels 1, and to prove the analyst's apprenticeship and authority in the 
field? When Taylor (2001a: 22) outlines that researchers should design studies to 
build cumulatively on previous findings, the point seems to be to apply previously 
`discovered' phenomena to new data (see also Antaki et al., 2003: 16; Wetherell et al., 
2001b: 6). But there is still the issue of imposing these previously found categories on 
the data. Billig (1999b: 574) contends that prior judgements cannot be avoided: "the 
analyst, in order to conduct the analysis, must bring presuppositions about the nature 
of the interaction". 
How does this apply in this research? I have sought a balance between focusing on 
what authors are doing in their accounts, and imposing categories of analysis on them. 
I have applied concepts from previous research, but made efforts to show how these 
are matter for participants, even if they would not use or recognise the terms. While 
this may not constitute `unmotivated looking', I do not think this is possible. I first 
read my data without any ideas as to what it might contain; but then it is impossible to 
chart where this ends and the recognition of concepts or devices begins. It is also of 
note that this is a thesis, has to be firmly situated within previous research, and 
demonstrate knowledge and understanding of it. 
10 A point eluded to by Potter and Wetherell (1987: 171). 
21 There is little point and no credit in for example `discovering' that when items are grouped in threes, 
speakers orient to the third part as a sign of completion - this should reference Jefferson (1990: 63). 
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In summary, while there is an emphasis on examining `participants' orientations' in 
data without any preconceptions, this may be unrealistic because the previous 
research will be known about, and referencing it may be required for academic 
credibility. Is it the case that reflexively acknowledging this is the only way to 
proceed, rather than striving for an impossible ideal of `unmotivated looking' for 
participants' orientations? 
4.6 Context 
The next issue is the importance of context. A fundamental principle in DA is the 
contingent, indexical nature of language. Potter (1997: 4) says that "the simple point 
here is that people do not produce descriptions out of the blue; they produce them for 
what they can do in some stream of activity", a point echoed by Antaki (1994); Tuffin 
and Howard (2001: 198); Jackson and Cram (2003: 16), and McGhee and Miell 
(1998: 66). As Moloney and Walker (2002: 317) describe, the variability in talk means 
context is crucial, and is a way of understanding this. Language use is contingent on 
the context in which it is produced 12. 
The amount of context necessary to give an account meaning varies according to the 
approach taken (Wetherell, 2001b: 387). Conversation analysts might onl include 
contextual factors to the extent that participants refer to them in their talk 3. In 
contrast, critical discourse analysts would argue that understanding an interaction 
requires knowledge of the social, historical and cultural context; moreover, it is a 
knowledge of these conditions that determines which interactions will be examined. 
Wetherell (2001b) argues that these differences reflect different approaches. What 
she does not go on to say is that there is debate about this within, as well as between 
approaches. 
Considering the amount of context deemed necessary, Wetherell says that context 
may only be relevant for analysts in terms of what participants are trying to achieve: 
"identities, narratives, and versions can be understood in terms of the work they do in 
the immediate interaction and, once again, relevance is an issue for participants rather 
than analysts" (2001b: 388)14. Is this workable in practice? In contrast, Taylor 
explicitly argues that the meaning language has derives both from an institutional and 
interactional context (2001a: 7, emphasis added). Billig (1991: 18-9) stresses that "the 
strategic interactions of individuals, who are greeting, blaming, excusing, etc, each 
other, occur within a wider social patterning. Even the words they use have a history, 
which is echoed in the present... in addition to the immediate context in which 
opinions are expressed, there is also a wider context". It may therefore not only be 
12 It is important to note the two meanings of `context' in which an utterance or sentence is important. 
The first is an institutional context, such as a classroom, a courtroom, a casual conversation; the second 
is an interactional context, meaning the series of utterances in which something is said and oriented to; 
for example Potter (1997: 4) describes a phrase being "occasioned by its context", where it may be a 
response to one given previously. This is perhaps similar to Schegloff s (1992) distinction between an 
external (or distal) context, and a proximate context. 
13 See for example Psathas (1990: 5) who argues that "we will not undertake to define the phenomena of 
interaction since, from the epistemological position on which such work is based, no stipulative 
position would be sensible. Interactional phenomena are discoverable matters". 
14 Indeed, it has been noted that institutional contexts only exist when the participants orient to them; 
Lawes (1999: 17) for example describes how the appearance of something such as a research interview 
is produced through the interaction of those involved, a point reiterated by Speer (2002: 512). 
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that the wider context is important for participants and for the meaning of language 
use, but that analysts could not examine the data without an understanding of what 
this context might be: Gill (1996: 147) says that "without an awareness of the social, 
political and cultural trends and contexts to which our texts refer, we would be unable 
to carry out any analysis". 
A question then arises: if it is necessary to describe an institutional as well an 
interactional context, how might this be done? One answer is to give details of a 
wider context - but this means moving beyond the data. Firstly, this may lead to data 
and background information becoming confused or intertwined: "it can be argued that 
including in the data the information that, say, one speaker is female and one is male 
amounts to a claim that gender is relevant to the interaction, when perhaps it is not" 
(Taylor, 2001a: 25). Secondly, any description given of the context will be a 
constructed version of it. Any features described will be the analyst's selection, and 
of course will not be `neutral' 15. As Antaki says, details of a context will be "the 
analyst's culturally informed reading of it" (1994: 130). Thirdly, how can a wider 
context be presented to readers for validation, if it is based on the analyst's account 
and not directly on the data? I will return to this point in the next section. 
An alternative answer would therefore be to avoid descriptions of context, and present 
enough data that it becomes apparent. But how much data is necessary to allow 
readers to assess both the relevant institutional and interactional context? 
One option is to present all the data; this might allow an understanding of the 
particular institutional context to which the participants are orienting, and the 
particular interaction that an extract comes from. However, academic constraints, 
limits on space and reader patience render this problematic (I will expand on this in 
the next section). Further, it maybe difficult to determine just what `all the data' is. 
Any selection of a topic and the data related to it is the choice of the analyst. These 
choices are not merely a reflection of what is `out there' or is `obviously' relevant. 
Others might select the data differently 16, and there will always be data excluded in a 
study. As there are no boundaries around `the data' for a `topic', including `all the 
data' becomes a problematic notion. 
A second option is therefore a necessary selection of the data studied. But this may 
not be simple. Antaki (1988: 12) argues that a "sentence ripped out of a transcript is 
all but impossible to make sense of, and even a reasonably long extract is thought by 
some to be unintelligible". In later work he cites Condor (1990) to argue that to "crop 
extracts from transcripts may be to alter significantly the meaning they had at the 17 time" (Antaki, 1994: 125). Potter and Wetherell give a data extract that is 126 lines 
's potter (1997: 133) for example draws attention to the "problem I am having giving a `neutral' 
description of the `thing' that is subject to competing description". He also acknowledges that "the 
search for non-metaphorical language within which to discuss metaphor is futile, or, at very least, it 
begs the question of what literal uses of language would be" (1997: 180). This point is reiterated by 
Gill (1996: 147) who points out that "to say that an awareness of the context of discourse is vital is not 
to imply that this can be neutrally and unproblematically described". 
16 As Potter and Wetherell (1987: 7) note about their selection of data: "[n]aturally we have been guided 
by our own value judgements as to what is the most productive and interesting. Others will look at the 
field differently". 
" This is not of course automatically to assume that participants had a definite meaning, or that it can 
be known, but that taking extracts out of context and attempting to understand them is problematic. 
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long and covers four pages in their article. Even this they state is a "relatively 
disembodied example" (1988: 154). 
It is clear that a balance is required between the meaningful presentation of extracts 
and allowing readers to validate work; and infinite data collection and limits on space 
and patience. Whatever position is reached will not be ideal. In this research, I have 
described and referred to a wider context, to make the data meaningful to readers. I 
do not pretend that this was an objective summary of the situation' ; the overview of 
ECS in the Introduction was of course deliberately constructed. Aspects were 
highlighted that proponents in the debate would question, and it was in no way a 
neutral account. It was also constructed to be persuasive about the importance of the 
issue, and therefore the value of studying it. But I consider such an account was 
necessary so that readers can make sense of the purpose of the research. Perhaps what 
is important is to acknowledge the contingent, constructed nature of such contextual 
description, to avoid giving the impression that it is possible to have access to the 
`facts' of the issue, or that some language is neutral and may be unproblematically 
used. Furthermore, I would argue (and demonstrate in analysis) that the wider context 
is oriented to by participants. I have aimed to highlight when and how this occurs in 
the data. Potter (1988: 48) advocates presenting as much data as is "manageable" and 
ensuring that any selection is as representative as possible of the materials studied. I 
have followed this to allow validation of this by readers. This leads into a 
consideration of exactly how that might take place. 
4.7 Validation 
While validity is an issue in all research (and I will compare DA and other research 
more fully shortly), in DA there are no facts to which analysis can be compared. As 
Taylor says, for DA research this may amount to a "crisis", because the researcher 
"cannot claim to offer `objective' knowledge of reality" (2001a: 12). Seale points out 
that conceptions of reliability and replicability are rooted in a "realist view of a single 
external reality knowable through language" (1990: 4 1), and "validity in this tradition 
refers to nothing less than truth, known through language referring to a stable social 
reality (1990: 34)". For discourse analysts, different criteria for evaluation are 
required. 
DA therefore has particular methods of validation. Potter (1996: 11-12) recognises 
that even though conventional measures of validity and reliability are not useful here, 
and that there is less of distinction between them than in conventional research, the 
concepts are still important. The five methods that Potter (1996) and Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) describe will be briefly described here. 
The first of these is to ensure coherence. Analysis should show how the discourse fits 
together and how discursive structures produce effects and functions (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987: 170). Potter (1996: 11) argues that each new study provides a check 
on the adequacy of the previous studies on which it draws; those studies which 
illuminate aspects of interaction may be built on, while those that do not are likely to 
become ignored, a point also made in Edwards and Potter (1993: 33)19. This clearly 
1s Or of course that such a thing could be achieved. 
19 This confirms again the way in which research is carried out in the light of previous work. 
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also relates back to the generalisation of DA research; `valid' studies may be applied 
to further research. 
The second method is to consider deviant cases; indeed, Potter (1996: 11) says that 
cases apparently contradicting a pattern are some of the most useful analytic 
phenomena. He argues that in DA research "deviant cases are not necessarily 
disconfirmations of the pattern (although they could be); instead their special features 
may help confirm the genuineness of the pattern"; the exception proves the rule. 
Indeed, Puchta and Potter (2002: 349) argue that because analysis is concerned with 
identifying patterns rather than a general statistical association, analysis of potential 
deviant cases is particularly important for supporting the adequacy of claims. 
The third method of validation is an emphasis on `participants' orientations': "when 
looking at variability and consistency, it is not sufficient to say that as analysts we can 
see that these statements are consistent and these dissonant; the important things is the 
orientation of participants, what they see as consistent and different. " (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987: 170). I have already noted that DA privileges participants' 
perspectives over those of the analyst. Potter (1996: 11) describes the oft cited critique 
that there is no assessment of DA interpretations, but states that a close attention to 
participants' understandings provides one kind of check. 
Fourth, Potter and Wetherell describe the criterion of 'fruitfulness'. This is "the scope 
of an analytic scheme to make sense of new kinds of discourse and to generate novel 
explanations" (1987: 171). This also relates back to the balance between 
acknowledging existing research, and finding new and interesting concepts. 
Finally, Potter (1996: 12) states that "perhaps the most important and distinctive 
feature in the validation of discourse work is the presentation of rich and extended 
materials in a way that allows readers of discourse studies to evaluate their adequacy". 
As Potter and Wetherell (1987: 172) make clear, a DA report is more than a 
presentation of the findings, it is part of the process of confirmation and validation; 
and potter (1997: 105-6) states that "if we have a transcribed record of discourse, 
rather than a set of formulations in note form, it places the reader of the research in a 
much stronger position to evaluate the claims and interpretations". This follows 
Sacks's ideal of work "where the reader has as much information as the author, and 
can reproduce the analysis" (1992: I, 27)20. 
In conclusion, Potter (1996: 12) does add the caveat that not every study will combine 
all these measures; nor do they guarantee the validity of DA research, as there can be 
no such thing as a guarantee. In relation to this, it is useful to draw out a comparison 
between DA and other forms of research. Indeed, some of the methods of validation 
20 Of course, the reader may not want to examine all the data presented; analysis is the job of the 
analyst. This seems similar to the fascination in natural science with replication, which is a 
fundamental principle but rarely carried out. Replications of experiments are usually only carried out 
by students learning how to do them - and if the experiment doesn't work, there is a presumption of 
student error. But replicability is a standard that is used in science, and this standard is not 
compromised by questions of whether or not anyone actually does it (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). 
Similarly in DA, there is the ideal, in theory at least, that the analysis can be opened up, the data 
presented, and the reader invited to consider whether they would come to the same conclusions. 
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are apparently similar. Lofland and Lofland's (1984) comments about deviant cases 
and coherence in ethnography are remarkably similar to DA. Lieblich et al. (1998) 
describe how they gave interviewees the analysis of their interviews to check that they 
had understood them properly. The desirability of generating `novel explanations', 
and doing so by presenting a report are common to researchers (Dey, 1993). 
However, the point is that the enactment of these procedures is based on the 
proposition that it is possible to get closer to the truth, and that research can be more 
or less successful in achieving this. While this may be apparent as a principle of 
quantitative research, where a survey can be made more accurate and free from 
distortions and bias (de Vaus, 1993), this is also applicable to qualitative methods 
such as ethnography, unstructured interviews, or documentary analysis. Referring to 
documents, MacDonald and Tipton (1993: 199) say that achieving validity requires a 
"triangulation of research strategies"; more data can be collected to provide a check 
on the accuracy of the results. In ethnography, Fielding (1993: 167) notes that 
"objective observation is hopeless to achieve", but lists various procedures to 
"evaluate the quality of observation in terms of possible error and bias". Remarkably 
similar concerns are expressed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) about grounded theory. 
Silverman (1985), Denzin (1988), and May (1997) all highlight that the development 
of methods in such a search for `truth' can seem to deny the interpretations and 
creations of the social world by the people in it; but even an in-depth ethnography 
assesses whether the account produced is a valid reflection of that particular social 
setting. In other research, validity is the relationship between the analysis and the 
topic; in DA, validity is the relationship between the analysis and the data, because 
that data is the topic. 
4.7.1 Considerations about validation 
I will now reflect on the measures for validation of DA I have just described. It is 
interesting to consider is how these seemingly straightforward criteria may be 
implemented in practice, and what they imply about the very nature of DA work. 
will address four aspects of validation in practice. 
4.7.2 Validation and volume 
First, there are considerations concerning volume of data. If readers are to validate 
analysis by examining the data and comparing their conclusions, this would mean 
presenting all the original data: Psathas (1990: 15) argues that a report should "include 
all or as much of the data.. as the researcher actually analysed in developing the 
description and the analysis". As I considered in section 4.6, is this possible in 
practice? 
One problem is the permitted length of journal articles. Reicher (2000: 6) says this is 
particularly pertinent when "dealing with data that is not amenable to summary and to 
compression". Indeed, he goes onto ask whether journal word limits may actually 
indirectly discriminate against certain forms of research. To a certain extent, this 
depends on the data. MacMillan and Edwards (1998) for example append the full text 
of a newspaper article that they studied to their paper; but as this was just one article, 
it was possible. It would not be possible to append the transcripts of 50 interviews. 
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Taylor (2001a: 41-2) says this means analysts will usually have to leave out most of 
their material, especially in larger scale projects21. 
One solution is to present summaries of the data. Taylor (2001a: 42) describes how 
Brown (1999), in his study of self-help books, presents summaries of the narratives 
and devices found, illustrated with brief quotations. But while this means analytic 
claims can be based on large quantities of data, it is difficult to validate them because 
the data is not presented and participants' orientations can be less easily assessed 22 
Data presentation and summary was considered in section 4.6; the point is that this 
has implications for validity as well as for the context and detail of an account. 
Another solution is to attempt to compromise over volume. Puchta and Potter 
(2002: 349) do so by presenting one instance of each phenomenon: "this is a 
compromise between journal space and reader patience on the one hand, and allowing 
the reader the option to assess our analysis of a range of examples on the other". 
They then referred readers to their other publications with more details in them. 
Yearley (1981: 412) resolved this difficultly by acknowledging that his description of 
his data involved a "clearly a certain amount of `glossing"', but implies that this is 
unproblematic because the paper he analysed "can be checked in a number of major 
libraries and is relatively short". By providing some `raw data'23, the discourse 
analyst is opening their work up for verification. But in DA this is a fundamental 
principle; is this apparent compromise enough? 
4.7.3 Validation and extracts 
Second, there are considerations about the presentation of data extracts. In the 
previous section I addressed the effect of selecting extracts on context and meaning. 
There are others difficulties that pertain to validation. Taylor (2001a: 42) describes the 
difficulty of finding appropriate examples to illustrate general claims: a feature which 
appears across a large sample may not be visible in a short extract. She also makes 
the point, developed by Antaki et al. (2003), that the richness of discourse data means 
an extract offered as an example of a particular feature may be open to further 
analysis, distracting from the point it was intended to illustrate. This may mean 
having to ignore features in a large data extract, or trying to present meaningful 
occurrences in a shorter one, which leads to drawing on information outside the text to 
make it meaningful, which is difficult to validate.. and so on. 
Furthermore, the examples that are chosen will have been extracted, cut, and 
presented by the analyst; they do not exist as ready-made example of a feature. 
Antaki (1994: 126-7) highlights some analysis and data extracts presented by 
McNaghten (1993). He points out that "what McNaghten does is to pick out those 
passages in the stream of text and written evidence that hint most strongly at the 
discourse which informs what participants are saying". There is of course every 
21 This is of course true of almost all methods - it would not be practical to append thousands of 
completed survey questionnaires to an article. But quantitative survey work has different methods of 
validation than DA. So while it might be useful to attach a blank questionnaire to assess whether the 
wording would have generated bias, the answers respondents give will be summarised in the article 
itself. In DA, this validation comes from examination of this data itself. 
22 While it would of course be possible for the reader to access the original texts, for example by 
borrowing them from a library, it seems unlikely that they would be inclined to make this effort. 
23 Taking into account Speer's (2002) point about the difficulty of drawing a distinction between 
`naturally occurring' and `contrived' data. 
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reason to do this; analysts have little real interest in readers not coming to the same 
conclusions as them. Does the necessity of only presenting extracts of the data, which 
the analyst selects and structures, make `validation through presentation' 
meaningless? 
4.7.4 Validation and wrong turns 
Third, there are considerations of how much of the research process can and should be 
validated. The analyst is supposed to "present the data in full and work through the 
analysis to show the reader exactly how the data were interpreted and the conclusions 
were reached" (Taylor, 2001a: 41-2). Wetherell and Potter (1988: 183) furthermore 
state that "the overall goal is to openly present the entire reasoning process from data 
to the conclusions". However, Tuffin and Howard (2001: 200) note that many texts 
fall short of describing the nature of analysis. When Wetherell et al. state that the 
chapters in their book are written by analysts who are "going behind the scenes of 
their published articles to show the reasoning and procedures which led to the finished 
product" (2001 a: ii), this seems to be a rare acknowledgement that research texts are a 
`finished product', not ignoring what Gill (1996: 146) describes as "the hours of 
frustration and apparent dead ends". However, it is unsurprising that examples of the 
processes of reasoning are rare24, as there are clear reasons to avoid this. Of course, 
there may not be the space to expand on the process of analysis. But is there any 
credibility in describing the wrong turns, mistakes, and wasted time that are inevitably 
part of analysis? 
4.7.5 Validation and realism 
There is a fourth consideration about validation. Does maintaining that analysis can 
be substantiated by presenting features in the data on which it is based amount to a 
realist claim about the existence of such features? 
There are apparent examples of this. Seymour-Smith et al. state of their study that 
"analysis of the file proceeded through identifying the main repetitive patterns evident 
in these accounts" (2002: 256, emphasis added). Gilbert and Mulkay point to the 
"direct evidence that the same interpretative pattern is employed in social contexts 
other than that of the interview" (1984: 86). Psathas says that "our claim about what 
the phenomenon is must be based on the phenomenon itself - what any one of us can 
discover and 'see' if we are also brought to a point where we can 'seethe same 
phenomenon" (1990: 8, emphasis added). Indeed, Schegloff states adamantly that: 
"For whatever naturally occurring setting in the world turns out to be 
engaging, observing it carefully, closely, seriously, open-mindedly; observing 
- over and over again - to find what the natural world may be `telling you' 
that you did not know before"(1999b: 581). 
The point seems to be that features in interaction can be seen and discovered, they 
exist there for the analyst to identify them, and furthermore, through the presentation 
of data, their presence can be validated by others. This does seem reminiscent of 
realist critiques of a discursive approach in the paper written by Edwards et al. (1995) 
in which they describe banging on furniture to prove its existence. Is pointing to data 
24 potter and Wetherell's (1995) study of how quantification is used as a tool in cancer research 
campaigns seems to be a unusual example of this, when they describe "telling the story" of their 
research, and that they could have done so in other ways, referring to a range of other contingent 
factors that would "make a good narrative". 
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and saying `there, look, this is the feature, I've seen it and you can too' tantamount to 
hitting a table? 
Billig certainly seems to think so. He discusses this in relation to the imposition of 
preconceived ideas during analysis, and dismisses the "naive methodology and 
epistemology" that conversation analysts use to maintain that they do not impose 
categories on the data25. He says that when they claim to be merely labelling what 
actually exists and can be observed to exist, they "assert that the technical terms 
describe objective realities in an unproblematic way" (1999a: 547). Antaki concurs, 
and gives a pragmatic view of the process: "it can never be the case that a nugget of 
talk will appear before the reader and supposedly prompt the analyst to say `here: this 
clearly shows that such-and-such a thing is happening in this explanation': in 
discourse analysis the hand of the analyst is already needed" (1994: 138). Features 
may not simply exist in the text, but need to be brought into being by the analyst; and 
indeed, Wetherell (2001b: 396) has argued that "findings is the wrong word. The 
results are not found, they are narrated into being"26 . 
Two points can be made in response to this; first, the principle of validation through 
presentation encourages what may seem to be realist declarations about existence. 
Second, this necessary `narration' is not always acknowledged. Does this mean that 
validation through presentation should be used as a way of seeking agreement with 
the claims made, but not as a presumption that what is being highlighted could have 
been made apparent without intervention or `exists'? 
In this research I have attempted to avoid implying a realist orientation to the analysis, 
and presented it as one possible interpretation that may be highlighted by the data - 
but may not. I have used the other considerations about validation to try and find a 
balance between presenting enough data to make the analysis meaningful and possible 
to validate, and overwhelming the reader. I do not wish to pretend that such decisions 
were easy, obvious, or self evident in the data. 
4 .8 Reflexivity 
There are three reflexive issues relevant to this research27. First is the consideration 
that (this) research is constructed. Second, selecting an issue for study involves 
`ontological gerrymandering' about its existence, and using language referentially in 
order to do so. And thirdly, DA deconstructs texts, so the texts that it produces can be 
deconstructed. Are any of these issues a problem? And if so, what can be done about 
there? I consider these issues, and how I dealt with them in this research. 
Firstly then to consider the nature of research. On one level this is because of the 
academic constraints fundamental to all research. Research does not take place in a 
vacuum, but in university departments, or as part of research contracts, bound by 
25 Again, while Billig's comments are directed at CA, they are applicable to DA as well. 
26 The parallels with findings from the sociology of scientific knowledge are clear. These have 
described how scientific inquiry proceeds by stating the objective existence of phenomena, which are 
then brought into being by the work of the scientist, who can then claim to have 'discovered' what 
exists and provide evidence of this that can be validated by others; see for example, Woolgar (1980). 
27 As Cooper points out, reflexivity "resists easy or singular definition" (1997: 272). What I wish to do 
here, rather than attempt definition, it explore those aspects that arose for this research. 
42 
funding criteria, journal regulations, the need for peer approval, and so on, a point 
made by Cooper and Woolgar (1996: 148). As Simons (1989) says, researchers 
inevitably make choices about language, frame issues, design arguments for certain 
audiences, and do not necessarily fit into the mythical image of good scholarship, 
consisting of cold hard logic, devoid of rhetoric. But more than this, research can be 
seen as perhaps implicitly, but also deliberately, constructed. 
For example, Taylor (2001 a: 14) argues that the researcher's identity is relevant to data 
collection. Moreover, Edwards and Potter issue a reminder that discourse analysts 
cannot somehow remove themselves from the research process: "clearly analysis of 
this kind cannot be adequately performed without the analyst drawing on their native 
linguistic competence" (2003: 178-9). Researchers use their own skills and 
understandings to analyse those of others. Potter describes how a particular 
discussion "drew heavily on my own linguistic and cultural intuitions" (1997: 214). 
Indeed, he uses Mulkay's (1981) warnings to point out that researchers may draw on 
their everyday knowledge and resources in unexplicated ways. For example, data is 
only data when it is selected by the researcher; this will be guided by their theoretical 
assumptions both about the topic and discursive work more broadly (Taylor, 
2001 a: 24). 
This leads into the second issue to be considered; the way that topics and data are 
selected, and the implications of doing so. DA research may seek to understand how 
participants present a particular issue. But does identifying this issue amount to 
`ontological gerrymandering'? Woolgar and Pawluch (1985a; 1985b) developed this 
term to describe that while the claims made about issues may be problematised, the 
issues themselves are not. In DA, a research topic is selected. To deny this selection 
would be to engage in realist argument, similarly used in defence of scientific work, 
that phenomena present themselves to the researcher. Such a claim cannot be made in 
DA, which emphasises the constructive power of language, and that the very selection 
of topics constructs their existence. This is related to another point of tension; that 
DA research has both a constructive and a referential view of language. This creates a 
problem for the analyst: Taylor (2001a: 2) states that "On one hand, language is 
assumed to be constitutive. On the other hand, in academia as elsewhere, no one 
entirely abandons the premise that talk and texts convey information about something 
else. So language is also assumed to be referential". As she points out, this is an 
assumed feature of any academic text, including hers, and of course, this one. Billig 
(1991) also makes an interesting comment about the nature of academic argument. 
He cites Habermas' critique of Foucault and Derrida to point out that to argue 
something is to get away from treating all arguments equally, because it means 
arguing counter to something else. As Billig says, "the argumentative act itself 
constitutes a denial of the sort of strict relativism.. it assumes that [some] positions are 
better, stronger, wiser and more convincing than those of... (an] opponent". 
Furthermore, "the expression of the argument assumes its own persuasiveness in 
practice, and, in this case, the theory of argumentation is an instance of the practice of 
argument" (1991: 25). So, while arguments about ECS are treated symmetrically, the 
case being argued about them is only one side, even while it attempts to persuade that 
it is true. 
There are other ways in which academic writing is structured. It is of course shaped 
by its purpose and audience, and so will vary because of this (Taylor, 2001a: 40). It 
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maybe subject to conventions (Cooper and Woolgar, 1996), use examples in a 
deliberate attempt "to keep things interesting" (Potter, 1997: 178), and inevitably fit 
the topic to its restrictions (Antaki, 1994: 1). When Potter (1997: 98) states that he has 
"chosen the construction metaphor on pragmatic grounds", it is apparent that 
academic work is not based solely on relaying information but on practical choices. 
All this construction, of course, is done to benefit the research and add credibility to 
the researcher. Accounts are constructed to convince readers (Potter, 1997: 4), and to 
foster particular impressions of the author (Smith, 2000). As Billig (1999: 545) points 
out, any contrasts that are used are not "rhetorically neutral" but are designed to 
illustrate the particular strengths and weaknesses, in order to make an argument more 
compelling. So when for example Van Dijk (1999: 459) states that ".. in my view 
regrettably so, both critical discourse analysis and conversation analysis generally 
ignore the cognitive basis of discourse and interaction", the choice of the word 
`ignore' here is significant as it constructs the cognitive base as something that exists. 
This leads into the third reflexive issue. All academic texts can be deconstructed and 
subject to DA (Mulkay, 1988: 97; Wooffitt, 1992: 55; Woolgar, 1992: 329; Billig, 
1996; Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988: 1), and this includes DA texts themselves (Potter 
and Wetherell, 1987: 3; 183). The claims made in DA texts are constructed to achieve 
particular effects, and can be deconstructed to understand this. Any DA of a DA text 
could then of course be deconstructed as well. As Simons (1989: 4) states, "rhetoric 
about rhetoric cannot avoid doubling back on itself; cannot avoid its own rhetoricity". 
Collins and Yearley (1992a: 304) describe this deconstruction of a relativist approach: 
"within the first few nanoseconds of the relativist big bang, nearly everyone realised 
that the negative levers were equally applicable to the work of sociologists and 
historians themselves". They describe this as the "relativists' regress", and state that 
"in the end, [it] leads us to have nothing to say" (1992a: 302). 
Is this a problem? Hook (2001: 538-9) is without doubt. He discusses infinite 
interpretation from a Foucauldian perspective, and states that because close study of a 
text means that it can always have more than one reading, this leads to 
"[a] problem of textual relativism, where any reasonably supported textual 
interpretation will hold, within relative confines, as well as any other. Hence 
the results of our analyses will be of little significance beyond the scope of the 
analysed text.. [B]ecause a discourse analysis text cannot be taken to reveal a 
`truth' lying within the text, it must acknowledge its own research findings as 
open to other, potentially equally valid findings". 
Nightingale and Cromby (1999: 211), Noble (1992: 198) and Sarbin and Kitsuse 
(1994: 10) would agree. Furthermore, issues from a reflexive approach to DA maybe 
considered `problematic' in other ways. Reflexivity highlights both the constructed 
nature of work and its basis in interpretation and conventions, and apparent illogical 
inconsistencies about the role of language and the existence of certain things. These 
issues may be a `problem' when having work taken seriously in an academic (or 
indeed social) environment, and may not persuade about its value and contribution. 
As Taylor says, this could lead to "professional difficulties for researchers whose 
future employment depends on others' assessment of the quality of their work" 
(2001 a: 13). Is it possible to address these issues? And is it possible not to descend 
into a deconstructive spiral? 
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4.9.1 The benefits of a reflexive approach 
I will consider how these issues might be approached. Of course, to consider 
`problems' and hope to find `solutions' is to posit the debate within a `realist' 
framework, ignoring the very nature of reflexive considerations. Taylor states that 
"these limitations are not simply a consequence of weaknesses in the research 
process: the issue is not that better research would produce more enduring and reliable 
findings. Rather, all knowledge is considered to be situated, contingent and partial" 
(2001b: 319). However, in order for research to proceed, some `position' (if not 
`solution') on these issues has to be reached. Woolgar (1988: 12) says of Woolgar and 
Ashmore (1988) that they "seem to be juggling with several balls at once. They raise 
questions about ways of exploring reflexivity, their discussion throws up more 
questions, questions about the questions and so on. The trouble is that, in the end, the 
balls remain in the air". The same can probably be said of this research. I am raising 
questions and issues; but in order for this research to proceed, and to be about 
`something' rather than an exploration of reflexivity, some decisions may have to be 
made, answers sought, and balls caught. 
The first way to consider reflexivity then is to appreciate the insights it brings. 
Woolgar and Ashmore (1988: 1-2) describe that doing so "brings extra dividends" and 
that "reflexivists see the study of knowledge as an occasion for exploring new ways of 
addressing longstanding questions of knowledge and epistemology". Considering the 
constructed nature of research certainly highlights such questions. For example, 
Woolgar (1992: 334) argues that "reflexivity asks us to problematise the assumption 
that the analyst (author, self) stands in a disengaged relationship to the world 
(subjects, objects, scientists, things). It asks us to explore the consequences of 
challenging the assumption that the analyst enjoys a privileged position vis-ä-vis the 
subjects and objects that come under the authorial gaze". Reflexive considerations 
highlight that researcher is not seen to `know better' than the researched, and does not 
inhabit a different social world from which they can observe. The researcher and the 
researched are not only on the same level, but the researcher may even be `in awe' 
(Potter, 1997) of the sophistication with which the researched construct their accounts 
and organise their social lives through them. 
Woolgar (1992: 333) goes on to describe how "reflexivity aims to capitalize upon the 
strains and tensions associated with all research practice"; this may be by "observ[ing] 
that research practice tends to abide by a series of representational conventions which 
delimit the manner and substance of research". Some of these have already been 
detailed in this chapter. The point that Woolgar makes is that considering them is not 
a weakness of research or a problem, but a valuable appreciation. Potter (1988: 48) 
also views such considerations in a positive light, and argues that DA challenges our 
assumptions and reading practices which are taken for granted. He says that we 
should "celebrate" that DA does not ignore such issues or "sweep them under the 
positivist rug". Furthermore, Potter and Wetherell argue "discourse analysts are 
simply more honest than other researchers, recognizing their own work is not immune 
from the social psychological processes being studied" (1987: 182, emphasis added). 
Does celebrating rather than problematising reflexive issues even enhance academic 
credibility, rather than detracting from it? Clearly, this fundamentally contingent on 
the academic environment, and it is easy to imagine situations (which have also been 
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experienced) in which they might not be particularly well received28. And of course, 
I would not be raising these issues if I did not hope they would enhance this research. 
4.9.2.1 The benefits of new literary forms 
A second approach to reflexivity, beyond merely highlighting and celebrating its 
insights, is "to construct analyses with a self-referential quality. These studies 
examine at the same time the topic and their own investigation of that topic" (Potter 
and Wetherell 1987: 183, emphasis in the original). These are ways of presenting text 
that, while commonplace in social life, may be rare in academic writing. They can be 
in any style the author wishes, such as a two-sided conversation or a chatty 
commentaryz9. They offer a means to be "self-exemplifying" about the text (Pinch 
and Pinch, 1988: 178), and are a practical demonstration rather than just a description 
of some of the issues raised by a reflexive approach (Cooper and Woolgar, 1996; 
Ashmore et al., 1995). Indeed, Woolgar and Ashmore note that "the explicit presence 
of more than one voice reminds the reader (and the writer) that interpretation goes on 
all the time, that the idea of one reading -a singular correspondence between text and 
meaning - is illusory" (1988: 4). 
As Collins and Yearley point out, these `new literary forms' are no less `constructed' 
than conventional form, but are constructed differently, with an acknowledgement of 
the conventions that both they and academic texts draw on. So for example, "the 
absence of convergent argument draws attention to the devices that are normally used 
to make conclusions come about" (1992a: 305). Similarly, as Wetherell (2001b: 397) 
points out, developing a dialogue with a reader undermines "any simple assumption 
that there is only one truth or one way to read the data", and Collier and Toomey 
(1997: 286) outline how different literary forms can invite the active participation of 
the reader into the text. Examples of such textual forms highlight their benefits. In 
her text, Horton-Salway (2001 a) uses the `voice' of a student to make interesting 
points, clarify the argument, and does so in a clear, interesting and compelling way. 
As she says, "the construction of invented dialogue not only invites the reader into the 
text, but also displays the dialogism inherent in one's writing"; and O'Brien-Malone 
and Antaki (2001) present their chapter as an engaging dialogue between them. 
Adopting a different style of writing therefore draws attention to the constructed 
nature of research. It may also be a way of addressing the issue of referential 
language. Rather than describing language as constructive and then ignoring the 
implications of using language referentially to do so, a new literary form can stress the 
constructive power of all language. Further, the voice of the author can be made 
apparent. In this way, arguments about the nature of argument (as previously 
considered by Billig) may also be addressed. Instead of assuming that the research 
account is somehow above argument, debates can be built into the structure, raise 
issues that might otherwise be ignored or assumed to be unproblematic. Argument 
can explicitly as well as implicitly be at the very heart of the text. 
However, new literary forms may not always be appropriate. Myers (1992: 22 1) 
argues that "the fiction of the dialogue does not allow an escape from the realist 
28 Being asked to address what the point of DA was to an audience of positivist psychologists was 
certainly one such instance of this. 
29 Cooper (1997: 272) gives an overview of these different forms. 
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assumptions about representation; the dialogue itself suggests an authority lying 
behind it". Pinch and Pinch (1988) argue that new literary forms distract readers and 
are counter-productive - especially if the points made are translated back into a 
conventional form. Cooper (1997: 272) raises the question of whether they are 
necessary for adequate engagement with reflexivity, and cites Latour's (1988) 
argument that they may patronise readers by assuming that they would have been 
`taken in' by ordinary texts. Obviously I have not adopted a new literary form here. 
It may not be appropriate within a thesis, because of efforts to create a seemingly 
factual and authoritative account, and also because of the (perhaps self imposed) ideas 
about what a thesis should look like, the standards of professionalism it should 
maintain, and of course the fear of making a mess of trying to do so30. A rejected 
journal article can be re-written; this is a more daunting task with a thesis. 
Furthermore, using a innovative style of writing may not address the ontological 
questions raised in this research. When Potter and Wetherell (1987: 183) state that self 
referential practices "examine at the same time the topic and their own investigation 
of that topic", they do not seem to address the implications of just what `looking at a 
topic' has. Identification of a topic necessarily means making some claims that 
something exists in order to be able to study it. Further, new literary forms can still 
be deconstructed in order to assess their discursive practices; just because they may 
use a more obvious or honest writing style does not make them immune to this. 
Perhaps they do not represent a way out of continual deconstruction. But does 
attempting to do so and 'stopping' analysis at some point mean engaging in 
gerrymandering with claims about existence? 
4.9.2.2 The way forward? 
There seem to be three possible ways to proceed. Firstly, Wetherell (2001b: 393-4) 
notes the argument that some reality exists and underlies and determines discourse. 
She cites Bhaskar (1978)'s distinction between constructed objects which are the 
products of social and historical processes, and those which are not the products of 
people; `intransitive' objects. However, the idea that discourse only is only partially 
constructive, and that a reality exists and is open to assessment has been roundly 
rejected. Edwards et al. (1995) for example argue that even what may seem to be 
independent of discursive construction cannot be separated from the constructive 
processes that give them their meaning and their significance for people. The point of 
study is not to identify what is real but how ideas about the real are used, and how 
things are made to seem real. 
A second way of working is to embrace the perspective of phenomenology and the 
importance of perception. Butt (1999: 134) draws on Merleau-Ponty's considerations 
in the Phenomenology of Perception (1962), and argues that our perception cannot be 
doubted; it is not open to dispute. As Butt states "I see a keyboard in front of me, and 
this is indisputable. Of course, I could be wrong about exactly what I see, and my 
perception might change. But that I perceive something is self evident, and not 
evidenced by other data". He argues that an emphasis on perception places the focus 
30 Heeding the warnings given by Potter (1997: 9), who describes why he used a conventional style 
rather than a new literary form in his book: "more than anything it is the sheer difficulty of achieving 
one without making the text reader-unfriendly that put me off". Similarly, Woolgar and Ashmore 
(1988: 5) describe the difficulties of writing in this way, and that it may engender the irritation of 
readers if it is seen as "[t]oo arch, frivolous, clever, smart-arse, trendy, fancy stuff'. 
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between the person and the world rather than within either: "perception, then, is not 
imposed, either by an external real world or by a construction of it. It is instead a 
questioning process, an inquiry into a world which exhibits a resistance to our 
constructions". Butt states that while Merleau-Ponty insisted that no `inner world' 
exists, a study of perception can return us to the `lived world' of experience, an 
alternative construction to objective thought (1999: 134). Might taking as a topic 
what becomes apparent as a `result of perception' be a way to approach these issues? 
However, compelling as this might seem, Peters and Rothenbuhler (1989: 19) point 
out that "perception is often a function of the community and commitments of the 
perceiver. Hence even the most bodily, individualized and personal forms of 
experience of the world (one's sense) are socially constructed". Further, 
"[e]xperience is not something raw and dumb that gives our words their meaning; 
rather, our words give meanings to our experiences.. experience of the real world is 
always already symbolic, as is experience of others". Emphasising the constructive 
power of language undermines the usefulness of a phenomenological approach. It is 
not possible to sidestep the debate about existence and find a way out of continual 
deconstruction by simply referencing what one perceives to be real, as even such 
perceptions are already shaped and constructed in particular ways. To say that ECS 
exists and can be used as a topic is not therefore just a matter of saying that I have 
perceived it as such. 
If a realist approach or a new literary form are both rejected, what alternatives are 
left? A third option31 is to turn again to Woolgar and Pawluch. They state that "we 
do not believe that sociology has reached a dead end or that its only recourse lies in 
turning analytically upon itself. Instead [we suggest] an awareness of the social 
character of our explanatory practices, as significant an advance as it may be, is only 
the first step towards understanding how we accomplish these practices" (1985b: 162). 
I have therefore tried to adopt an awareness of its `explanatory practices'. The way 
forward seems to be to do so and then `just get on with it'. Research is constructed in 
a number of ways. Is it enough then to admit this? And is it enough to acknowledge 
some of these issues without fording a `solution' for them? Potter for example, 
having pointed out the constructed nature of his own work, seems to indicate that it is 
enough to acknowledge this and move on: "So with the emphasis that, of course, this 
chapter is a story which involves a range of constructive work, simplifications, 
categorizations, and implicit rhetorical oppositions, let us move on... " (1997: 69, 
emphasis in original). The only way to proceed appears to be to acknowledge the 
processes of research, the tensions encountered between the principles and 
practicalities of DA. This includes, paradoxically, where issues of reflexivity have 
been considered but sometimes ignored. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 182) certainly 
seem to think so, and argue that it is possible to acknowledge that while analysing 
texts, DA research constructs its own version of the world. They state that "most of 
the time, therefore, the most practical way of dealing with this issue is simply to get 
on with it, and not to get paralysed by or caught up in the infinite regress possible". 
The point then is to "reflexively acknowledge the theories, values and politics which 
guide research so these can be taken into account when evaluating the analyst's 
claims" (Wetherell, 2001b: 396); acknowledge the reflexive nature of research, and 
" This is not of course to imply that no others exist, or that what is being presented in this chapter is 
anything other than my interpretation of these `options'. 
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then carry it out. Such a sentiment seems to be reiterated by Collins and Yearley 
(1992a: 324), who state that "in the relativist's world you have to decide what you 
want to do; epistemology does not make the decision for you. But once you have 
decided what to do, all there is left is to do it". 
So that's it then. 
Yes. 
I still can't help thinking that I'm engaging in ontological gerrymandering, or taking a 
line similar to Collins and Yearley's maligned social realism. 
But you don't want to get into a deconstructive spiral do you? 
No.. 
And you do want your research to be about something, don 't you, not just about 
reflexivity? 
Yes.. 
Well then. The best thing to do is to acknowledge the constructions and limitations of 
the research, and just get on with it. 
It seems so. 
And you can discuss this some more in your discussion chapter anyway. 
Well, in that case - the next chapter outlines just how it was done. 
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Chapter Five: 
Potter and Wetherell's Ten Stages 
In this chapter I describe the methods used in this research. This study is based on 
DA as approached by Potter and Wetherell (1987), so I detail the methodology they 
outline, subsequent developments, and how I used it here. As I highlight, ethical 
issues became particularly pertinent in this research. These are more fully 
documented in Chapter Five. 
5.1. DA as a `craft skill' 
The first point to make is that DA is criticised for not explicating the actual process of 
that analysis. Indeed, Tuffin and Howard (2001: 200) describe how many texts fall 
short in explaining "what actually to do with the data at the point of analysis", and 
Potter and Wetherell declare that "words fail us" when it comes to describing the 
analytic process in abstract (1987: 168). This is not to say that such critiques are not 
made of other research, both qualitative and quantitative. The focus in most research 
training is on data collection, rather than analysis. But the very notion of `reliability' 
in social science is dependant on the idea of analytic method; that two people using 
the same procedures will produce the same results. Dey (1993: 251) for example 
describes the means for checking the reliability of qualitative work. Some of these 
means might be similar to DA - explaining how the results were arrived at and 
allowing the audience to scrutinize procedures - but their execution is based on the 
ideal of "improving" reliability. In DA, the researcher presents their interpretation of 
an account, and acknowledges that others may understand it differently. As Potter 
(1996: 11) says, traditional approaches to reliability are not applicable to DA. 
Explicating the analytic process is difficult in DA, and it is frequently described as a 
`craft skill', (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; 1995; Puchta and Potter, 2002; Potter, 1988; 
1996; Ashmore et al., 1995). The best way to learn how to do DA is through practice, 
despite the lengthy, labour intensive and often abortive efforts that this may involve. 
Wooffitt (1993) describes analysis as being conducted without hard and fast rules, and 
of an `analytical mentality' acquired through practical experience; similarly, Lawes 
(1999: 5) describes analysing discourse as a process of `living with' one's data, and 
Potter maintains that there is no substitute for "learning by doing" with DA (1996: 13). 
Being in this form, DA is "not easy to render or describe in an explicit codified 
manner" (Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 55). 
While describing the processes of analysis is difficult, it does not mean that DA is 
without a method. While, as Gill (1996: 143) says, "it is much easier to explicate the 
central tenets of discourse analysis than it is to explain how actually to go about 
analysing discourse", and Antaki et al. (2003: 3) describe that it might seem like 
`anything goes', this is certainly not the case. There are principles that can be 
followed, and advice on approaching the daunting prospect of a mountain of data. 
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Although their method has since been developed, the "groundbreaking"' principles 
outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987) in Discourse and Social Psychology are still 
universally drawn on by researchers in this field. This is both because Potter and 
Wetherell explicitly developed this particular approach, and because they do give a 
number of procedures that may be followed. 
In their book, Potter and Wetherell state that "data are everywhere.. and the resources 
needed to start work are minimal" (1987: 187), and maintain that "discourse analysis.. 
provides a workable methodology" (1987: 32) to be able to do so. They acknowledge 
there is no "analytic method" as such, but rather, a "broad theoretical framework, 
which focuses attention on the constructive and functional dimensions of discourse, 
coupled with the reader's skill in identifying significant patterns of consistency and 
variation" (1987: 169). This chapter will now detail the approach they describe, and 
describe how the stages were used, developed (or ignored) in this research. 
5.2. Potter and Wetherell's ten sta es2 
5.2.1 Stage one: Research questions 
Stage One in Potter and Wetherell's framework is about developing research 
questions (1987: 160). As has been discussed, in DA this means approaching texts in 
their own right, not to discover the meaning `behind them'. Potter and Wetherell state 
that doing so "does not mean that we are indulging in easy escapism, postponing the 
`big' questions or ruling them out of court". They go on to point out that "the 
research questions discourse analysts do focus on are broadly related to construction 
and function: how is discourse put together, and what is gained by this construction" 
(1987: 160). Clearly, I have adopted this approach. My research questions are not 
about the risk of ECS, but how groups persuade about its existence, apportion blame, 
and present themselves, focusing on their accounts to understand how they do so. 
In setting research questions, Potter (1996: 5) points out that "one of the skills 
involved in discourse analytic work is in formulating questions that are theoretically 
coherent and analytically manageable"; indeed, MacMillan and Edwards (1998: 325) 
describe how they selected the data for their study partly "on the basis that they 
contain an analytically manageable set of reports". It was tempting to be too 
ambitious in the design of this research and consider a range of risks, rather than 
focusing on one. This was partly fuelled by a notion of increasing the usefulness and 
credibility of the research; producing a `model' of risk construction, rather than 
detailed analysis of just one. However, the vast amount of data and the time taken to 
analyse it for one risk, (always pointed out as one of the `disadvantages' of DA3), 
precluded this. I have included some preliminary thoughts on the applicability of this 
analysis to another risk in Chapter Eleven, of course with the caveats that DA may not 
produce generalisable results (and further thoughts are also given on this in Chapter 
Gill (1996: 141) 
2 It has to be acknowledged of course that the design of research is likely to be less explicitly linear 
than listing these stages might imply. For example, what is presented as the research question is 
determined by the sample that it was possible to obtain, and so forth, and some stages might be 
excluded altogether. 
3 Wetherell and Potter (1988: 182); Taylor (2001a: 24) 
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Twelve). I did eventually acknowledge that to have an `analytically manageable' data 
set, I would have to limit the amount of extended analysis, but it was a hard decision. 
5.2.2 Stage two: Sample selection 
Once the topic area and research questions have been formulated, Stage Two is 
sample selection. I have already discussed in section 4.6 the practical and theoretical 
impossibility of collecting `all the data', or even knowing what that is. In selecting 
data, a balance is required between getting "bogged down in too much data", even in 
the specific area chosen, and preventing "the linguistic detail emerge from the 
mountains of text" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 16 1); and a desire to collect large 
amounts because "the commonplace or important patterns are not recognisable in 
advance and recurrently used systems of terms need to be elucidated" (1987: 162). 
This was certainly initially the case with this research. I selected data without 
knowing what might be found in them, feeling that a large amount might be necessary 
to generate patterns and concepts. Having since carried out analysis, I now recognise 
the naivety of this. 
Initial ideas about data did generate a huge amount from various different sources; 
which, because of the danger of becoming `bogged down', it was not possible to 
analyse. For example, a House of Commons Select Committee report (2000) on ECS 
makes riveting reading, but analysis of it could not be included because of limits on 
space and time. Moreover, I regret that these limits precluded analysis of media 
sources. However, Potter and Wetherell argue that "the success of the study is not in 
the least dependant on sample size" (1987: 161); the sample is determined by the 
specific research question. Here, the research question was to consider the varying 
constructions of ECS; I will detail how I chose the particular sources shortly. Potter 
and Wetherell (1987: 160) also say that selection and collection of data may be 
governed by what is available. This was a significant consideration with collecting 
data from airlines. For example, not all airlines give information about risks of a 
blood clot in flight4, and while this was interesting in itself, it impacted on what data 
could be collected. Potter and Wetherell also point out that "generally, there is no 
`natural' boundary line to be drawn in these cases, or no point at which sampling can 
be said to be complete. It is simply a case of giving a clear and detailed description of 
the nature of the material one is analysing and its origins" (1987: 161). I will therefore 
now describe the data collected. 
5.2.2.1 Airlines 
I collected the information available on ECS from a number of airlines; this included 
information on websites, inflight magazines, advice cards given out with tickets, news 
releases. The collection of these data was governed by availability, and all the data 
that could be found from airlines were collected and analysed. Some major airlines - 
for example, United Airlines - did not provide any information on blood clots or 
related issues during the collection period. British Airways have produced extensive 
information about the (possible) risk, so analysis focuses on this, and any other data 
that could be collected was also analysed; this totalled about fifty web pages, two 
4 The fact that while the term `ECS' was referred to, none of them used it as a description for the issue, 
is another matter altogether, and fully considered in Chapter Twelve. 
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inflight magazine articles, two advice cards, and eight press releases. The size of the 
data set was also increased through the collection of the online data produced over a 
period of time. Using an internet archive search engine5, it was possible to download 
versions of the web pages every time a change was made to them, therefore allowing 
an analysis of temporal change. 
5.2.2.2 Passenger groups 
As I will fully consider shortly, interviews with ECS sufferers to generate data were 
not carried out in this research, even though a sample of them was being built up 
through contacts and `snowballing'. Instead, I collected the published accounts of 
groups set up to represent and campaign for them. I identified three such groups, and 
collected the information they produce. 
The Aviation Health Institute, or AHI, is a British based group established in 1990. 
The founder, Farrol Kahn, is a prominent speaker on the medical impacts of flying. 
Although the group ostensibly has a broad remit and considers a wide variety of 
issues, recently its focus has been more narrowly on the risks of ECS. A second 
group, VARDA (Victims of Air Related DVT Association), originally developed as 
an offshoot of the AHI, but was established in its own right in 2001. Their chair is 
Ruth Christoffersen, the mother of Emma Christoffersen, a British woman who died 
of ECS at Heathrow airport in October 2000. Her case received a high profile both in 
this country and around the world. VARDA sets out its aims as preventing such 
deaths, and is solely focussed on ECS. A final group, Airhealth, was set up in 2001, 
and proactively campaigns just on that issue. An American based organisation, it was 
established by Michael Reynolds after he developed a blood clot following a flight. It 
aims to raise awareness of the risks of ECS, and to challenge the position of the 
airlines on the issue. 
I selected these groups because they were actively campaigning about ECS. The type 
of information they produce varies. Airhealth presents the most information and have 
pages introducing the issue, on advice for passengers, and pilots, on how to avoid 
ECS, overviews of the medical research, news, wallet cards with tips to print out, 
details of how to join, and an `about us' section. The AHI also details news reports 
and research on ECS, outlines the legal action being taken, useful links, a shop where 
products to prevent ECS can be bought (such as stockings and exercise aids to use 
inflight), and details about the organisation. VARDA produces a smaller amount of 
information. It includes details of the founding of the organisation, their mission, 
objectives, and progress made. Analysis of these groups was carried out by 
examining the online information they produce. An internet library tracks and logs 
any changes that are made to websites. For all three groups, the information from 
their websites was downloaded after every change. Different versions of the same 
page were then compared and the changes noted. This revealed in many instances 
both how groups had developed their construction of the issue, and of themselves. 
These three groups were the only groups campaigning on ECS identified, so analysis 
here was of the population rather than a sample of it. All the information collected 
from all three groups was analysed. 
5 Available at http: //www. archive. org 
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5.2.2.3 Medical research 
This is clearly a very broad category. In this research I chose to focus on The Lancet, 
the journal of the British Medical Association, in which the phrase `Economy Class 
Syndrome' first appeared in August 1988. All articles and references to ECS from 
this first piece until August 2003 have been collected and analysed (33 in total); see 
the Appendix for details. 
As has been mentioned, I have attempted to balance gathering enough data to generate 
interesting conclusions, without being overwhelmed by it. I also drew on Taylor's 
(2001a: 25) argument that documents may be selected, not because of their 
representativeness, but because they are particularly worthy of analysis. She gives 
examples of texts associated with powerful or well known people. Therefore, I 
analysed articles printed in The Lancet both because of the prestige of the journal, and 
because it is the medical research source most often quoted by other groups. To only 
analyse The Lancet was a consciously subjective decision that was taken on the basis 
of its perceived importance, and not an attempt at representativeness. 
Although there is a history in DA of carrying out interviews with scientists (Gilbert 
and Mulkay, 1984, for example), this was not part of this research. The reasons for 
this are fully considered in Chapter Six. In the meantime, the point is that this is not 
felt to disadvantage the research. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 64) state that 
"it is fairly easy to collect scientists" discourse without disturbing their social 
fabric; journals and books are full of publicly available accounts. [.. ] By 
collecting material in this way the researcher is able to amass what is basically 
a slice through the social life of one discrete realm of human activity". 
This is therefore both a justification of the approach used in this research, and an 
indication of the benefit of it. 
5.2.2.4 Online forums 
In undertaking this research, an interesting and unexpectedly rich data source was 
found. I collected data from two online discussion forums, who draw their 
membership from pilots, medics, and those with an interest in aviation and health 
issues. A search using the principles outlined by Hewson et al. (2003) indicated that 
these may be the only two groups with an interest in health and aviation. Again, this is 
therefore a study of the identified population, rather than a sample of it. 
Of the two groups analysed, the first is an email based list. It is set up so that once 
members have registered on the group's Internet homepage, messages are delivered 
direct to their email account, and messages can be posted to all members by entering 
one generic email address. Previous posts may also be accessed from the homepage. 
The second group is an Internet forum. Members register and gain access through an 
Internet server. Once logged in they can post messages, and both members and 
observers can read previous posts, for which observers do not have to register. Such 
`threads' or collections of previous posts are displayed sequentially, and a member 
adds their post as the next contribution to the series. The members of this forum are 
stated to include doctors, health professionals, pilots, and others interested in aviation 
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issues, and the site has over seventy different sub forums. The site has a search 
facility, and a search was carried out of all of the public forums (some are private and 
are only accessible through invitation, for example if an employee of a specific 
airline). The forums were searched on the keywords `DVT', `deep vein thrombosis', 
and `economy class syndrome', and hits came from a number of different forums. 
These sources were interesting because debates about ECS rage on the sites, usually 
in the form of an initial question or comment which is followed up in a series of 
messages. The data here are not a final polished article, but an indication of the 
current state of the controversy. Messages hotly debate and contradict each other on 
whether ECS exists, what can or should be done about it, and who is to blame. Myers 
(1985a) notes that the criticisms and responses in the review process of scientific 
articles highlight details that are "usually compressed and decisions that are usually 
unnoticed"; so examining these groups accesses the discussion and presentation of 
opinions that are still being debated, in the way that a press release, magazine story or 
journal article does not allow. This allows a glimpse `behind the scenes' in the 
construction of the issue, and an opportunity to see `facts in the making'. 
To analyse these sources, I anonymised the details and the addresses of both sites, and 
all individual members. Dates have been given as these may be relevant to the 
content of the message (dates show that one message follows on from another for 
example), and I gave initials to each member to distinguish them. I will now briefly 
document why. 
Formats such as online newsgroups and email discussion forums are valuable to study 
because, as Couper (2000) points out, the Internet is having a profound effect on 
almost every area of life. Mann and Stewart (2002: 19) state that this has led to the 
"generation of a mass of new information and even new communities which are of 
interest and value to the qualitative researcher". These include "interest groups", in a 
variety of formats such as chat rooms and mailing lists, which "draw together 
geographically dispersed participants who may share interests, experiences, or 
expertise". Both Stanton (1998) and Coomber (1997) highlight the potential of 
researching using email, list servers and news groups. Indeed, the Internet has been 
described as "ideal" for linguistic observation studies, studying such things as 
archived posts to newsgroups (Hewson et al., 2003: 46). 
Not only are discussion groups and mailing lists rich resources for researchers, but 
DA is particularly appropriate to study them. Bordia argues that computer mediated 
communication (CMC) offers "an exciting opportunity to researchers interested in 
studying linguistic and socio-psychological characteristics of verbal interaction in a 
naturalistic setting" (1999: 149). She outlines three advantages to studying CMC: 
first, it represents a naturalistic setting; second, computer technology facilitates data 
collection by storing the interaction; and thirdly and most importantly, unobtrusive 
data collection is possible "in a setting that is ethically defensible"; this final point 
will be considered more fully in Chapter Six. Mann and Stewart (2002: 86) concur 
with this enthusiasm and argue that "researchers with an interest in 
ethnomethodological approaches can `observe' the natural conversation of various 
kinds of newsgroups". They do also highlight some disadvantages with this. First, 
the time taken typing, and the delays between turn taking can shape the mood of the 
interaction. This information is often lost in analysis" (2002: 87). This is an 
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interesting point, and I included the dates of when messages were posted to give a 
sense of how they responded to each other, but I acknowledge that some of the detail 
of the interaction is lost. Second, Mann and Stewart say that logs of messages ignore 
the context of speech, which as Paccagenella (1997) describes, is the actual 
experiences of individual participants at their own keyboards in their own rooms 
around the world; but this seems largely inescapable, and no different from 
considering any text separated from its author and time of production. Third, Mann 
and Stewart point out that because CMC is intended for people involved in the 
interaction, it loses a sense of its meaning when reread afterwards by others. Again, 
this may be little different from reading any text after it has been produced. Bordia 
notes a final consideration of studying CMC: "the generalisability of the findings in 
the CMC domain to other communication contexts, such as face to face interaction" 
(1999: 150). Of course, in DA, the context of an interaction is crucial for 
understanding it; generalising beyond this is not the immediate objective. I would 
therefore argue that analysis of online material is both theoretically valuable and 
methodologically defensible. 
5 . 2.3 
Stage three: Data collection 
Continuing to address Potter and Wetherell's stages of research, Stage Three concerns 
data collection (1987: 162). They point out that DA is often carried out on records and 
documents of interaction, rather than data garnered from the researcher's own 
dealings with participants. The material collected for this research was publicly 
available texts and documentation; no interviews were carried out or data elicited. 
While in their Stage Four Potter and Wetherell argue that "interviews have the virtue 
of allowing the researcher room for active intervention" (1987: 163), I have concluded 
that it is ethically unreasonable to carry out interviews and then use DA to examine 
them; I address this fully in Chapter Six. In the meantime, it is important to note that 
a focus on documents and texts is not necessarily a disadvantage. Indeed, not having 
to "constrain the participants' response options to obtain usable data" (Wetherell and 
Potter, 1988: 183) is a distinct advantage. Collecting documentary materials precludes 
analysis of `interaction'; this is maintained to be a way to understanding `participants' 
orientations' (see section 4.4). However, Potter notes collecting a range of sources 
(including documentary materials) can "facilitate a rhetorical analysis of some 
domain. In this way it becomes possible to identify the rhetorical targets and 
oppositions of particular arguments and descriptions". (1996: 8). What Potter 
describes is precisely what I have sought to do in this research. 
5.2.4 Stage six: Coding 
Stages Four (interviews) and Five (transcription) listed by Potter and Wetherell are 
not relevant to this research. Stage Six is coding, the preparation for analysis. As 
Potter and Wetherell state, the goal is not to find results but to "squeeze an unwieldy 
body of discourse into manageable chunks" (1987: 167), which can then be subject to 
more intensive analysis. They point out that this process may mean moving back and 
forward between the stages of coding and analysis, and document this in their own 
study of racism (1987: 167). 
Moving between coding and analysis was certainly the case with this research. 
Firstly, I read the texts again and again to become as familiar as possible with them. 
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Taylor (2001a: 38) writes that there is no other way to proceed with the process, as 
does Carabine (2001) (interestingly, as she conducted a Foucauldian analysis). 
During this reading, preliminary coding notes were made, and Wetherell and Potter 
(1988: 177) advise careful repeated readings in search of patterns: "this is not a matter 
of following rules and recipes; it often involves following up hunches and the 
development of tentative interpretative schemes which may need to be abandoned and 
started all over again". Following Seymour-Smith et al. (2002: 256), thorough reading 
of the data meant patterns in the codes and common themes starting to emerge. 
Tuffin and Howard (2001: 202) argue that "once this preliminary coding stage is 
completed, the next step is to organise the data into discrete coding categories. The 
importance of these categories cannot be overstated as they form the backbone of the 
analytic process". After organising these preliminary codes, I carried out more 
detailed analysis to understand just how a particular theme was developed in a 
particular extract. 
I have already raised the issue of whether coding and analysis are a case of 
`unmotivated looking' or `imposing categories' (see section 4.5). In carrying out the 
research, I had little preconceived idea about what the data might hold; hence the 
perceived need to gather such a large amount of it. I first looked at the data with only 
a few vague ideas about what might be interesting - who was being blamed for ECS, 
how the presentation of self was being managed to avoid blame, and so on - but I had 
little idea quite how these might be constructed. However, to say that this was 
`unmotivated looking' would be naive, in light of knowledge about themes and tools 
of other DA research. For example, seeing the use of words such as `totally', 
`always' or `never' immediately brought to mind the work of Pomerantz (1986) on 
`extreme case formulations'. Unmotivated looking may therefore be somewhat 
unrealistic; but not necessarily problematic. Familiarity with previous DA can both 
highlight conceptual patterns in the new data, and the relevance of the previous work 
to current research. 
5.2.5 Stage seven: Analysis 
In relation to analysis, Potter and Wetherell (1987: 168) state that "it is not a case of 
stating first you do this, then you do that. The skills required are developed as one 
tries to make sense of transcripts and identify the organizational features of 
documents". Having carried out analysis, it is easy to understand their hesitancy on 
this point. Describing the process of analysis is difficult6, especially because the 
movement between coding and analysis makes it hard to explicitly state when analysis 
takes place. Certainly the process of analysis here followed two closely related 
features identified by Potter and Wetherell; searching for pattern in the data; and a 
concern with function and consequence which "consists of forming hypotheses about 
these functions and effects and searching for linguistic evidence" (1987: 168). Potter 
and Wetherell (1987: 168) say that "the analyst constantly asks: why am I reading this 
passage in this way? What features produce this reading? ". The data here were 
interrogated to understand why they had given the impression they had. 
6 Either in a thesis or to classes of students facing the seemingly daunting prospect of a first DA 
assignment. 
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In later work (1995: 55) Potter and Wetherell expand upon this, and describe four 
analytical considerations that I drew on here. The first is to examine instances of 
variation to help identify features of construction. In this research, the data from The 
Lancet included scientific research reports with contradictory findings. Examining 
how authors treated these divergent results was extremely helpful in unpacking their 
constructions of the issue; for example, they used critiques of method to dismiss 
unfavourable results. The second consideration is to attend to the fine details of the 
discourse. As Potter and Wetherell say, there is no formula for reading for details, 
and "it is surprisingly difficult to overcome years of academic training in which the 
goal of reading it to produce some gist or unitary summary" (1995: 59). This was 
tackled by asking how a particular gist had been gained. For example, a comment in 
one of the online discussion forums seemed to paint the passengers in a highly 
damning light. This was identified, and then the fine details of the discourse were 
examined to see just how this impression had been created. It was also helpful to bear 
in mind Wooffitt's (1992) point about Sacks' work, that all the details in a particular 
stretch of discourse are potentially there for a purpose. At times, the constructive 
work in a section only became apparent alter repeated reading and knowing that there 
must be some. For example, the opening statements from the Aviation Health 
Institute seemed rhetorically uninformative, and it was only by continual re-reading 
that they become (considerably) less so. 
A third consideration that Potter and Wetherell (1995: 159) mention is looking for 
"rhetorical organisation". Considering how versions relate to actual or potential 
alternatives was extremely helpful. For example, the airline texts seemed to be 
working to counter other versions of what their responsibility for ECS might be. It 
was also a significant factor in The Lancet articles, where results that contradicted 
previous work were being presented and justified. Potter and Wetherell (1995: 59) 
argue that "the rhetorical orientation draws our attention away from questions about 
how a version relates to some putative reality [.. ] and focuses it on how a version 
relates to competing alternatives". The aim was not to discover `the truth' about ECS, 
but to examine how different groups present their version as that truth. 
A final consideration Potter and Wetherell describe is to look for accountability. 
Here, this related to examining the rhetorical organisation, because it refers to a 
consideration of how accounts are constructed "in ways which make them hard to 
rebut or undermine, ways which can make them seem fair or objective" (1995: 160). 
All the texts examined undertook this in various ways, as will be detailed in Chapters 
Seven to Ten. This may not be surprising, as from an ethnomethodological point of 
view (see Heritage, 1984, and Watson and Sharrock, 1991) accountability is an 
essential character of the design of interaction. 
5.2.6 Stage eight-: Validation 
Potter and Wetherell make clear that the absence of an `analytical method' does not 
mean no checks on what is produced, and outline several stages to validation; "some 
are an extension of the analysis, others intrinsic to the presentation of findings" 
(1987: 169). The criteria for validation have been considered in section 4.7. In this 
chapter I will briefly review how I addressed these. How far this has been achieved is 
of course up to the reader to assess. 
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The first criterion is coherence (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 170). Following this, I 
have attempted to give extracts of data to show how discursive structures produce 
effects and functions. The second criterion is to consider "participants' orientations" 
(1987: 170). Throughout this research, I have emphasised my focus on how 
participants construct their accounts and orient to issues, not on what I think is 
important in them. Thirdly, validation may be enhanced by considering "new 
problems" (1987: 171). Deviant cases were particularly interesting in The Lancet, 
where it seemed that contradictory claims were being made within accounts. 
Subsequent analysis of these led to a theoretical scheme in which they were included 
and understood as constructive features. For example, scientific research methods 
were brought into question. This initially seemed to represent a challenge to all 
scientific work. Closer examination identified that this was actually a critique of 
particular methods only - those that had produced unfavourable results. The overall 
analytic scheme was therefore reinforced. Fourthly, Potter and Wetherell describe the 
criterion of validity as "fruitfulness" (1987: 171). The balance between acknowledging 
previous research and finding new concepts has already been considered (sections 4.5; 
5.2.4). In this research I have tried to strike this balance by applying some of the 
work of DA to a new topic, ECS; a seemingly under considered area, risk; and using 
multiple data sources to draw out interesting schemes through their comparison with 
each other. 
5.2.7 Stage nine: The report 
When Potter and Wetherell describe two types of validation, some that are an 
extension of the analysis, others intrinsic to the presentation of findings, the former 
refers to the previous stage, and the latter to this one. As they make clear, in a DA 
report "the goal is to present analysis and conclusions in such a way that the reader is 
able to assess the researcher's interpretations" (1987: 172). Examples from the data 
should be given along with the analysis, not just to illustrate the claims being made, 
but so that readers can themselves analyse the data and evaluate the interpretations of 
it. Issues about the practicalities of doing so were considered in section 4.7.1. The 
issues raised about context (section 4.6) are also relevant here. In this research I 
attempted to present data that could be validated and to not include in analysis 
anything from outside the data extract. In some cases, this meant having to abandon 
analysis of some data, because it was not amenable to this presentation. For example, 
I had analysed this extract from the campaign group Airhealth: 
www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 31/03/01 
1 Pilots are at risk, too, and the first sign often is fainting. Dr David McKenas, 
2 medical director of American Airlines, says that the most common causes 
3 of sudden pilot incapacitation are cardiac arrest, arrhythmia, and fainting. 
4 All of which are often caused by a blood clot in the lung. 
There are obviously a number of interesting features in this text. For example, putting 
the second and third sentences together attributes the third to Dr McKenas, but this 
may just be an addition by the group. The impression given however is of a causal 
link between incidences of pilot incapacitation and blood clots. What I had found 
particularly interesting was that this is the medical director from American Airlines, 
and the text makes it seem as if he is admitting that these common incapacitations are 
due to ECS. The Airhealth site implicitly and directly accuses the airlines of being 
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misleading about ECS, and of denying that it exists at all. American Airlines are 
associated a number of times with this. To then mention their medical director in this 
context, implying his agreement with the occurrence of blood clots in pilots, suggests 
that American Airlines do know about the risks, agree that ECS is a danger, and are 
therefore deliberately covering this up. Making this comment seem as if it is by Dr 
McKenas therefore not only helps to establish it as an independent fact and an urgent 
issue, but constructs the position of the airline he represents in a highly damning light. 
However, the text on the Airhealth site where American Airlines were mentioned was 
not readily amenable to being extracted; lots of `mentions in passing' in the midst of 
swathes of text did not make selecting examples of the presentation by Airhealth that I 
have just outlined easy. I could have tried to pick out quotes, but this would have 
risked losing their meaning out of context; I could have included large amounts of 
data, but there would have been many other features in it and limits on space; I could 
have drawn on summary, but it is not possible to validate that. Ultimately then, 
because I could not draw out this comparative point, I felt I had to leave this analysis 
out. In this research, I have therefore presented extracts of data with the analysis of 
them, and invite readers to decide whether they come to the same conclusions. 
5.2.8 Stage ten: Application 
Finally, Potter and Wetherell address the application of research and note that 
researchers should "pay considerably more attention to the practical use of their work 
over and above the amassing of research findings and the furtherance of careers" 
(1987: 174). This ties into considerations about the use and value of this type of DA, 
especially when it does not necessarily have the political agenda of other more critical 
approaches. Potter and Wetherell do acknowledge this when they highlight the 
criticism that is often levelled at DA, that it is `just looking at words - not real things' 
(1987: 174). This implies that while a focus on language use and function may be 
interesting, it will be of no practical use. 
There are a number of points to be made about this. Potter and Wetherell argue that it 
is important to remember that "virtually the entirety of anyone's understanding of the 
social world is mediated by discourse... one of the positive fruits of discourse 
analysis is to promote an informed critical attitude to discourse of this kind; to be 
more aware of its constructive nature and the close connection between the way 
textual versions of the world are put together and specific policies and evaluations are 
pushed" (1987: 175). If social life is constructed, managed, and lived through 
discourse, then what can be more productive than to study that discourse? As Potter 
and Wetherell say, the phenomena of study for DA have "genuine consequences for 
peoples' social lives" (1987: 170). 
Further, this leads to a related point of what else would be studied, if it were not 
discourse? Potter and Wetherell (1987), and Edwards et al. (1995) have a rebutted 
criticisms that they ignore pressing problems by merely focusing on language. But to 
describe such `issues' is to make judgements about them; any knowledge about them 
has been mediated through some source, and interpreted in a particular way; and 
issues are made real and important through discourse. What DA does is examine how 
this is done, how distinctions between `the real' and `the constructed' are made, and 
to look at "the procedures through which some part of reality is made to seem stable, 
neutral, and objectively there" (Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 50). 
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In this research, I am aiming to understand how the groups make their version of ECS 
seem `stable, neutral, and objectively there'. Each group differently constructs the 
existence and frequency of ECS, it is not possible to compare these to `the truth' 
about it. The truth about ECS for each of these groups is brought into being through 
the discourse that they use. Furthermore, as Taylor says, (and reiterating Potter and 
Wetherell's point about fruitfulness), "arguments may be presented for the value of an 
analysis in terms of its usefulness.. analysis may generate new theory and hypotheses.. 
[and] it may provide original, novel explanations, including explanations relevant to 
previous analyses.. " (2001b: 321). The point of this research is also then to apply 
discourse concepts, and generate new understandings, by relating them to a new field 
and a new topic area, in the hope of developing such `novel explanations'. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Ethics of Using Discourse Analysis on Interviews and the Internet 
In this chapter I outline some ethical considerations of carrying out DA on interviews, 
and from sources of data from the Internet. These considerations have shaped this 
research. After evaluating the ethics of analysing interviews, only `naturally 
occurring' data were collected in this research. However, I consider analysis of 
Internet sources to be morally justifiable, for reasons that will be detailed. 
6.1. Ethical considerations of discourse analysis 
In this research I have collected data from a variety of sources. I had initially planned 
also to carry out interviews, and did conduct one. Very quickly after this however, I 
concluded that there are ethical and methodological concerns with carrying out DA on 
interview transcripts, particularly those on sensitive or political topics, although this 
has not been given much attention in previous DA research. Is it insensitive to analyse 
only how people say things, ignoring what is being said? Do respondents need to be 
informed that DA will be carried out on their transcripts, and is it possible to fully 
inform them? Furthermore, informing respondents risks influencing how they 
structure their accounts while not doing so may amount to deception. In this chapter I 
conclude that when respondents are involved, the `means' of achieving an `end' can 
never be discounted, and that while the ultimate decisions about research design rest 
with the researcher, these decisions can and should be fully informed by ethical 
debates and considerations. These issues will now be considered. 
6.1.1 Ethics and the nature of DA 
A key consideration is whether it is ethically justifiable to conduct an interview, in 
particular about a sensitive or traumatic experience, and focus only on the rhetorical 
features of that account. As Widdicombe notes, the attention directed to accounts in 
DA may mean those who have produced them are ignored: "in an important sense the 
participants themselves are irrelevant because it is the language they speak that is the 
site of the investigation" (1993: 109). Of course this is the main tenet of DA; not to 
examine texts at face value, but to consider their construction. The point I wish to 
make is not that DA should examine the content of accounts. Doing so would 
contravene its principles, and is exactly what its proponents have argued against 
(Antaki et al.; 2003: 13, for example)'. Rather, the point is that when the analysis is 
being carried out on interview accounts that have been elicited for the research, then it 
seems unethical to - in the baldest of terms - ignore what people have said, in favour 
of how they have said it. 
I It should of course be remembered that these arguments I am presenting are in response to the version 
of DA as developed by Potter and Wetherell and others from a social psychological perspective. Other 
forms of DA, such as that advocated by Van Dijk (1990), argue that internal cognitive processes do 
exist and should be taken account of. Such an approach would not sideline the content of participant's 
accounts in the same way; but as has been outlined, such a model is not deemed to be as theoretically 
useful as the social psychological one, and has not been drawn upon to any degree in this research. 
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This is important because, as Lepper (2000: 190) argues, analyses will "surprise and 
probably disturb" respondents. This is reiterated by Stenner who points out that "like 
most people I have experienced the irritation, or even horror, of having someone else 
take control over the `meaning' of my words" (1993: 131). One of the particular 
ethical issues of carrying out DA may be, as Parker and Burman2 (1993: 157) argue, to 
do with the authority of "the analyst to impose meanings upon another('s) text". 
Similarly, Wetherell (2001b: 396) points out that "the act of interpreting the words of 
another can bean appropriation of their voice". Stenner (1993: 131) argues that he is 
"painfully aware of having power and control over other people's words", and that 
this awareness is heightened by the lack of any (misconceived) reassurance of an 
objectivist methodology to back me up". An examination of language may focus on 
and suggest interpretations that participants would be unlikely to expect or want. It 
might also ignore other aspects that they could expect to be emphasised. While this 
may be the case in all DA work, to impose an alternative meaning when the account 
has been produced for the purposes of that research alone makes these considerations 
particularly pertinent. Furthermore, Widdicombe and Wooffitt argue that studying 
instances of language use means analysts "seem to deny the significance of what 
people may be saying and doing with their talk" (1995: 65). Through a focus on the 
language rather than the content of accounts, DA may not only marginalize speakers, 
but it may impose a different meaning or interpretation on their talk. 
It is important to consider of course the extent to which DA does ignore content. 
While the emphasis is on examining the constructions used in language and not taking 
content at face value, as Billig (1999b: 574) points out, when "material is collected on 
the basis of content - such as gathering a corpus of material on wife-beating, rape or 
child supervision - then.. the analyst must bring in presuppositions about the nature of 
the phenomenon before the analysis is conducted in detail". He contrasts this with a 
CA perspective which may examine in great detail only one account. In this research, 
I have gathered data on the basis of their content; texts have been collected that were 
`about' ECS. However, I am then deconstructing the content of these texts to 
understand how they present the views that I identified in them (following Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987: 168). So for example, while Horton-Salway (2001a: 147) collected 
data on M. E., and identified this topic in accounts to be able to do so, her analysis 
then focuses on "how the participants made sense of its causes and definitions". The 
difficulty here may arise over definitions of what `content' is, and how it is used. 
Antaki (1994: 121) describes that for discourse analysts, "content is some more 
complex constellation of cultural themes (variously called `repertoires', `practices', 
and even, rather confusingly, `discourses')". The point is then that while DA does 
examine content, it does not take it at face value as an indicator of an underlying 
attitude or truth, but analyses how a particular truth is presented as such: "the interest 
in facts.. is attributional rather than actual. That is, the topic is what participants 
count as factual rather than what is actually factual" (Potter, 1997: 7). 
2 Parker, Burman, (and some of the other sources here) are not advocates of discursive psychology as 
such, and develop a more critical DA. However, their comments are still relevant, partly because of 
some of the similarities between approaches noted in the Chapter Two. They are also being drawn 
upon here because so little has been said about ethics in DP. In later sections of this chapter, I draw 
upon the literature from social research more generally, and from ethics, again because of the 
pertinency and applicability of the comments made; and the silence from DP. 
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In contrast to other qualitative research therefore, DA focuses on the presentation of 
information rather than what that information is. This is a point made again and again 
in discursive work. Potter and Wetherell state that "one is interested in language use 
rather than the people generating the language"... "given the theoretical primacy of 
the talk itself in the discourse mode of research and the focus on how talk is 
constructed" (1987: 161; 164). Psathas (1990: 4) states that "the phenomena being 
studied are not studied in relation to `who' the persons are but rather in terms of the 
organizational or structural features of the interactional phenomena themselves". In a 
rare acknowledgement of the ethical dilemmas that such an approach might raise, Gill 
(1996: 149) argues that the practice of analysing texts "breaks with a more humanist 
tradition of critical research in which respondents' talk is treated as `authentic' and is 
accorded respect". Can this be considered an ethical approach to `respondents' talk? 
I would argue not. 
6 . 1.2 
Sensitive topics: A moral obligation to help? 
I have so far questioned whether it is right to look only at how people construct their 
talk. This debate may be further complicated by the subject matter of interviews. If 
they are about delicate or political topics, it may be felt there is a `moral imperative to 
help', or that it is insensitive to analyse them. Although he was writing about CA, 
Billig (1999b: 574) makes a crucial point, relevant to DA as well. He says that CA is: 
"particularly unsuited for a critical analysis of situations such as rape, 
racial abuse, etc... This form of analysis, again to quote adherents 
of CA, involves a particular pattern of `attending and disattending', 
which specifically disattends to content". 
Sensitive topics should not be subject to analysis that ignores their content3. ECS is a 
sensitive topic, framed as a pressing social problem, and suffering a clot is both life- 
threatening and life-changing. Of course, I do not wish to slip into realist statements 
about the `obvious and apparent' sensitive and traumatic character of the issue. In 
defining what is a sensitive topic, the approach is of course to determine what the 
participants' orientations towards it are. If they can be seen to define the topic as 
sensitive or political, then the analyst would be justified in doing so. As will 
demonstrated in some depth in the analysis chapters, the participants in this issue do 
very much present ECS as a sensitive topic, so I feel able to treat it as such as well. 
This ethical uneasiness about analysis of sensitive topics could be overcome either by 
campaigning on behalf of participants, or not carrying out discourse analysis. 
However, either of these would contradict the principles of this research. To 
campaign for respondents means acknowledging that the version they present is the 
`correct' one. This does not fit with a position of methodological relativism (see 
sections 2.6.1; and 4.8). This is not to say that respondents do not experience severe 
trauma in the occurrence of a blood clot, or that they are lying about their stories. As 
Marlaire and Maynard (1993: 175) put it, "we are not pointing to the devastating 
psychological and physical effects of social problems, however real these may be. 
3 This point is relevant because studies using DA are carried out on sensitive topics, even if they are 
not handled perhaps as diplomatically as they could be. MacMillan and Edwards for example describe 
that "the circumstances surrounding the death of Princess Diana offered a rich opportunity to examine 
the various ways in which the press handled their own availability as agents in the events they were 
reporting" (1999: 169, emphasis added), which seems at the very least to be a little callously phrased. 
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Rather, we are interested in the social organisation of sense making and experience as 
this organisation is manifest in the procedures of real time talk and interaction". 
Horton-Salway (2001b: 249) argues that focusing on the discursive accomplishments 
in an account "does not imply that discursive psychologists are less concerned about 
suffering that other analysts. It is rather that our theoretical equivalence does not 
assume an equivalence between people's accounts and their internal experiences and 
cognitive processes". Carrying out DA is therefore a way of acknowledging that the 
"researcher's constructions are not more privileged with respect to objectivity or truth 
than those of ordinary members" (Sarbin and Kitsuse, 1994: 10). 
Another way of overcoming ethical uneasiness might be to have some practical 
intention for the research. For example, Willig (1999) outlines a number of goals that 
discourse analysts may have, such as using DA as a social critique of a particular 
institution or setting, as a guide to reform, or as an empowerment of the respondents 
involved. However, doing any of these would require adopting an objective view of 
the situation analysed, and a position more commonly adopted in CDA (see section 
2.4). For example, Willig (1999: 147) studied the "positionings made available by 
discursive constructions of sex" and she assesses the implications for sexual practice. 
She argues that "sex education needs to challenge disempowering positionings in 
order to facilitate the practice of safer sex" and recommends a number of techniques 
that participants might use. This seems to be an identification of what is happening in 
a situation, and steps that can therefore be taken to improve it. In contrast, in this 
research I am examining the constructions used by different participants in an issue, 
and not describing that issue and making recommendations about it. A reading of 
Willig's work and others from CDA suggests that without an appreciation of the 
situation, it is not possible to have any further intentions for the research - such as 
recommendations for improvement or empowerment of respondents. It is not 
congruent with the aims of this research to describe a situation in such terms. This 
being so, I would argue that it cannot be right to use DA on interviews with 
participants. 
6.1.3 Trust and expectations in an interview 
A further consideration is whether it is right to carry out DA when respondents may 
be upset, disappointed or harmed by their participation. While most research aims to 
minimise harm to respondents, the focus on language in DA leads to particular 
concerns. The respondent may have expectations about what form the interview will 
take and how the data will be used, and this may be particularly pertinent with a 
political topic such as ECS. Potter (1997) describes that interviews are subject to 
respondents' powerful expectations about social science research. If these 
expectations are not met, respondents may feel disappointed or deceived. These 
expectations may be managed by gaining respondents' informed consent - but I will 
argue shortly that this is both ethically and practically problematic. 
While many respondents may welcome the chance to take part in research and may 
enjoy being given a chance to `tell their story' (Hunt, 2002; Dowie, forthcoming), this 
does not mean that all respondents will, and the design of research that examines the 
constructions rather than the content of accounts, and does not use the data on their 
behalf, increases the possibility that they will not. The effects of research that may 
antagonise, upset or disappoint respondents have to be at the very least anticipated. 
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This point is made by Taylor (2001 a: 20), who argues that ethical concerns are always 
relevant (including in DA) because of the "power relations between a researcher and 
the participants in a project.. the researcher has more power than the participant and 
must be careful not to abuse it". The analyst must therefore anticipate any negative 
outcomes or adverse effects on participants and take steps to protect them (Dixon et 
al., 1987: 164). For example, Brannen (1988: 552) states that "respondents are likely 
to find confronting and telling their stories a traumatic experience" and that "the 
researcher therefore has some responsibility for protecting the respondent". 
Furthermore it has been pointed out that taking part in research is inevitably 
"consciousness raising" for respondents and that if harmful consequences are a 
possibility, it is better not to undertake the research (Ely at al, 1991: 225, emphasis 
added). As Bulmer (1982: 3) argues, "the researcher has always to take into account 
the effects of his actions upon those subjects and act in such a way as to preserve their 
rights and integrities as human beings". Respondents recounting a traumatic 
experience may clearly find this distressing. Whether an approach which questions 
the facticity of participants' accounts and imposes alternative meanings4 on them can 
be seen as preserving individuals' rights is at the very least questionable. 
Furthermore, as Becker (1978) points out, it is important to consider the impact of 
research findings on the researched - they may feel discredited, or find themselves 
under attack. Schepper-Hughes (2000) has outlined the anger and upset of 
respondents who felt that she had emphasised the negative aspects of their 
community, and failed to acknowledge the advantages of their patterns of social 
organisation. Similarly with DA, respondents may not understand how or why a 
focus on language has taken precedence over what they see as the content of their 
account, and may feel it is unfair or unjustified. Horton-Salway (2001b: 256) 
describes how subjects of discursive analysis may be in danger of having their stories 
treated as disingenuous, and Riessman (1993) had similar concerns that she might be 
viewed as carrying out a `critical analysis' of her participant's story. Horton-Salway 
states that "clearly, none of us would want to treat participants in such a dismissive 
way"; but it is clear that this is a danger. Furthermore, respondents involved in a 
political issue may be disappointed if it does not back up their case or further their 
cause in the campaign. Bower and Gasparis (1978: 28-29) argue that this may amount 
to `social injury' where: 
"a subject, who wished to protect and promote the interests of the group to 
which he belonged, or of some other group, feels that his right to serve his 
own social goals has been abridged in the research because he lacked 
sufficient information about the uses that could be made of the information he 
provided; in effect, he was deprived of his rights because of an inadequacy 
of informed consent procedures". 
Informed consent is clearly a way of attempting to overcome these problems; the 
viability of this will now be considered. 
* Regarding `imposed meanings', while the nature of DA is to look at the data with an open mind and 
to develop concepts from the data, it has been pointed out that analysts impose categories upon the text, 
and use terms that participants themselves would have been unlikely to (Antaki, 1994: 138). A fuller 
consideration of the imposition of meaning has been given in section 4.5. Furthermore, to consider an 
account in terms of its rhetorical structure is to give it a different meaning than it would have for 
participants - for them it may be their story, their thoughts, their beliefs (although of course the only 
way to try and understand this would be through addressing what seemed to be their 'orientations' 
throughout the account). 
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6.1.4 The impossibility of informed consent 
Informed consent is widely held to be an important principle in research of all kinds 
(Lidz and Roth, 1983; Bower and Gasparis, 1978). However, there are a number of 
ethical and practical problems with this in DA research. If respondents are informed 
that the structure of their talk will be analysed, this may affect what they then say. 
Respondents might not agree to an interview if they knew that their discursive 
practices would be examined and their facticity challenged, but is it deceiving 
respondents if all this is not explained? If there are practical problems with informing 
respondents, and ethical problems with not informing them, I would argue that DA of 
interviews cannot and should not be carried out. 
In terms of attempts to inform respondents about the study, Schuler (1982: 193) argues 
that revealing too much may undermine the effectiveness of the research, and Homan 
(1991: 74) points out that "the reactivity of information provided for the purpose of 
consent is a problem". It has been acknowledged that speakers orient towards their 
environments (Ochberg 1994), and an interview is an example of a social 
environment. Potter and Mulkay concur with this and suggest that "whether they 
occur in interviews, in conferences, or in scientific texts, in every case accounts can 
only be understood in relation to the specific interactional and discursive occasion" 
(1985: 260). They go to great pains to point out that "different repertoires are suitable 
for different social occasions" and that "accounts of all kinds must be understood as 
the products of participants" contextualised interpretive practices' (1985: 266). It is 
clear that knowing the purpose of the interview could affect the account produced and 
make respondents self conscious in their language use. Potter and Wetherell for 
example describe how for interviewees in their study of racism "one of the dangers of 
producing highly negative claims about groups of people such as Islanders is that they 
can easily be heard as a display of vindictive racism. This may be a particular 
concern when being interviewed by a social researcher" (1988: 67). People may 
justify what they are saying because they are being interviewed. While this will not 
make their accounts any less `valid', it may produce different versions than if they 
were primarily concerned with `telling their story', and as in the example from Potter 
and Wetherell, respondents may attempt to alter their language use in respect of what 
they perceive the researcher's expectations to be. This would not make the account 
any less interesting, as it could be examined for the processes that were used to make 
it justifiable. It may be however that consideration of such processes was not the 
primary intention of the research5. Respondents may also attempt to alter their 
language use because of their own perceptions of what might constitute `good' use of 
language. Research where respondents have been surprised and alarmed when 
presented with their transcripts illustrates this. Lieblich (2002) documents 
S This is not of course to assume that the account would be invalid because it oriented towards the 
interview context, or that any such `bias' is something that can be removed from the research process. 
As Speer points out in her interesting commentary, since DA "treats respondents, not as passive 
containers of knowledge, but as active participants within the research process who construct rather 
than report on reality, 'bias' is regarded as both unavoidable and pervasive .. thus attempts to control bias may not only be futile, but may stifle the very features of the interaction that are theoretically 
interesting" (2002: 511-2). What I am attempting to do here however is not to avoid bias, but to 
consider how respondents' language use changes in different contexts, and the effect this has. Ten 
Have states that "[e]xperimenter effects are not `bad' in themselves, but should be taken into account, 
and used or avoided depending on one's chosen research strategy" (2002: 527), which is what I have 
therefore attempted to do. 
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respondents' disquiet with the casual language they used and their desire to modify it 
afterwards. While respondents may not engage in sustained use of a different 
linguistic repertoire, or may not do so at all because they are used to constructing a 
`story telling' narrative (Lieblich et al., 1998; Mishler, 1986), it is crucial to be alive 
to such a possibility. In light of what Fielding (1993: 144) describes as the "long 
tradition of methodological research [which] warns of the many effects the 
interviewer has on the respondent's statements", it is clear that giving the respondent 
`too much' information will have implications for the interaction that takes place. 
Information given to respondents may not only influence what they say, but it may be 
difficult for them to understand what they are being told, possibly invalidating the 
procedures of informed consent. The British Sociological Association's Statement of 
Ethical Practice (2002: 3) states that it should be explained "in terms meaningful to 
participants, what the research is about, why it is being undertaken, and how it is to be 
disseminated and used"; but applying this may be problematic. Parsons (1966) 
describes this difficulty as `the competency gap' where respondents do not have 
sufficient expertise to comprehend the subtleties of the information being given to 
them. They are then unable to make an informed choice about participation. Indeed, 
Lidz and Roth (1983: 155) propose that there are "problems of how to ensure adequate 
explanation of the factors involved in the decision". Ball (1984) reports that the 
majority of his participants had little grasp of what sociological research was, and the 
sort of outcomes it might produce. Respondents may be "naive" and this "makes it 
more imperative that we are careful to protect them" (Ely at al, 1991: 223). 
Importantly, Taylor (2001a: 20) makes this point in reference to DA and argues that 
"in practice, making sure that the consent is informed, that is, that participants fully 
understand the implications of their involvement, can be difficult". With DA, it may 
be difficult to explain analytical procedures in meaningful terms - especially when (as 
Potter and Wetherell (1987) point out6) even analysts have difficulty explicitly 
defining what these procedures are. 
There are other difficulties with regard to `consent'. Although in theory participants 
do not have to consent to an interview or can leave at any time, they are not 
encouraged to. For example, Homan writes that while researchers are trained to get 
informed consent: 
"what frequently happens is that researchers occupy the time set aside for 
informing potential subjects with a highly generalised and anodyne account 
which is couched in plausible terms and avoids any possibilities that might 
disincline intended subjects from participating" (1991: 75). 
Furthermore, he points out that standard practice, counselled by textbooks, is to use 
the informing of consent as an exercise in persuasion (1991: 76). This constitutes a 
deliberate `softening up' of participants by feeding them a "cover story" of what the 
research is about (MacNeil, 1985: 61). Informed consent tends to be gained on the 
basis of selective information, and structured so that respondents will say yes. Lidz 
and Roth (1983: 155) argue that overcoming the problems of informed consent would 
mean "abolishing the researcher's interest in getting a consent rather than a refusal". 
Gaining `informed consent' also transfers responsibility onto the respondent to stop 
6 This refers to their comment about ' words failing' them when it comes to describing the process of 
analysis (1987: 168). 
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the interview, and means that any potential harm from participation in an interview 
cannot be mitigated by arguing that respondents `did not have to take part'. 
It is clearly difficult to ensure that respondents are fully informed about a study. The 
other extreme would be to tell them as little as possible, to elicit data as 
`uncontaminated' by researcher effect as possible, and ignore any competency gap. 
However, this contradicts a deontological view of research which values respondents 
and their feelings. From this view, some actions are wrong in themselves, and not just 
because they have unwanted or unfortunate consequences (Gensler, 1998). The end 
never justifies the means. To deliberately deceive or mislead respondents about the 
intentions of the research violates what Homan (1991: 73) calls their "fundamental 
right to know". He says that respondents not informed of the nature of an 
investigation before it is conducted will feel alienated or betrayed when they discover 
it afterwards. 
Similarly, explaining the principles of the research in a way that Homan (1991: 76) 
describes as `half hearted' maybe just as unethical. He says that difficulties in the 
practical application of the principle of informed consent lead some researchers to 
satisfy themselves with this. As Johnson points out, there is a danger of confusing the 
theoretical implausibility of gaining totally informed consent with the practical 
convenience to the researcher of gaining none at all (1997: 44). Again, this 
manipulation of the principle of informed consent contradicts an ethical focus on the 
`means' rather than `ends'. Bower and Gasparis (1978: 17) argue that deceiving 
respondents, such as with a misleading description of the study's processes, 
denigrates them. Indeed, Erikson (1967) believes that `using masks' in social 
research compromises both those who wear them and those for whom they are worn. 
Moreover, he contends that doing so violates the terms of a contract that the 
sociologist should be ready to honour in their dealings with others. Clearly any 
deception of respondents is an abuse of their trust and (in theory at least) willing 
participation in the research. Keeping respondents uninformed about the research, 
what DA is, and how their talk will be used and analysed cannot be morally justified. 
6.1.5 The way forward 
These ethical and methodological considerations have shaped this research. The BSA 
Statement of Ethical Practice (2002: 4-5) states that it is "incumbent on members to be 
aware of the possible consequences of their work. Wherever possible they should 
attempt to anticipate and to guard against, consequences for research participants 
which can be predicted to be harmful". I designed this research with this in mind. As 
Pojman (1990: 37) asks, "who's best to judge what's right and wrong? We are. We do 
so on the basis of the best reasoning we can bring forth and with sympathy and 
understanding". Contentious issues in the social research literature are left in the end 
to the researcher and their conscience. Lofland and Lofland conclude that "as in all 
other ethical dimensions of naturalistic research, we believe that the ethically 
sensitive, thoughtful, and knowledgeable investigator is the best judge" (1984: 29), 
and Crow (2000: 79) argues that "ultimately the ethical obligation lies with the 
researcher". Benn (2000) outlines Kant's argument that if we are autonomous and our 
morality is `up to us', this does not detract from the vigour of our decisions. It means 
that we can, and should, make decisions that fully consider the ethics involved. 
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In the light of these considerations, it did not seem ethical to carry out interviews with 
people who have experienced ECS. Having asked respondents to be interviewed; 
having entered into the social engagement of an interview, with the obligations that it 
implies; having built up trust and rapport; and having asked them to tell a personal 
and traumatic story it seems ethically inappropriate to then take this data away and 
undertake discourse analysis on it, and not use it for any more proactive purpose. 
What were the options then for carrying out this research in an ethical way? One 
option would have been to carry out DA, but prepare careful informed consent and 
show participants the analysis afterwards. As has been discussed, however, there are 
a variety of methodological and ethical problems with attempting to gain informed 
consent. Furthermore, while Lieblich (2002) advocates allowing respondents to make 
alterations to their interview transcripts, this is difficult to incorporate into a study 
focused on language use, where even the smallest change will be significant, if this is 
not the focus of the study. 
The option that I chose was to design research that circumvents the need to obtain 
informed consent, by using measures that are unobtrusive and that do not include 
direct and elicited interaction with respondents. This means there is no social contract 
between the researcher and respondent, and there are no expectations to be managed. 
The documents I analysed were all in the public domain, such as websites, fact sheets, 
and new releases. Indeed, a number of DA studies have been carried out on publicly 
available or `naturally occurring'? data, such as Potter and Edwards (1990) on the 
media; Potter and Wetherell (1995) on television; and Brown (1999) on self-help 
books. Indeed, Edwards and Potter argue that "DP favours the analysis of records of 
natural interaction, or textual materials produced as part of life's activities (newspaper 
reports, medical records, written testimony etc)" (2001: 12, emphasis added). 
The use of `naturally occurring' data does not of course mean ethical and 
methodological considerations are not applicable. However, when a document is 
placed in the public domain, rather than being deliberately elicited, I would argue that 
these issues are not so pertinent. A focus on the constructions in a public document 
does not have the same moral obligations as a deliberately elicited interview. 
Respondents have sensitivities and expectations that need to be managed that 
documents and their authors do not. While an author may wish a document to have a 
certain effect, relinquishing any control over what this might be is a necessary part of 
making it public. The researcher may still have power over the words of the author, 
and the author does not know what use their text is being put to, but this is a 
consequence of submitting it for public consumption. The responsibility rests with 
authors, rather than the researcher, because of their decision to publish their text. 
Lepper (2000) is adamant on this point, arguing that "using naturally occurring data 
means that much data can be sought from the public domain [.. ] published records, 
public trials and hearings, broadcasts, newspaper texts - all provide a variety of 
7 Speer's (2002: 513; 516) point about the definition of 'natural' and 'contrived' data is acknowledged, 
where she describes that what is `natural' data is not decided on the basis of their type or the role of the 
researcher, but on what the researcher intends to do with it. Natural data is therefore often preferred 
because it is thought to be `better' than contrived materials and more amenable to analysis. However, 
in this research, my concern is not so much with 'natural' data which may be somehow free of bias, but 
with data which have not been elicited for the purposes of research, and in which there is no social 
contract to be managed between the analyst and the author. 
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different kinds of data, about the use of which no ethical dilemma should arise". 
Furthermore, Bechhofer and Paterson (2000) suggest that non-reactive measures may 
not incur the same issues of researcher effect, citing Billig (1995) to argue that 
research may be based upon entirely non-reactive measures. Wiggins and Potter 
(2003: 514) concur with this, and state that because "analysis of interview material 
may reveal more about interview practices than about how evaluations are used as 
part of daily interaction", discursive work should focus on naturalistic settings. 
In terms of the methodological justification of such an approach, it is also a 
consideration that when data is referred to as `naturally occurring', it is not somehow 
untouched by the researcher. When Heath and Luff (1993: 307) for example describe 
recordings of human interaction as `raw data' there is an implication that this is data 
that is uncontaminated, in contrast to field-notes or responses to questionnaires that 
have been constructed and meditated by the researcher. However they seem to miss 
the point that such raw data may also have been constructed, either by the presence of 
the researcher or recording equipment, or the situations or research design developed 
generate it. Similarly, the `naturally occurring' data examined here has been 
deliberately selected for this research, and involving decisions about selection. Issues 
of relevance and practicability have shaped this and all research and its findings. As 
will be further considered in the Chapter Twelve, the way to proceed is to 
acknowledge these issues, and be aware of their effect. This is not something that it is 
somehow possible to get away from. 
6 . 1.6 
Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed the moral implications of carrying out DA on 
interviews on sensitive topics. I have argued that ignoring the content of such an 
account, especially on a delicate or political topic, may be unethical. The results of 
analysis or use of the data may upset respondents, and attempts to manage their 
expectations with informed consent have been shown to be unsatisfactory. These 
moral problems do have to be solved and ignoring the dilemmas in research will not 
answer them: Denzin (1978: 383) argues that "some resolution of the ethical 
implications of research has to be made". The conclusion that if research cannot be 
carried out to the best of the researcher's (technical and ethical) abilities, it should not 
be carried out at all, may be somewhat extreme. Homan (1991: 4) however defends 
Baumrind's `high moral ground' and his insistence that if methodological rigour ever 
conflicts with the fundamental rights of subjects, methodology must be compromised 
(1971: 887). I believe that occupation of this high ground can be the only way 
forward. In light of these considerations, data has been collected from a variety of 
sources, but deliberately excluded from situations where there is a `social contract' 
between researcher and researched to be managed. 
6.2. Ethical considerations of research on Internet sources 
Moving onto the second ethical debate, I have already detailed in section 5.2.2 that I 
am analysing two sources of data from the Internet; a mail-based list, and an online 
discussion group. To do so, I became a member of the mail-based list and did not 
inform the members that I was a researcher, while I entered the Internet forum as an 
observer. Consent was not sought in either case. This may seem to contradict the 
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earlier importance placed on ethical considerations. However, the same principles 
used to assess the ethics of conducting interviews were applied here. I concluded that 
posts on Internet discussion groups and messages to email lists may also be 
considered to be public, which means that there may be less ethical difficulty with 
using them, and that such covert analysis does not involve a `social contract' between 
the researcher and the researched. I will now consider these issues in more detail. 
6.2.1 Privacy and the public domain 
Ethical considerations are extremely pertinent in Internet research. The Association 
of Internet Researchers' (AOIR) Ethical Guidelines for Internet Research state that 
"rights to privacy, confidentiality, autonomy and informed consent" should be 
protected at all times (2002: 6). I agree. What I wish to argue is that this research has 
not breached such ethical considerations because of the careful way it was carried out. 
The key ethical issues in research on Internet sources are considering individuals' 
privacy, and deciding what counts as a `public domain'. Howson et al. (2003: 53) 
argue that "internet mediated research raises new issues concerning respecting 
individual's rights for privacy.. the crucial question is whether the researcher is 
ethically justified in using publicly available information as data for a research study". 
Clearly, respect individuals' privacy is important. However, I think the key words in 
Howson et al. 's comment are "publicly available". Paccagenella (1997) argues that 
posted messages are public acts, deliberately intended for public consumption. When 
responses are placed in the public domain, the author concedes control over how they 
are used, and implicitly accepts this by submitting them. Bordia (1999: 150) says of 
interactions that took place in public discussion forums that "the participants were 
aware that their verbalizations were public domain" and that the researcher was not 
"snooping on a private conversations, such as email between two people", a point 
reiterated by Sudweeks and Rafaeli. They draw an interesting distinction between 
personal and private: "we view public discourse on CMC as just that: public. Such 
study is akin to the study of tombstone epitaphs, graffiti, or letters to the editor. 
Personal? - yes. Private? - no" (1995, no page number; cited in Paccagenella 1997). 
Indeed, the AOIR (2002) ethical guidelines state that if the research focuses on 
publicly accessible archives, then there may be less obligation to protect individual 
privacy. The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and 
Humanities' (NESH) guidelines (2001) point out that `public persons' and people in 
public spheres have a reduced expectation of privacy, such that simple observations of 
such persons and people is not ethically problematic. The AOIR guidelines 
specifically state that if subjects maybe understood as "authors intending for their 
work to be public (eg email postings to large listserves and USENET groups; public 
webpages such as homepages, web logs etc; chat exchanges in publicly accessible 
chatrooms etc) then fewer obligations to protect autonomy, privacy, confidentiality 
etc will likely follow" (2002: 7). 
I am therefore considering Internet chatrooms to be public spaces. But do their 
members? Again, it is useful to draw on the AOIR guidelines. These list several 
questions that should be asked when undertaking Internet research. The first concerns 
the site of interaction or communication, and what ethical expectations are established 
by the venue. They ask whether there is a posted site policy that establishes specific 
expectations "eg, a statement notifying users that the site is private" (2002: 5). The 
72 
guidelines state that "the greater the acknowledged privacy of the venue, the greater 
obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality and the right to 
informed consent" (2002: 5). Eysenbach and Till (2001: 1103) give an interesting 
example of this, and describe the `SickKids' discussion list for children with cancer. 
The information about the list states that "adults will NOT be permitted to participate 
on this list as its purpose it to provide kids with their own personal space to share". In 
my research, there were notices on both the forum and the mail-based list web page 
that they are public sites. The Internet forum warns members to be careful about what 
they say because of this, and the list administrator on the mail-based list cautions 
members and reminds them not to say anything on the list that they would not say in 
any other public forum. Indeed, the aim of the list is stated as a resource for those 
with an interest in the human side of aviation and "not just a private chat group for 
just a select few practitioners" (Member DW, mail based list, 08/01/03). 
I think there is a further element to whether a site can be considered public or private, 
and that is the ease with which non-members can access and join it. If access 
requires a registration, does this mean that a group is private? I have decided that if 
there are no restrictions on registration, this means a group is not private. If anyone 
can join the site and if membership is simply a matter of going through the procedures 
of registration requiring minimal details such as a name and email address, then I do 
not consider this to be a private site. It is certainly not private compared to a site 
where registration is only possible through invitation or where access is by password. 
In this research, I registered for the mail-based list but this only required a name and 
an email address. The Internet forum was open to anyone to observe. Posting a 
message required a registration, but I had no wish to post messages, on either site. No 
private forums were entered or used. If forums and lists are considered to be public 
spaces, then the same arguments apply as with documents outlined previously in 
section 6.1.5. Once an author submits their text into a public domain, they forsake 
control over what happens to that text, or how it may be used. On this point, 
Eysenbach and Till (2001) argue that it is ethical to record activities in a public place 
without consent, provided that individuals are not identifiable, an issue which will be 
fully considered in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.2 `Informed' consent revisited 
In this research, I observed posts without informing members of my presence. I did 
not ask their consent. However, I have already considered that even when 
participants do give consent, it may be difficult to judge whether this is fully informed 
(section 6.1.4). Furthermore it is important to consider `researcher effect', the extent 
to which knowing that a researcher is present changes what members do and say. As 
Eysenbach and Till state, "there is a considerable danger that announcing the research 
may influence future communication patterns or provoke members to opt out (which 
may damage the community)" (2001: 1104). Seeking `informed consent' therefore 
might not only mean participants attempt to change their language use (which might 
be considered a `problem') but announcing research might change community 
patterns and even "damage" the community. This is clearly to be avoided. 
To decide how to manage issues of informed consent and researcher effect, it was 
useful to draw on previous studies of Internet data. Paccagenella (1997: 6) for 
example acknowledges that carrying out observation on the Internet without 
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informing those being studied "reduces the dangers of distorting data and behaviour 
by the presence of the researcher". Denzin (1999: 123) has stated in relation to his on- 
line research that "I never identified myself to the group, not did I obtain permission 
to quote from postings". As Mann and Stewart (2002) point out, there are parallels 
here with conventional face-to-face research, and cite Garton et al. who ask: "Must 
researchers identify themselves if they are only participating in the electronic 
equivalent of hanging out on street comers or doughnut shops where they would 
never think of wearing large signs identifying themselves as `researchers'? " 
(1999: 93). I would argue not. Paccagenella (1997: 6) states that it is acceptable not to 
seek informed consent provided that the ethical issues that arise are given proper 
consideration. This is precisely what I have sought to do in this research. 
Furthermore, studies that have adopted this covert approach and then informed 
respondents afterwards have not found any difficulties with doing so. For example, 
Wilkins (1991: 58) observed a conference site and then presented her initial analysis 
back to the previously unsuspecting members of the group. The discussion on the 
ethics of this that followed on the site concluded that "anything posted to a publicly 
readable topic becomes public domain, and can be used". Rafaeli et al. (1994) cite a 
similar conclusion to their research, where it was decided that it was not necessary to 
seek permission for the recording and analysis of publicly posted messages. While 
members may not be expecting researchers to be present or to access their posts, as 
Ferri (2000) points out, they will not know who is in a public forum, and once 
submitting a message concede control over who reads it. 
6.2.3 ymity 
Finally, to ensure congruence with Paccagenella's invective to give proper 
consideration to ethical issues, I have anonymised the names of the forum and email 
list, and the names of the individual members whose messages I studied. This is 
despite there being disagreement in the literature over whether this is necessary. 
Mann and Stewart for example argue that there is no need to make participants' 
names anonymous, as a "more robust approach would simply be to use the name that 
accompanied the original text on the grounds that, if people were happy for the 
Internet to see the association between their words and their name, why should they 
object to it in a book? " (2002: 46). They furthermore state that "chat usernames may 
bear no relationship to the identity of the user and hence may be used in research 
reports without modification" (2002: 58). However, Herring (1996) discusses using 
pseudonyms for participants unless they have specifically granted permission for their 
real names to be used, and Paccagenella (1997: 7) states that "changing not only real 
names, but also aliases and pseudonyms (where used) proves the respect of the 
researchers for the social reality of cyberspace". He goes on to point out that even 
though some Internet resources may be publicly available, this does not mean that 
participants have waived their right to remain anonymous, nor that the identity of an 
institution and/or list should be exposed, and Kendall (1999) details how she changed 
both the names of the forum and the pseudonyms adopted by participants in her 
research. Finally, and importantly, Walthers (1999) points out that research that 
reveals even the name of a site can have significant consequences, such as extra 
visitors to that site, or recriminations between the members on it. Following these 
suggestions, I have anonymised the names and pseudonyms of members, and the 
names and addresses of the forums they have participated in. While some researchers 
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would not regard this double layer of anonymity as unnecessary, in order to make this 
research as ethical as possible, I have decided to adopt this position. 
A final point about quoting from messages is made by Bordia (1999: 151). She argues 
that in her study, "confidentiality was maintained by not reproducing large segments 
of [individuals'] postings. " To an extent, my research is reproducing postings from 
participants. This is in keeping with the requirements of DA validation. While this 
would to contradict Bordia's position, the segments reproduced from these groups are 
never more than a few lines long, and all other measures have been taken to assure 
author anonymity and confidentiality. In relation to this, Eysenbach and Till 
(2001: 1105) argue that "by quoting the exact words of a newsgroup participant, the 
researcher may breach the participant's confidentiality even if the researcher removes 
any personal information", because quotes can be traced through search engines. I 
therefore carried out extensive searches of the quotes that I was using in search 
engines, but they did not provide links to the messages or the forums they came from. 
I therefore believe the confidentiality of members to be maintained. 
I have argued here and in the previous chapter that it is both theoretically interesting 
and ethically justifiable to undertake covert research of Internet discussion forums and 
mailing lists. Overt research would mean that respondents' expectations would have 
to be managed, there is a risk of not obtaining `informed' consent from them, and of 
not treating their texts in line with their expectations. To undertake covert analysis 
instead may initially seem rather more unethical, but the key point is that members are 
leaving messages in public forums. Members are warned that their posts are public, 
and accessing them is very straightforward. Furthermore, every effort has been made 
to maintain the confidentiality of the members. I therefore believe that this research 
does not infringe the rights of members, or risk causing damage to communities, and 
is thus in line with the ethical guidelines outlined. 
6.3. Ethical considerations of research on the BA Intranet 
There is one final issue to be addressed. As part of this research I have analysed 
pages from the British Airways intranet. This is a web based information system for 
BA employees. I am not a BA employee, and the data was given to me by a contact 
at BA. The issues that have been considered here are clearly applicable to this data. 
The pages were not intended for public consumption, and I did not ask permission to 
use them. However, I think analysis of them is justifiable for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, there is no social contract to be managed. This was the main problem 
identified with analysis of interviews; here, the data has not been elicited intentionally 
for the purposes of research, and there are no expectations to be managed. Secondly, 
the data was offered to me, I did not ask for it. I did not put someone with access to it 
in the difficult position of having to obtain it for me. My contact knew I was studying 
ECS and thought it would be of interest to me. If they foresaw no ethical difficulty in 
volunteering me the data, then there seems to be less compulsion for me to do so 
either. Thirdly, there is the issue of public and private domains. The pages were not 
for public consumption. They were however designed for all BA employees to be 
able to access. This is a wide audience, not a specific recipient. To have used this 
data is not the same as eavesdropping on a private conversation, or, following Bordia 
(1999: 150), reading an email between two people; it is more akin to standing outside 
a conference hall without a ticket (and with a friend inside). My presence does not 
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harm or affect anyone inside. For these reasons, I have included analysis of the texts 
in this research. 
This chapter has been a consideration of the ethics of this research. I have 
documented how and why decisions were taken on the data to carry out DA on. The 
next four chapters present the analysis of data that was carried out. 
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Chapter Seven: 
The Actions of the Passengers and the Management of Stake: 
Airlines' Responsibility for Economy Class Syndrome 
In this chapter I consider how ECS is constructed by a number of airlines. I highlight 
various techniques used to avoid blame for the issue, downplay its seriousness, and 
emphasise their own concerned and active role. Moreover, these airlines attempt this 
whilst defending themselves against actual or potential criticisms of their actions and 
their interest in the issue. I discuss the mechanisms by which airlines achieve a 
construction of ECS as a voluntary risk taken by passengers, which they themselves 
have been active in trying to prevent, but cannot be held responsible for. 
7.1. Presentation of self 
ECS is an issue with potentially huge ramifications for the airline industry. With high 
profile media coverage and imminent lawsuits, it is crucial that airlines counter any 
claims about its seriousness and portray it as a risk assumed by passengers. It is 
equally important that the industry portrays itself as acting appropriately and 
responsibly in the controversy, but playing no part in causing or exacerbating the risk. 
Therefore, an airline's first objective in a document about ECS may be to present 
itself in such a way that the constructions it uses will be taken seriously and not 
dismissed out of hand. Presentation of self is important not just for what it will say 
about the speaker or author, but for how the rest of the account will be viewed; for 
example Horton-Salway (2001b), and Wooffitt (1992) discuss the importance of 
presenting oneself in a particular way to persuade about the account being told. As I 
noted in section 3.3, previous research has also considered the establishment of 
authority in accounts and demonstrated that facticity does not simply manifest itself as 
a reflection of content; rather, that active construction is required to make an account 
believable (Billig, 1996; Potter, 1997). In this instance, airlines may characterise 
themselves as presenting a factual and correct account of the situation. This 
presentation makes the rest of the account seem credible and gives them the authority 
to make the statements and claims that they do. Airlines may also present themselves 
by emphasising their responsible and concerned attitude to the issue, and outlining all 
the actions they are taking to inform passengers about the issue and understand the 
problem better. 
I therefore now consider how airlines self present as being concerned about ECS and 
active in trying to prevent it, how they manage potential criticisms about their interest 
in the issue, and outline that they are `on the same side' as the passengers. 
71 .1 Factual, concerned and active 
Airlines wish to establish the facticity of their account. This can be illustrated with 
the following extract from the Australian airline Qantas. Its website has information 
on a number of health related issues including mention of deep vein thrombosis, risk 
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factors, and preventative exercises. The introductory paragraphs are significant to 
consider, as they outline the airline's position on health issues generally, and guide 
the reader on how the rest of the pages should be considered: 
[1] From: www. gantas. conLau/flights/essentials/healthinflight. htnd [accessed 28/08/01] [line numbers 
added] ' 
Your Health Inflight 
At Qantas we care about your comfort and safety. 
We have included the following information about your health inflight 
that we hope you will find helpful and useful. 
The text also goes on to state with reference to the air quality and conditions in the 
cabin that: 
Although these unique factors do not pose a health or safety threat 
to most customers, there are guidelines you can follow 
that will improve your comfort level during and after a flight. 
The text starts out with `we care', thus setting the tone for what will follow. This may 
be similar to Horton-Salway's notion of `scene setting'. As she says, the start of a 
narrative "has profound consequences for the kinds of causal account that speakers go 
on to give" (2001b: 250). The presentation of self is as concerned, responsibly 
providing information and advice that is factual and proven. The text states that the 
guidelines given "will" improve comfort, not that they `may'. It goes on to state that 
the recommended exercises have been `designed', implying that they have been 
deliberately and carefully constructed, will work, and are proven and tested. These 
guidelines can be "followed" by passengers - the airline has devised and made 
available the appropriate information, passengers need only respond to what has been 
provided for them. The airline comes across as efficient and responsible, and this 
gives them the authority to continue. 
An airline may also attempt a favourable self presentation by emphasising its active 
role in the issue of ECS. It is doing all it can to provide information, and to research 
the problem. This makes the airline seem to be taking the issue seriously and 
responsibly, and therefore cannot be accused of ignoring it. Adopting a proactive role 
in fording out more about the issue makes the airline seem as if they have nothing to 
hide. This press release from British Airways (BA) illustrates this involved and 
vigorous attitude: 
1 Layout of quotes follow the style set out by, for example, MacMillan and Edwards (1999) 
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[2] British Airways - Online Press Office - News Releases www. britishairways. com/press [accessed 
22/11/00] 
British Airways takes the health and well-being of passengers and staff 
extremely seriously. 
We welcome the House of Lords' investigation into the health effects 
of travel in commercial aircraft and have co-operated fully 
by providing evidence on a number of occasions to members of 
the Science and Technology Committee. 
7 We are already very active in the provision of health information to 
8 our passengers, however we are keen to learn more about DVT and 
9 we are supporting an independent study looking at all aspects of 
10 transportation, including flying. 
11 We also fully support the need to provide accurate health information 
12 and advice to passengers. For many years, British Airways has provided 
13 expert medical advice to customers and health professionals 
14 and will continue to do so. 
There is a great deal of emphasis in the text about what BA are doing. This is both in 
terms of stressing the activities they are involved in, and also through the action- 
oriented language used: `we are active', `we are keen', `we support'. Often, even 
while it is being described in these terms, actually not very much is being done; "we 
fully support the need to provide accurate health information" sounds extremely pro- 
active, but at the same time does not say very much. However, the impression is 
given of an efficient and responsible organisation, actively involved in an 
investigation of ECS and in health issues more generally. They are even so 
knowledgeable about such issues that their experts provide medical advice to health 
professionals (lines 12-14). The actions of passengers are not mentioned in this text, 
and the emphasis is all on the pro-active BA. 
It is particularly interesting to note how an airline may continue to stress this 
concerned and responsible attitude in the face of criticism. That the airline does so 
shows how crucial it is to maintain such a position. Potter (1997: 107) describes how 
factual accounts can be analysed in terms of their offensive and defensive rhetoric, 
and Billig (1991: 143) points out that "every attitude in favour of a position is also 
implicitly, but more often explicitly, also a stance against the counter position"; see 
section 3.3. In the following example, there is an explicitly defensive rhetoric being 
employed. The extract is taken from internal BA communications. While the BA 
factsheets and website information are for public use and may be designed to allay 
public fears and to encourage people to fly, the BA intranet is for BA employees only. 
This is clearly an audience with knowledge of flying and BA practices, many of 
whom regularly fly as part of their jobs. The extract here gives a newspaper quote 
about BA, and then BA's response to it. 
79 
[3] British Airways Intranet - What the papers say [accessed 24/01/02] [line numbers added] 
1 BA issues a blood clot warning with tickets 
2 British Airways is to issue health warnings with its flight tickets 
3 in a bid to allay passengers' fears over so-called `economy class syndrome'. 
4 The airline will introduce the measures next month in the form of a leaflet 
5 instructing passengers how to minimise risk during travel. 
Wednesday, January 10,2001 Daily Mail p39 
7 BA Position 
8 From the beginning of next month we will be sending out health information 
9 leaflets with tickets - the aim of which is to provide passengers 
10 with information on well-being and travel. 
11 The leaflet will offer a range of travel health advice - for example, 
12 on immunisations, carrying medication in hand luggage, what to eat and 
13 drink on-board as well as exercises to do on-board. 
14 The leaflet points out that the possibility of circulatory problems, 
15 particularly traveller's thrombosis, can be reduced by limiting the length 
16 of time passengers sit still. It recommends a few simple exercises which 
17 can help - standing up, stretching your arms and legs every couple of hours 
18 and trying to take a brief walk around the cabin whenever you can. It refers 
19 passengers to BA's inflight magazine Highlife for further detail, including 
20 exercises passengers can do in their seats. 
21 The introduction of this leaflet is not a reaction to recent media coverage 
22 on DVT nor to speculation about impending legal action. For some years 
23 BA has provided information on well-being in the air through its 
24 in-flight magazine and its 24 hour travel health line for passengers. 
25 The airline also has an inflight exercise video demonstrating exercises 
26 passengers can do on board. This is to be updated in the next few months. 
27 BA was the first, and is still the only British airline, to have a health website 
28 - www. britishairways. com/health 
29 In February BA will also be writing to 14,000 GP's and sending them 
30 leaflets and posters for their surgeries. 
The two texts construct differently the issue being discussed. The newspaper says 
that the leaflet is a bid by BA to "allay fears" and is about "economy class syndrome". 
In contrast BA states that they aim to provide passengers with "information", and that 
the leaflet is about "well-being and travel", offering a range of advice. Their actions 
are not about responding to "fears" - the emotive tone of the newspaper article is 
countermanded by an emphasis on travel generally. It is only in the third paragraph of 
the BA statement that DVT is mentioned, and then the emphasis is on passengers' 
actions; that they should not sit still, that they should take exercises and move about. 
It is written in terms of passengers with phrases such as `whenever you can' (line 14, 
emphasis added). Outlining these measures has the effect of making the passengers 
responsible for avoiding the occurrence of DVT. 
Whilst BA is outlining that passengers may take these steps, the text is written to 
emphasise all the actions it is undertaking. BA says that they recommend, they refer, 
they will be sending out information, and have adopted a very pro-active stance to the 
issue. The text is very defensive in this respect, and specifically states that the 
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information being provided is not a reaction, but an ongoing part of their health and 
well being programme. The fact that they are not merely reacting is mentioned late in 
the text, after a number of things that they are doing or have already done have been 
mentioned, thus subtly substantiating these claims. 
7.1.2 Management of stake 
It is clear from the defensive tone of this last extract that while airlines are trying to 
appear factual and authoritative, they are also having to contend with what Potter 
(1997: 110) has described as "the dilemma of stake", where what is being said may be 
"discounted as a product of stake or interest". Indeed, MacMillan and Edwards 
(1999: 153) describe how "various kinds of stake, motive or interest are marshalled in 
ways that undermine factuality. And as Horton-Salway (2001b: 155) says, because 
there is this danger, participants attend to it in their accounts; see section 3.3. While 
issues of stake are considered as part of the rhetorical strategies of all the. groups 
studied, they are particularly important for the airlines. Airlines clearly have an 
involvement in ECS, and a commercial interest in playing down its significance 
whilst outlining their own responsible role in tackling it. Indeed, their role is so clear 
that as Potter says "issues of stake may be so salient that inoculating against them 
may be difficult and ignoring them unlikely to be effective" (1997: 130). The airlines 
cannot pretend to be disinterested or uninvolved; yet they want what they say to be 
believed and taken seriously, and not just dismissed as a product of their stake. 
A variety of methods are used to manage stake. The first is to emphasise that the facts 
of the issue are being presented. The implication is that as facts are value neutral, the 
airline cannot be biased in their presentation of them, and they are merely outlining 
what is already known and proven about the issue. Acknowledging that ECS exists 
by giving the facts about it may be used to disarm potential accusations about airline 
cover-ups. Furthermore, an airline may attempt to inoculate against stake by 
presenting itself as being on the same side as passengers, so presenting information 
about the issue in the interests of themselves as well as passengers. The implication is 
that the information provided is reliable and accurate because they have a self interest 
in making it so. 
7.1.2.1 Presentation of Facts 
An example of management of stake through the presentation of facts is an article in 
the Olympic Airways in-flight magazine. The introduction to the text is significant: 
[4] Motion, Olympic Airway's inflight magazine: Travel Health section p94 [26/06/01 ] 
Economy Class Syndrome 
2 Everything You Should Know 
3 Deep Venous Thrombosis (DVT) is a much debated subject. Education about 
4 in-flight DVT is the best preventative measure because knowledge can lead 
5 to actions that offset the development of the condition during flight. 
The words "much debated" and "education" are important here. They imply that even 
though there is a controversy, there is one version that is accurate, and facts exist that 
it is possible to be educated about. The implication is that it is on these pages that this 
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version will be given. This is emphasised by the way the article is written, with a 
series of questions and answers. In this instance, the airline is setting out the `facts', 
rather than just writing an article which might be dismissed as opinion. Indeed, the 
text is written in an empiricist style. Following Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), this is a 
way of constructing a text to make it seem distant from the author. In this text, a 
factual presentation is maintained through descriptions of the education that it is 
possible to have - this is presented not as information that the airline has had a part in 
but that exists independently of them and that passengers can use. In this extract, the 
effect of this empiricist style is emphasised by its combination with an interesting use 
of pronouns. Herschell (2001) notes how pronouns can be employed to, for example, 
encourage solidarity, deny responsibility, or identify enemies and supporters. In this 
example, the pronoun "you" is used for the passengers in the strap-line. This presents 
the account as directly related to those reading it rather than passengers generally, or 
the account being about what `other people' should do. The combination of the 
empiricist style and the personalisation in terms of the passengers constructs the text 
as providing independent facts about ECS. It detracts from the airline's stake in 
producing them, and makes taking account of the advice the responsibility of the 
passengers. The text acknowledges that inflight DVT exists, and there are ways to 
prevent it. It does not try and ignore the issue altogether. The text goes on to state 
that "here are some steps that you can take to avoid the condition". This is not `to 
help avoid the condition', or `that may prevent' it; it is presented as a definite fact that 
the occurrence of a DVT is avoidable, and that this is the way to do so. 
One way of dealing with issues of stake is to therefore acknowledge that ECS exists 
as an issue. To either deny it or to dither would be expected, but to acknowledge it is 
to disarm such criticism. This may be what Potter (1997: 129) describes as "stake 
confession". This "shows that the writer is live to its relevance and its not trying to 
dupe the readership. It may also work as a display of honesty and objectivity: the 
author is someone who can stand outside his interests and is well aware of their 
distorting potential. In this sense it is disarming. Also it puts potential objectors in 
the interactional position of making a point that has already been conceded". An 
airline cannot be accused of being involved in a cover up about ECS or trying to hide 
the facts if they are stating that it exists and providing advice on how to prevent it. 
Once this has been established however, the focus for the blame for its occurrence can 
be shifted onto passengers. Stake management in this way can be seen at various 
points throughout the text. For example: 
[5] Motion, Olympic Airway's inflight magazine: Travel Health section p94 [26/06/01] 
1 Ql Why is DVT also called 'Economy Class Syndrome'? 
2 The first reports on DVT appeared in the 1940's among Londoners 
3 who were forced to sit for many hours in air-raid shelters. 
4 The earliest report of a flight related leg vein problem was published in 1954. 
The start to this answer acknowledges that the issue of DVT has been known about 
for some time. This is interesting because airlines have been accused of denying this 
and covering it up, by passenger groups, articles in medical journals, and the press. 
This is an example of what Puchta and Potter (2002: 347) describe as a simultaneous 
justification of one position and criticism of the counter position. The airline is 
presenting an account of the risk, and by saying it exists is making it harder for such a 
criticism to be levelled against them. Mentioning the known history of DVT as an 
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issue also detracts from the idea that flying is the cause. The history of the risk is 
constructed in such a way to detract from airline responsibility for it. What is also 
interesting is the way that the airline `acknowledges' the existence of a risk, but does 
so in such a way to diminish any responsibility for it. In the text, lines 2 and 3 are 
simply irrelevant to the question the author has asked. Instead, they function to 
emphasise that while DVT may exist, it is not just an air flight problem. 
Further statements in the article seem to be an attempt to acknowledge some of the 
controversy and issues around ECS, in order to disarm potential critics. For example: 
[6] Motion, Olympic Airway's inflight magazine Travel Health section p95 [29/6/01 ] 
1 `But if airlines need to be held in any way responsible, I think it is only 
2 if they make a habit of keeping the `Fasten Seat Belt' light on for the 
3 convenience of the crew rather than for actual passenger safety. 
4I truly believe that only the captain knows when the risk from turbulence 
5 outweighs the risk from DVT' says Dr. I. Dale Carroll, medical director of 
6 The Travel Doctor clinic in Michigan. 
The use of the quote in the text seems significant, because at first it appears that the 
airline is claiming responsibility for bringing on a DVT through their actions, such as 
unnecessarily asking passengers to remain in their seats. However, while appearing to 
concede this responsibility, the airline actually implies that this is the only way they 
might be responsible, and it suggests that keeping a light on is not particularly serious. 
The only reason the airline does this is for `convenience', reasonable in the cramped 
working environment of a plane, and not for any more sinister reasons. The expertise 
of the pilot is emphasised, as subtly are the risks of turbulence. Without explicitly 
stating it, the risks of turbulence are portrayed as being as significant as those from 
ECS; and ECS has been taken seriously so far in the article. It is implied therefore 
that it is obvious and understandable that the pilot might want to keep passengers in 
their seats, clearly for their own safety. Furthermore, the acknowledgement that the 
airlines and pilots do this pre-empts any accusations about this, and the airline may be 
orienting themselves against a potentially hostile context (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987: 33; Wooffitt, 1992: 2). That it is an `expert', supposedly free from stake, making 
these claims only substantiates what is being said, and carries more weight than using 
an airline industry spokesperson or leaving it as a simple statement in the text. This is 
similar to Wooffitt's (1992: 158) description of `active voicing'. To cite someone else 
as holding a particular view helps to establish its objectivity and distances it from 
being the author's interpretation. Further, MacMillan and Edwards (1998: 329) note 
the importance of the use of titles accorded to people. In this extract, it is a doctor, 
and the director, of a clinic that specialises in travel health that is being quoted. Not 
only is this an active voice, but it is a prestigious one. The claim is made to seem 
authoritative and independent from the airline. A way of managing stake is therefore 
to disarm potential critics by acknowledging what may appear to be a problem, and 
then subtly detract from how serious a problem this is. 
Another way of inoculating against stake is to acknowledge the facts of a link 
between the onset of a DVT and travel; but with a careful stress on travel generally 
rather than flying per se. An interesting illustration of this is from BA, and it is 
particularly significant to compare the information released by BA over a period of 
time. Factsheets available on their website have changed in small but significant 
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ways, and examining where these changes have been made and possible reasons why 
further highlights a number of interesting features. The following concerns two 
factsheets that were available and downloaded on the 28/08/01, and the 30/01/02: 
Figure 7: www. britishairways. com/health [accessed 28/08/01] 
In Traveller's Thrombosis 
2a Deep vein thrombosis and air travel 
3a Clotting of blood in the lower legs is known as deep vein thrombosis (DVT). 
4a This has been referred to in the press as `economy class syndrome' but the term is misleading. 
5a Individuals seated in cars, trucks, buses, trains and aeroplanes may all be at risk, and cases 
6a of DVT occurring in flight have been reported in travellers in premium as well as economy. 
7a The term `traveller's thrombosis' is much more accurate. 
8a Some people are more susceptible than others to DVT. 
9a Generally, the risk of thrombosis increases over the age of 40 years 
10a but there are a number of additional known risk factors including: 
I la Previous personal or family history of DVT 
12a Abnormalities of blood clotting factors 
13a Certain forms of cardiac disease 
14a Previous history or currently suffering from malignant disease 
15a Hormone treatment, including the oral contraceptive pill and oestrogen 
16a containing hormone replacement therapy 
17a Pregnancy 
18a Recent major surgery or injury, particularly affecting the lower limbs or abdomen 
19a Recent immobilisation for a day or more 
20a Some research has also suggested that, in addition, there may be an added risk from 
21a tobacco smoking, obesity and varicose veins. 
22a DVT is most common in the lower limbs and the general symptoms are pain, swelling below the site 
23a of the clot, redness and warmth. However, DVT may be present without any associated symptoms. 
24a It begins with the collection of stagnant pooled blood in the deep leg veins, which progresses 
25a to blood clotting. As the clot grows, it can shed emboli which are carried through the blood stream 
26a to the right side of the heart, from where they may pass into the lungs causing a pulmonary embolus. 
27a Embolisation may occur hours or days after the formation of the clot and this may have serious 
28a consequences including chest pain, shortness of breath, and sudden death. 
29a There is limited epidemiological evidence on the incidence of travellers thrombosis. 
30a However, British Airways has supported a study by Dr Patrick Kesteven of Newcastle University 
3la in which all cases of DVT occurring in the north east over a 12 month period have been investigated 
32a to establish any association with recent travel (air or otherwise). The findings, published in 
33a summer 2000, showed that although a history of travel appears to be a risk factor accounting for 
34a 26 cases out of a total of 634, only 16 cases reported having flown in the preceding 4 weeks. 
41a It seems, from this and other studies of which we are aware, that there is indeed an association 
42a between long journeys and the occurrence of DVT but there is no evidence that flying 
43a is a specific risk in itself, There is a consensus view that it is immobility rather than the environment 
44a which is a factor. In addition, at least 75% of DVTs in these studies occurred in travellers had 
45a who already at least one of the risk factors listed above. 
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Figure 8: www. britishairways. com/health [accessed 30/1/01] 
lb Traveller's Thrombosis - the risks and the research 
2b Clotting of blood, usually occurring in the lower legs, is known 
3b as deep venous thrombosis (DVT). 
4b This has become known in the press as `economy class syndrome' but the term is misleading. 
5b individuals seated in cars, buses and trains may all be at risk, and cases of DVT occurring 
6b in flight have been reported in travellers in premium cabins as well as economy. 
7b The term `traveller's thrombosis' is much more accurate. 
8b Research 
9b Reduced blood flow may lead to DVT. Although most of the scientific research relates 
10b to hospital patients during the period immediately after surgery, it is clear that prolonged 
I lb immobility can often be a key factor in the development of a blood clot. 
12b Specific studies examining traveller's thrombosis have looked particularly at how many 
13b DVT sufferers have travelled in the weeks preceding their diagnosis. 
14b It is clear from the studies of which we are aware, that there is indeed an association between 
15b long journeys and the occurrence of a DVT. However, thromboses can occur after car, bus, 
16b rail or air travel, and there is no conclusive evidence that flying itself is a specific risk factor. 
17b in addition, at least 75% of DVTs in these studies occurred in passengers 
18b who already had at least one of the risk factors listed on the next page. 
19b Risk factors 
20b Some people are more susceptible to DVT than others. Generally, the risk of thrombosis increases 
21b once you are over 40 years of age, but there are a number of additional risk factors including: 
22b Previous or family history of DVT 
23b Abnormality of blood clotting factors 
24b Certain forms of cardiac disease 
25b Previous history or currently suffering from malignant disease 
26b Hormone treatment including the oral contraceptive pill and oestrogen 
27b containing hormone replacement therapy 
28b Pregnancy 
29b Recent major surgery or injury, particularly affecting the lower limbs 
30b or abdomen 
31b Recent immobilisation for a day or more. 
32b Some research has also suggested that, in addition, there may be an added risk 
33b from tobacco smoking, obesity and varicose veins. 
34b Signs and Symptoms of DVT 
35b DVT is most common in the lower limbs and may well occur without any obvious 
36b signs or symptoms. 
37b The general symptoms, where they occur, are pain, swelling and discolouration of the affected 
38b limb. The leg may also feel warm to touch and there may be congestion of the superficial veins. 
39b The clinical diagnosis of DVT is not easy. It can mimic many other medical conditions 
40b and expert investigation is required to confirm the diagnosis. 
41b Pulmonary embolism 
42b In some cases, small pieces of clot may detach and be carried through the blood stream 
43b to the heart and onward into the lungs causing a pulmonary embolus. This usually occurs 
44b where there is already an extensive clot in the leg and may happen hours or days after the 
45b formation of the clot. It may result in serious consequences, including chest pain, 
46b shortness of breath, and even sudden death. 
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Examination of these two texts highlights a number of features of stake management, 
and how this may be done by emphasising the risk from travel2. Both texts outline 
that there "is indeed an association between long journeys and the occurrence of 
DVT" (line 41-42a; 14-15b). However, this is not stating a causal link, rather more 
circumspectly saying that there is a relationship, and again only states that it is only 
"long journeys" that might be significant here. Again, this seems to be an example of 
offensive and defensive rhetoric; BA are describing that the risk exists and so 
defending themselves against criticisms that they are ignoring it; but at the same time 
offensively orienting to the accusations that it is flying that causes it by stressing the 
impacts of travel generally. The new pages (30/01/02) emphasise this more 
categorically, by stating twice that "thromboses can occur after car, bus, rail or air 
travel" (line 15-16b, as well as 5b). Stating this in the sentence after one that mention 
"studies" (14b) implies that this is a research finding, and adds greater credibility to it, 
although it does not actually say so. To actually state the different forms of travel that 
might bring on a DVT, rather than just saying that sitting still causes it serves to direct 
attention away from the airline. 
The research section in the new document uses the same text as previously to outline 
that "reduced blood flow may lead to DVT" (line 9b) and states that "prolonged 
immobility can often be a key factor" (line 12b). It furthermore points out that studies 
into DVT "looked particularly at how DVT sufferers have travelled in the weeks 
preceding their diagnosis" (lines 12-13b). Describing this directed focus 
("particularly") on the weeks leading up to a diagnosis emphasises the importance of 
what passengers do pre-and post flight, and removes attention from the experience of 
flight and the airline. Again, a presentation of acknowledging the issue of ECS is 
done in such a way that it takes the emphasis away from the airlines; DVT is caused 
by reduced blood flow, not specifically through the plane environment, but sitting 
still, and by what the passengers had been doing in the previous weeks. 
Another example of stake management through acknowledgment of the risks is from 
the United Arab Emirates Airline. Emirates are an interesting case to study, as they 
provide their passengers with an `airogym', a cushion that passengers place under 
their feet. Exercising with it is designed to stimulate blood flow. While this might 
seem like an acknowledgement that ECS exists and is a cause for concern, the 
information given out by the airline still plays down the risks and emphasises that it is 
not flying in particular that may cause it: 
2 These are lengthy extracts with myriad interesting features in them. The difficulties of only focusing 
on some of these have been discussed in Chapter Four. Some of the features will be referred to later in 
this chapter, but it is acknowledged that there are many aspects of the text that it is not possible to 
mention here. 
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[9] http: //www. emirates. com/abouteniirates/emiratesnews/eniiratesnews2001/news_3553. asp accessed 
31/07/04 
1 EMIRATES TO GIVE PASSENGERS A LEG EXERCISER 
2 Emirates, the international airline of the UAE, today becomes the first airline 
3 in the world to respond to current, world-wide fears about deep vein thrombosis 
4 (DVT) by providing every passenger on long-haul flights with an exercise device 
5 proven to boost blood circulation in the legs. 
6 Emirates' Head of Medical Services, Dr. Alasdair Beatton, said: "The health and welfare 
7 of customers is our top priority. Airogym is a significant product because it is a simple 
8 and fun way of exercising whilst sitting. 
9 "Airogym will encourage people to exercise on board - something we already urge passengers 
10 to do through our video and audio channels during flights and in our inflight magazine. 
11 "Although there is much to learn about the causes of DVT, which appears to affect specific 
12 groups of people who sit still without exercise for long periods of time - even when sitting 
13 at home - Airogym has proven to improve blood flow. That is why Emirates is becoming the 
14 first airline to give its support to this product and is taking a lead role by making it available 
15 to our customers. " 
16 Amanda Richards, Director of Airogym, said: "The beauty of Airogym is that it's simple, 
17 discreet and allows you to exercise your leg muscles effectively and quietly, in the safety 
18 and comfort of your own seat. 
19 "The use of Airogym can prove beneficial to office workers, the elderly, coach, car or train 
20 passengers - not just air travellers. In fact it can help any job, hobby or task that requires 
21 someone to be seated for long periods of time. " 
The airline has to make the risks of a DVT seem serious enough that passengers will 
choose to fly with them because they provide an airogym, and yet not so serious that 
they choose not to fly at all. They do this by presenting themselves as over-cautious - 
although the facts about DVT have not yet been agreed and there is still "much to 
learn", they are taking "a lead role" and responsibly taking action. This is why they 
are providing exercisers for passengers, not because ECS is very serious. However, 
while stating that their provision is in response to "fears about deep vein thrombosis", 
the airline does not present a causal link between flights and blood clots. If clots 
occur on flights, it is because people are sitting down, not because they are flying. 
This is emphasised by the vast number of people who may be susceptible to a blood 
clot - "any job, hobby or task that requires someone to be seated for long periods of 
time" could apply to most people, especially when it can happen "at home" as well. 
The quote from the director of airogym authenticates it - this is someone who would 
know. The emphasis on the range of risky people and locations shifts the focus away 
from the airline as causing ECS. It is caused by immobility. This does not mean 
flying is risky, just immobility; and the airline presents themselves as having the 
answer to this. ECS is a problem, but choosing to fly with Emirates, who can 
substantiate their claim to care about "the health and well-being of their passengers", 
alleviates that risk. 
7.1.2.2 On the same side 
An airline may try to characterise itself as being `on the same side' as passengers, and 
so acting in their interests, as this extract from a BA press release shows: 
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[10] British Airways News Releases [www. britishairways. com/press] [accessed 22/11/00] 
British Airways takes the health and well-being of passengers and staff 
extremely seriously. 
This seems like something that might almost not need saying, as it would be unusual 
to expect anything less. This may be significant in the light of what Wooffitt 
(1992: 52) says about references to actions and elements that are prefaced by 
formulations of intentions or expectations. He notes that "people do not routinely 
construct sentences such as `I tried to arrive on time, and I did', unless they are 
specifically emphasising the virtue of the effort". Similarly, for BA to mention that 
they take the well-being of passengers and staff so seriously might almost seem 
unnecessary, unless it was to emphasise this `virtue of effort'. Furthermore, this does 
not construct ECS as something that creeps up on unsuspecting victims and that the 
airlines are in a conspiracy of silence about, and instead portrays it as something that 
affects everyone, including the airlines and their staff. The issue then becomes less 
about `them and us', the passengers versus the airlines, and more about that fact that 
`we are in all this together'. This sentence has the effect of inoculating against 
criticisms that BA does not care for its passengers, because what may affect them is 
likely to affect their staff as well. 
7.2. Downplaying the seriousness of the issue 
While the airlines want to appear to be presenting an accurate and not overtly partial 
account of the issue, they also have an interest in playing down the seriousness of it - they do not want people to stop flying. This may be subtly done in order to make it 
more effective; untempered claims that ECS is an insignificant issue barely worthy of 
attention may be in danger of being dismissed out of hand. In relation to such 
situations, Potter and Wetherell argue that making a derogatory point less overt may 
actually make it more successful: "It can be sensible to be inexplicit. For one thing, 
explicitness risks being less persuasive" (1987: 33). Playing down the seriousness of 
ECS may be desired, but it may be more effective to delicately construct this idea. 
7.2.1 One issue among many 
One way to play down the seriousness of the risks of ECS is to mention it amongst a 
number of other travel and health issues. For example, the Qantas website lists the 
following factors as relevant to health inflight: 
[11] http: //www. gantas. com. au/info/flying/inTheAir/yourHealthInflight accessed 28/08/01 
Cabin Humidity and Dehydration 
Cabin Pressurisation 
Eating and Drinking 
Jet Lag 
Blood Circulation and Muscle Relaxation 
Motion Sickness 
Inflight Workout 
It is in the section on `Blood Circulation and Muscle Relaxation' that the risk of blood 
clots is mentioned: 
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1 Blood Circulation and Muscle Relaxation 
2 When you're sitting upright and inactive for a long period of time, several things can happen: 
3 The central blood vessels in your legs can be compressed, making it harder for the blood 
4 to get back to your heart. Muscles can become tense, resulting in backaches and a feeling 
5 of excessive fatigue during, and even after your flight. The normal body mechanism for 
6 returning fluid to the heart, can be inhibited and gravity can cause the fluid to collect in your 
7 feet, resulting in swollen feet after a long flight. 
8 Some studies have concluded that prolonged immobility may be a risk factor in the formation 
9 of blood clots in the legs, deep vein thrombosis (DVT). Particular medications and medical 
10 conditions may increase the risk of formation of blood clots if associated with prolonged immobility. 
The importance of the issue is played down in a number of ways. It is firstly 
interesting that the risk of a blood clot does not have its own category. It is covered 
under `blood circulation', and even this is grouped together with muscle relaxation, 
thus denying it the importance that having a category on its own would bring. This 
section also comes some way after other issues and information. It is not the first one 
listed, so does not carry any implications that it may be the most important one for 
passengers to know about or consider. There is no mention of `ECS', of the media 
attention, public campaign or publicity that the issue is getting. The emphasis is on 
the experience of flight on the body more generally than just blood clots - this is only 
mentioned only after all the other effects, such as tense muscles and swollen feet, 
have been considered. Not only does this de-emphasise the importance of the issue, 
but the text is very tentative about the seriousness when the risk is mentioned. It is 
only "some" studies that have found that there "may" be a link; and it is only between 
"immobility" and blood clots, not flying. This is interesting, because in the previous 
paragraph, flight was explicitly mentioned twice as having an effect on the body. 
Here, it is just immobility that may be a factor. 
7.2.2 Unemotional language 
Another way of playing down the seriousness of the issue is to use unemotional 
language and instead draw upon factual formal terms that may attempt to take the heat 
out of the issue. The following extract is again taken from BA communications, and 
outlines their position to newspaper coverage they have received: 
[ 12] British Airways Intranet - What the papers say [24/01/02] [line numbers added] 
1 The deadly cost of economy class 
2 Deep vein thrombosis is thought to kill 2,000 British aeroplane 
3 passengers each year. Now the airlines are facing accusations 
4 of negligence for not telling us about the risks. 
5 Tuesday, February 20,2001 Independent page 10 
6 BA Position 
7 British Airways confirms that it has received one formal legal inquiry 
8 regarding DVT in the form of a pre-claim letter. It would be inappropriate 
9 to give any further details in light of the pending legal action. 
89 
Although the response from BA is short, it is effective. While the newspaper outlines 
that ECS is "thought to kill 2,000" people, BA takes the steam out of this emotive 
claim by saying that it has only received "one" letter. Furthermore, the "accusations" 
in the newspaper have become an "inquiry" in the response. BA does not directly 
respond to the newspaper claims, thus making them not seem worthy of a response, as 
well as it being "inappropriate" to do so. The newspaper text is written very 
emotively, mentioning `killing' passengers, rather than just passenger `deaths', or `the 
risk of suffering a DVT'. The mention of "aeroplane passengers" and then "the 
airlines" in the media text does imply responsibility by the airlines. These are not just 
`people' or `sufferers', but "aeroplane passengers" which constructs them as being in 
the care of the airlines when this took place. Furthermore, that the airlines have not 
released information about "the risks" constructs these risks as objective, decided 
facts, making the airlines seem even more reprehensible for not passing on 
information. That they didn't tell "us" sets up an emotional `them and us' situation 
between the airlines and the newspaper on behalf of the passengers, thought to be 
dying in their thousands due to the attitude and position of the airlines. The BA 
response totally detracts from all of this, and is unemotionally couched in formal legal 
language. 
A further way that this is done can be seen in the following extracts from BA (see 
Figures 7 and 8). There is a section in both texts about the `signs and symptoms of 
ECS', and the changes between them are interesting. The language used has changed 
subtly but significantly. The original text states that: 
[13] www. britishairways. com/health accessed 28/08/01 
22a DVT is most common in the lower limbs and the general symptoms are pain, swelling below the site 
23a of the clot, redness and warmth. However, a DVT may be present without any associated symptoms. 
24a It begins with the collection of stagnant pooled blood in the deep leg veins, which progresses 
25a to blood clotting. As the clot grows, it can shed emboli which are carried through the blood stream 
26a to the right side of the heart, from where they may pass into the lungs causing a pulmonary embolus. 
27a Embolisation may occur hours or days after the formation of the clot, and this may have serious 
28a consequences including chest pain, shortness of breath and sudden death. 
The later text states: 
[14] www. britishairways. com/health accessed 30/01/02 
35b DVT is most common in the lower limbs and may well occur without any 
36b obvious signs or symptoms. 
37b The general symptoms, where they occur, are pain, swelling, and discolouration of the affected limb. 
38b The leg may also feel warm to touch and there maybe congestion of the superficial veins. 
39b The clinical diagnosis of ECS is not easy. It can mimic many other medical conditions and 
40b expert investigation is required to confirm the diagnosis. 
41b Pulmonary embolism 
42b In some cases, small pieces of clot may detach and be carried through the blood stream 
43b to the heart and onward into the lungs causing a pulmonary embolus. This usually occurs 
44b only where there is already an extensive clot in the leg and may happen hours or days after the 
45b formation of the clot. It may result in serious consequences including chest pain, 
46b shortness of breath and even sudden death. 
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There are a number of small but significant differences between these texts. The 
original text makes a whole sentence out of mentioning the potential lack of 
symptoms with a DVT and prefixes it with "However", making it more noticeable 
(line 23a). In the new text such a frightening idea is tucked away in the first sentence 
and is stated much more calmly. The original text lists the "general symptoms" 
associated with a DVT, and while the new text mentions these as well, this is only 
"when they occur", detracting from their likelihood and seriousness, and making them 
less frightening. Furthermore, the inclusion of the phrase "congestion of the 
superficial veins" in the newer extract (line 38b) does not make this sound particularly 
worrying. `Congestion of the veins' would seem very serious, but adding the word 
"superficial" has the effect of detracting from this. 
The next details given are similar, but there are some differences between texts. The 
original text uses more technical language; it states that a clot can "shed emboli" (line 
25a), while the new version states that "small pieces of clot may detach" (line 42b). 
This more straightforward language may have the effect of making the condition seem 
simpler and less frightening. It is certainly portrayed as less serious in the second text 
which argues that this may happen only "in some cases" while in the original text this 
is "as the clot grows" (line 25a), an unpleasant, worrying, and sinister thought. 
Another unpleasant image used in the first text is that of "stagnant pooled blood in the 
deep veins" (line 24a). This has been replaced altogether in the later text for the 
simpler, less frightening version, which instead focuses on passengers who already 
have , an extensive clot in the leg" (line 44b). This implies that this is something that 
previously existed. The distinction between DVT and pulmonary embolism is made 
much clearer in the new text. The first text implies that all DVTs lead to a PE, while 
the second is much more careful about this, and has a separate section about PE, 
which only happens in "some cases". In comparison to this, DVT is constructed in 
the second text as not too serious, and merely involves swelling and warmth. Both 
texts are careful to state that a PE may happen "hours or days after the formation of a 
clot", so may occur after a flight, which again focuses attention away from the airlines 
themselves. 
7.3. ECS. DVT or `travellers thrombosis' 
One of the crucial factors in constructing ECS is the term that is used for it. Just as 
Allan et al. (2000) have argued that the change in rhetorical terms for issues can have 
significant effects on their construction, so the term `ECS' can be seen to be important 
here. Indeed, Schoenfeld et al. (1979: 39) argue that "as the claims-makers 
communicate to attract early converts to the proposed point of view, they are 
significantly aided if they can find a distinctive term for their overall concern, if only 
for the convenience of headline writers". ECS is a catchy and distinctive term, and 
this is useful for making a story eye-catching, memorable and interesting (Anderson, 
1997). How the term `ECS' is used is significant for constructing wider issues about 
its existence and risk, which feed into further concerns about the responsibility for it. 
This is crucial for determining an airline's culpability, as the following extracts from 
two BA factsheets illustrate (see Figures 7 and 8). Both title the text "Traveller's 
Thrombosis", a term that is less emotive than `economy class syndrome' and one 
which takes the emphasis away from the airlines and onto travellers, not just on 
aeroplanes, but also on other forms of transport. 
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The original text states that: 
[15] www. britishairways. com/health [accessed 28/08/01] 
1a Traveller's Thrombosis 
2a Deep vein thrombosis and air travel 
3a Clotting of blood in the lower legs is known as deep vein thrombosis (DVT). 
4a This has been referred to in the press as `economy class syndrome' but the term is misleading. 
5a Individuals seated in cars, trucks, buses, trains and aeroplanes may all be at risk, and cases 
6a of DVT occurring in flight have been reported in travellers in premium as well as economy. 
7a The term `traveller's thrombosis' is much more accurate. 
The newer text states that: 
[16] www. britishairways. com/health [accessed 30/1/01] 
Ib Traveller's Thrombosis - the risks and the research 
2b Clotting of blood, usually occurring in the lower legs, is known 
3b as deep venous thrombosis (DVT). 
4b This has become known in the press as `economy class syndrome' but the term is misleading. 
5b Individuals seated in cars, buses and trains may all be at risk, and cases of DVT occurring 
6b in flight have been reported in travellers in premium cabins as well as economy. 
7b The term `traveller's thrombosis' is much more accurate. 
The later version of the text differs in that instead of DVT having been "referred" to 
in the press as economy class syndrome, "this has become known in the press", but 
this is still "misleading". This describes the way that the press have adopted the term 
ECS and indicates that it is now used to encapsulate the condition. However, the text 
implies that this is just the term that the press use, rather than it having any kind of 
descriptive accuracy. This is also a significant change from the first text. To `refer' is 
to take note of something that exists. 
Both texts focus on other factors that may lead to a DVT, and so change the focus 
from flying to other forms of transport. Furthermore, the term `ECS' is outlined in 
both to be a inaccurate because "cases of a DVT occurring in flight have been 
reported in travellers in premium cabins as well as economy" (lines 6a and 6b). This 
is interestingly written to play down the significance and seriousness of ECS, even 
while it appears to be acknowledging that ECS is a more widespread phenomenon; 
cases are stated as having been `reported' rather than `occurring', which casts doubt 
on their existence. For something to have been reported does not state that it actually 
happened, just that someone is saying it has. Instead of calling the issue ECS, BA 
favour the term "Traveller's Thrombosis". They characterise ECS as an inaccurate 
term, and then establish the use of the term `traveller's thrombosis' by using it 
without referring to the fact that they are. Doing so would highlight that this was their 
particular construction of the issue only; merely using it without emphasising this 
make it seem like a factual term that they are simply drawing upon, and makes it seem 
distant from their production of it. Further references build up its appropriateness. 
For example, both texts (lines 44-45a; 17-18b) go on to state that: 
"in addition, at least 75% of DVTs in these studies occurred in travellers who 
already had one of the risk factors listed on the previous page" 
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After giving this statistic, both texts then give a number of passenger characteristics 
that may make them more susceptible to ECS. This sentence construction makes the 
text seem factual and authoritative. The phrase "in addition" really piles on the 
emphasis that there is a great deal of evidence against a DVT-flying link; quoting an 
actual percentage from this research is impressive, and gives the idea of knowledge 
about the situation. This is a significantly high percentage too, and of course no 
mention is made of the 25% who had `no risk factors'. Calling these people 
"travellers" is interesting too, as it reinforces BA's term for the situation "Traveller's 
Thrombosis", and with the quoting of figures from medical research, we are a long 
way from the emotive `economy class syndrome' now. It can be seen that the name 
an issue has is of fundamental importance, and has implications for what exactly that 
issue is. In this case, `ECS' implies airline responsibility. It is crucial for an airline to 
discredit this as an accurate description of the issue, and instead encapsulate the term 
in a way which draws attention away from them. 
7.4. Voluntary and imposed risk 
Finally, I will consider the issue of whether ECS is a `controllable' risk. The 
significance of this idea was highlighted in section 3.1.4, and it was an interesting and 
key aspect of the constructions used. Airlines attempt to make the risk more 
acceptable by presenting it as part of the passengers (voluntary) choice to fly, while 
passenger groups present it as an imposed risk. As I will discuss in the next chapter, 
campaign groups present ECS as being something that happens to passengers; they 
are passive, and ECS is active. This serves to take the blame away from passengers, 
and presents it as being something they are helpless against. Airlines however 
attempt to present ECS as a voluntary risk that passengers subject themselves to 
through their personal characteristics, their behaviour in-flight, and their choice to fly. 
Airlines construct the issue by using offensive and defensive rhetoric. They place the 
emphasis on passengers; and consequently away from themselves. One way this is 
done is by outlining the responsible position that the airline has taken, and the 
information that they have provided; and it is therefore up to the passengers then to 
use this information. The airline has done all it can by providing it. 
This is illustrated in the following extract from Qantas: 
[17] From www. gantas. conLau/flights/essentials/healthinflight. html accessed 28/08/01 
1 When you are flying you can be seated and inactive 
2 for long periods of time. The environment can be low in humidity 
3 and pressurised up to an altitude of 2440 metres above sea level. 
4 Unlike other forms of transportation, air travel allows for rapid 
5 movement across many time zones, causing disruption to the body's 
6 'biological clock'. Although these unique factors do not pose a health 
7 or safety threat to most customers, there are guidelines you can 
8 follow that will improve your comfort level during and after a flight. 
9 We hope the following recommendations will help you 
10 have a more pleasant flight today and in the future. 
While this is ostensibly a description of the effects of flying, it actually constructs the 
passengers' responsibility in the occurrence of ECS. It is written in terms of the 
passengers; "when you are flying" (line 1, emphasis added). This takes the emphasis 
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away from the airlines and the consequences of being in a plane. It directly describes 
what passengers do: "you can be seated and inactive for long periods of time" (lines 
1-2), rather than saying that `movement may be limited'. It is of course completely 
unexceptional that passengers will be seated, and largely inactive - they are onboard 
an aircraft for several hours. This seems obvious, but it must have been pointed out 
for a reason; and it clearly foregrounds the passengers and their actions in the 
development and prevention of ECS. There is also a responsibility on passengers; the 
airlines are providing the guidelines, but it is now up to passengers to improve their 
own health. The phrase `will help you have.. ' (lines 9-10) is written with the 
emphasis on the passengers. It does not say `will make your journey more pleasant', 
but is in terms of the things that passengers can do for themselves, and the ways that 
they can make their flight more pleasant through their own actions. Despite the 
mention of the conditions of the plane, it is still the passengers who have the ability to 
care for themselves and the airline is not to blame if they don't; the attitude is `we've 
told you, it's up to you now'. 
This shifting of responsibility onto the passengers can also be seen in terms of the 
following extract from Olympic Airways: 
[18] Motion, Olympic Airway's inflight magazine Travel Health section p98 26/6/01 
1 Any person who sits for a long time runs the risk of developing 
2 small clumps of clotted blood in the lower legs. 
3 Fatal clots can also occur in people who sit still for long periods 
4 in buses, trains, cars, theatres, or at their desks. 
While again taking the focus away from air travel by mentioning these other forms of 
transport, using the phrase "runs the risk" further couches this in terms of action by 
individuals, not something that is imposed upon them. "Runs the risk" is a phrase that 
implies foolhardy and even reckless behaviour, knowingly engaged in. To "sit still" is 
presented as a choice. 
This is reiterated in a further extract from the magazine: 
[19] Motion, Olympic Airway's inflight magazine Travel Health section p98 26/6/01 
Q8 What preventative measures can be taken? 
The Economy Class Syndrome may be deadly in some cases 
but it is highly preventable. 
Here are some steps you can take to avoid the condition 
Again, the emphasis in on passenger action: "you can take". There is also the element 
of passenger choice here; "can" take, rather than `should' or `must'. This choice 
means that the responsibility for making this decision rests with passengers, and that 
therefore the onus of blame is shifted onto them. When the answer to this question 
states that "Here are some steps you can take", this is interesting because at the 
beginning of the article it was stated that it was possible to prevent ECS with 
knowledge and education (see Section 7.1.2.1 in this chapter). Therefore by 
providing this to the passengers so that they can now take these steps, the airlines are 
absolving themselves of blame. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have outlined how airlines construct the issue of ECS, their position 
and that of the passengers. In their texts these airlines undertake a particular 
presentation of themselves, in order to strengthen the claims made in their account, 
and to invoke a particular response in the reader to what they wish to say. They 
portray themselves as taking as active role in finding out about ECS and trying to 
prevent it, not being involved in a sinister cover up about the issue. They also 
undertake work to manage their stake in the issue, and to prevent what they say being 
dismissed because of their interest in it. The seriousness of ECS is counteracted, and 
formal language is used to take the emotional intensity out of the issue. Similarly, the 
name for the issue is used by airlines as a way of detracting from their responsibility 
for it. 
The airlines are also oriented to defending themselves against potential critics by 
presenting an acknowledgment that ECS is an important issue and should be dealt 
with. However, because the actions and characteristics of the passengers are 
presented as the cause of it, avoiding it becomes their responsibility, rather than the 
airlines'. If `you' as a passenger have any of these conditions that are recognisable 
and medically known, if you take these precautions or actions, it can be prevented. 
ECS is not constructed as a random accident or as something stealthily creeping up on 
unsuspecting victims. It is possible to know about it, it is possible to avoid it, but the 
responsibility for doing so rests with the passengers and their actions. 
These features become more apparent through comparison with a very different 
version of the issue. The next chapter is about passenger groups. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Easy to Prevent and Needlessly Tragic: 
Campaign Groups' Construction of Economy Class Syndrome 
In this chapter I consider the constructions of the risk and responsibility for ECS that 
are used by campaign groups. The groups examined are the Aviation Health Institute 
(AHI), VARDA (Victims of Air Related DVT Association), and Airhealth. Full 
details are given in section 5.2.2. 
ECS is presented as essentially very simple by all three groups. The risk is real and 
serious, but it can be avoided. The necessary information is readily available, but 
airlines refuse to acknowledge the risk or give this information. They could tell 
passengers what they need to know; therefore ECS is preventable. This makes the 
deaths and suffering from it all the more tragic because they are needless, and the 
airlines directly responsible. In this chapter, I consider the devices used by the 
campaign groups to present themselves so that this claim seems plausible, how they 
construct the tragedy and the seriousness of the issue, and the responsibility of the 
passengers and the airlines in relation to it. 
8.1. Presentation of `self 
As I discussed in the last chapter, self presentation is crucial for claims to be 
believable, and this requires work by the author/s of the text (Woolgar, 1980; Potter, 
1997). It is important for groups to establish quickly their knowledge and authority 
on the issue, so that the rest of their account seems plausible, and to encourage 
support for their cause. 
8.1.1 In command of the facts 
One way groups do this is by constructing themselves as presenting the facts of the 
risk of ECS. This may be done by stressing their thorough grasp of the situation, and 
their independent and unbiased position in relation to these facts. The first page of the 
AHI website illustrates this: 
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[20] www. aviation-health. org/about_us. httnl accessed 25/11/02 
1 About the Aviation Health Institute 
2 The world's first independent non-profit making body 
3 dealing with the health and well-being of passengers worldwide. 
4 In 1990 Farrol Kahn, realising that there was a need to bring 
5 to the attention of the public the health risks associated with flying, 
6 founded the Aviation Health Institute. The Institute, based in Oxford, 
7 was established in 1996 as a Registered Charity No 1017574. 
8 Since then the Institute has been at the forefront of efforts 
9 to promote the health of passengers worldwide. 
10 The AHI's objectives are to encourage research, 
11 educate the public and the industry and to seeks ways of 
12 preventing and reducing the health risks to the flying public. 
This presentation of self constructs the knowledge and authority of the Institute in 
several ways. The scale used to describe the Institute and their work emphasises their 
importance and credibility. They are the "world's" first such body, they care about 
passengers "worldwide" (a point which is stressed twice in lines 3 and 9). This is not 
some small tin-pot organisation. They objectively deal with facts, they are 
"independent" and "non profit making", as well as being a "registered charity". That 
their charity number is listed as well, when it is unlikely to be required by anyone 
reading the first few paragraphs on the site, really emphasises their status. This is an 
organisation who are pioneering to further the causes outlined. Not only are they the 
"first" such body, but they are the organisation who are educating others - both "the 
public" and "the industry". Not only does it seem impressive that they have the 
knowledge and authority to be able to do this, in particular to educate the industry, but 
listing these groups further makes the AHI seem separate and independent from them. 
The text makes it clear that there is knowledge that does need to be communicated, 
and this emphasises the importance of the organisation's work. The "need" to raise 
awareness of issues was "realised", not decided. This was information that existed 
but was not known about, and it was up to the AHI to do something about that. The 
risks to passengers exist - they are described as "the health risks" (emphasis added), 
not `any health risks' or `the possibility of risks'. The information given on the site is 
therefore presented as factual, not as opinion, because it already existed independently 
of the group; all they have done is present it. 
8.1.2 Proven facts 
Having access to the facts about ECS is important in terms of a group's self 
presentation, and also because it can substantiate the claim that (their) information can 
prevent ECS. It is maintained on a number of occasions by all three groups that ECS 
can be `avoided' - if passengers know what to do. This information is available from 
the group, so they must present themselves as able to give accurate information. 
This is quite starkly stated on the Airhealth welcome page: 
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[20] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 31/03/01 
I Travellers could avoid the misdiagnosis that causes further 
2 suffering and sometimes death, if only they knew how. 
3 On this website you will find the information you need. 
This is an emotive part of their introduction. The poignant "if only they knew how" 
constructs ECS as needless and preventable. The aid this, the effectiveness of the 
information that the group has is emphasised. It is not just information that 
passengers `may' require, or that will `help' - but what they "need" to prevent 
"suffering and death". The group present the issue as serious, and therefore 
themselves as knowledgeable, efficient, and important in being able to provide the 
information to prevent it. As well as using defensive rhetoric, this may also be a use 
of offensive rhetoric. That the group are presenting the necessary information implies 
that the airlines are not. 
Groups may substantiate their presentation of accurate facts by citing sources of 
information or quoting from people presented as `experts'. The following two 
extracts are from the same page of the Airhealth site at different times: 
[21] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 20/01/01 
1 Stealth factor: symptoms of pulmonary embolism usually do not appear until 
2a few days or more after the flight. 
[22] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 31/03/01 
1 Dr Stanley Mohler, Director of Aerospace Medicine at Wright State 
2 Medical School, calls this a "stealth disease" 
Use of the word "stealth" to describe the condition has changed from assertion and 
opinion to a referenced reality. Quoting from this source has acted as an 
"externalising device". Woolgar describes that these allow "a reading that the 
phenomenon described has an existence by virtue of actions beyond the realm of 
human agency" (1988: 75). Here, it makes this description seem independent from the 
group. That this source is a doctor, with a prestigious title (MacMillan and Edwards, 
1998: 329) from what is presented as a prestigious institution, further establishes this 
as an important and robust fact. The group are still able to use the image they wanted 
- with the associated implications about the sinister nature of the issue, serious enough 
to be called a "disease" - but can now make it seem independent from them and an 
established fact. 
The importance to groups of presenting `proven' claims is highlighted at times where 
they may not be substantiated, but are made to seem as if they are. For example: 
[23] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 31/03/01 
1 Common misconceptions: 
2 I'll just upgrade and avoid the cramped seats 
3 Altitude affects blood coagulability and the altitude is the same in the front 
4 of the plane as the rear. A Japanese study found 70% of victims in coach class, 
5 25% in business class, 5% in first class and one pilot. 
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This extract is from the opening page of the Airhealth site, which lists "common 
misconceptions" about ECS, and their construction of the `reality'. This response 
from the group does not say anything more about this Japanese "study" and does not 
even give a reference for it; without this, such a mention might be deemed quite 
useless in terms of adding to the evidence. But the quoting of figures from a "study" 
adds credibility, even if no more details are given about it. Also, use of the word 
"victim" is interesting here. The group do not specify whether the word "victim" was 
used in the study, or whether this is their interpretation in their summary of it. Either 
way, the impression is given that this is the term used and found in the study, and this 
substantiates the use of it on the site. These people are officially victims. 
8.1.1.3 Facts under threat 
The status of information that groups present may come under threat. This could be 
because contrasting information on a topic exists, or through more direct challenges to 
it. Accordingly, two strategies may be used by groups; to acknowledge that 
differences in information do exist, but that the one accurate version is given here by 
them; or to attack and denigrate any challenges to their preferred view. 
For instance, there is an acknowledgement by Airhealth that the facts about ECS are 
not yet finalised; however, they present their information as an authoritative account 
of the current situation. This position is knowledgably outlined, and very factually 
and concisely stated. An example of this is given on the `Advice for Pilots' page, 
which discusses the recommended frequency for an ankle flexing exercise: 
[24] www. airhealth. org/pilots. html accessed 20/0201 
1 How often? Most experts say every two hours. However, it is easier 
2 and safer to do it more frequently. 
The implication here is that while there is a variation in opinion and "most experts" 
say one thing, the group are expert enough themselves to give a different 
recommendation. They externalise this by saying that "it is easier.. ", not `we 
recommend', or attributing this as their own view - but they make it clear that this is 
the one that should be used. 
The Airhealth site is further highly disparaging about a study that does not support the 
link between air travel and blood clots: 
[25] www. airhealth. org/research. html accessed 21/07/01 
1 Kraaijenhagen is the only one that denies the link between 
2 air travel and blood clots. In an October 28 2000 letter to the editor 
3 of the Lancet he reported a study of DVT victims using a control group. 
4 The control group was so ill-conceived that it led to bizarre conclusions. 
5 For example, Kraaijenhagen found that recent injury reduces the risk of DVT. 
6 This is like saying that a few drinks will reduce your risk of an auto accident. 
7 Six letters from researchers like Ferrari excoriated Kraaijenhagen 
8 in the Feb 17 issue. Kraaijenhagen continues to insist that his methods 
9 were valid, taking comfort, he said, in the fact that one of his findings 
10 was consistent with the findings of other researchers. American Airlines 
11 continues to cite Kraaijenhagen as the only valid study. 
99 
The research that has been undertaken here is undermined in a number of ways; its 
(unfavourable) conclusions are therefore made to seem unlikely. That this study is the 
"only one" (line 1) not to find a link implies that there are many which have. Leaving 
the sentence as "Kraaijenhagen denies the link" would not have this effect at all. The 
way that his study "denies" the link is also interesting. This is stronger than "did not 
find a link" or "no link existed". A "denial" implies that the link is there but he is just 
not admitting it. Furthermore, research that is "ill-conceived" and "bizarre" is clearly 
not in keeping with the expectations of good scientific enquiry. The comparison to 
the risks of an auto accident (line 6) compounds the ridiculousness of the whole 
enterprise. The way that Kraaijenhagen is cited also reflects badly on him. He 
"continues to insist" (line 8, emphasis added) his findings are valid, rather than 
emphasising the quality of his research, incorporating comments into it or undertaking 
any further work. This makes him sound belligerent and unwilling to listen to reason. 
That he "said" (line 9) does not imply any more of an evidential basis to his 
assertions, only that they are mere opinion. Also, mention of "one of his findings" 
being consistent begs questions about the rest of them, and implies that even 
Kraaijenhagen could not find any further corroborating evidence to back them up. 
Mention of other researchers (line 7) who also disagreed with Kraaijenhagen 
substantiates the denigration of his work being constructed here, especially when 
words as strong as "excoriated" are used to describe them. The comment about 
American Airlines in the last sentence does nothing to add credibility to 
Kraaijenhagen's research. Rather, it makes it seem as if the airline deliberately chose 
this "ill-conceived" study simply because it is the only one that sides with them, and 
they appear in denial about the facts also. Working to discredit contradictory views 
can be a way therefore of maintaining the appearance of having the correct and 
established facts, and giving a reliable and authoritative account. 
g 1_ 2 T'aking effective action 
While it is important for groups to seem as if they are presenting the facts of the issue, 
they must also establish themselves as a credible campaign force. To do so, they may 
emphasise all the action they have undertaken, and how important and effectual it has 
been. For example, the first page of the AHI website lists the group's achievements: 
[26] www. aviation-health. org/abouLus. hhW accessed 25/11/02 
1 Since 1996 we have achieved the following: 
2 Increased the awareness of air related problems to the medical profession, 
3 parliament and the public. 
4 Compiled a factual database relating to air related problems. 
5 Promoted methods of prevention. 
6 Developed a programme for educating the public on preventable airline conditions. 
7 Made aviation a high profile public issue demonstrated by the wide coverage in the media. 
8 Supported medical research into Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT). 
9 Stimulated the interest of the international community, including 
10 the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
11 Increased the importance of leg room/ seat pitch. 
13 Focused the airlines on their responsibility for the health of their passengers. 
14 Ran a clean air campaign, in the year 2000, which drew attention to the risk of 
15 disease transmission resulting from recirculated air in aircraft cabins. 
The list of actions undertaken by the group make them seem very proactive - but do 
not actually say very much. To have "increased the importance of leg room/seat 
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pitch" is very vague and does not imply anything about what this might have entailed 
or achieved. The impression given overall however from the numerous action 
oriented words used ("promoted", "developed", "supported") is that the group has a 
history of achievement behind them. Fahrestock (1989: 36) makes an interesting 
comment that relates to this. She states that "in the world of ordinary rhetorical 
arguments, the amount of time and effort that reputable people place in an inquiry is 
persuasive in and of itself of the value of their results". Persuading about this value 
seems to be what the group are trying to do here. Giving so much detail about their 
effort may be designed to give what they say credibility; establish their authority to 
continue; persuade that they are a worthwhile group to become involved with; and 
emphasise the importance of the issue with which they have become so involved. 
Self-presentation as involved in action is further demonstrated by VARDA: 
[27] www. aviation-health. org/varda. htrnl accessed 25/11/02 
1 VARDA will lobby all MP's at Westminster in its call for a Public Inquiry 
2 and will be asking the public to sign a petition in support of the campaign. 
3 John Smith, Austin Mitchell and Dr Ian Gibson are among the first MPs 
4 to back the campaign 
The text details the influential circles in which the group are moving. It is implied 
that they are working at the heart of government, and are trying to set up a Public 
Inquiry, an official and well respected government instrument. That they are going to 
lobby "all" MPs, a sizeable and difficult task, carries favourable implications about 
their capabilities and influence. To list the three MPs by name adds credibility, and to 
say that they are "among the first" implies that this is a currently ongoing process, that 
these are just the "first" of many others who are on their way. This is in no way 
implied to be the end result of the campaign and that these were the only three who 
could be persuaded to join. The group present themselves as dynamic and high 
achieving, currently in the process of achieving their aims. 
8.1.4 Increasing professionalism 
A group may assume greater authority if they can adopt a professional approach. If 
the issues are presented as extremely serious, then a group must seem able to cope 
with and effectively address them. Increasing professionalisation is illustrated by 
these changes on the Airhealth website. The extracts are from the "About Us" page, 
from three different dates, and give details about the group's founder: 
[28] www. airhealth. org/about. html accessed 02/02/01 
I My name is Mike Reynolds. I became an ECS victim in Paris in October 2000 
2 on the same day Emma Christoffersen died of ECS at Heathrow Airport. 
3I made it to a hospital and survived. Back home I began studying and soon 
4 located more than 40 medical journal articles related to ECS. As I read the studies 
51 developed a growing sense of horror at the needless suffering and deaths 
(29) www. airhealth. org/about. html accessed 31/03/01 
1 The Executive Director is Michael Reynolds, who suffered a PE in Paris 
2 in October, 2000. Since then he has been studying medical journals and working towards 
3 the goal of ending the needless suffering and deaths of flight-induced DVT and PE. 
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The second text is written in an empiricist style (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). The 
change from first to third person means that this is no longer a chatty friendly account 
of how the organisation started, but an official account of a professional and efficient 
group. The founder is now more formally "Michael" rather than the familiar "Mike", 
with an important sounding title of `Executive Director'. Less personal details are 
given about his own experience, and the term "ECS", over which there is controversy, 
has been replaced by "PE" [pulmonary embolism] and "DVT". These are official 
medical terms and may appear more professional than the debated and media-friendly 
ECS; but the causal link between flying and blood clots is still made clear - they are "flight induced" DVT. Increasing professionalism is emphasised still further in later 
versions: 
[30] www. airhealth. org/about. html accessed 21/07/01 
1 Michael Reynolds, Director, suffered a PE in Paris in October, 2000. 
2 Since then he has been working toward ending the needless suffering 
3 and deaths of flight-induced DVT and PE. 
"Working toward" is an interesting phrase here, as it implies that this is his job, that 
he is full time on this campaign, and that he is even in some way qualified to do so, 
beyond his personal interest. This is very different from the original text where he 
was collecting whatever articles he could find, which made him seem like any other 
untrained member of the public, with no special skills. Previously details were given 
of how he was doing this - he was "studying", "locating articles" and "reading". This 
has been replaced by "working towards" and this `gloss' (Potter, 1997: 163) over the 
unsophisticated details of his efforts gives an increasingly professional aura to his 
work. He is not an amateur but gives the presentation of doing what those who `work 
towards' and achieve do. He, and consequently the organisation, now appear to have 
a far more professional approach, and are more qualified to discuss these issues. The 
page now includes mention that "we have consulted recognized experts" and of the 
numerous research papers that have been cited elsewhere. This is now an 
organisation backed up by fact with an expert and specialised approach, not merely 
personal interest or resentment. 
8 . 1.5 
Management of Stake 
The previous chapter considered the pertinence of issues of stake for the airlines. 
They are also important here. In order for their accounts not to be dismissed and to be 
seen to be presenting facts, groups need to appear objective and independent from the 
information they are presenting. The following passage from the AHI illustrates this: 
[31] www. aviation-health. org/about_us. html 25/11/02 
1 The objectives of the AHI are to investigate the effects of flying on the health 
2 of passengers and on the course of common diseases, and to promote awareness 
3 and prevention of such conditions, so as to increase to the productivity of frequent 
4 flyers. The Institute provides an invaluable, independent source of reference, 
5 information and comment on aviation health issues. It also encourages airlines # 
6 and passengers to take action to address the problems. 
From this it can be implied that the Institute has no personal agenda in providing this 
information, and are purely altruistic. They are only concerned to "promote 
awareness". This is presented as a neutral and unobjectionable phrase - how could 
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anyone not want to be aware of what exists, or what risks there might be? The text 
does not say that they will be actively campaigning or taking any kind of action other 
than "promoting awareness" and "encouraging" others. They present themselves as a 
fact-finding organisation, acting to increase information for the good of all, who can 
then take action on the basis of the information that the Institute has provided. 
Attempts are made to maintain this neutral position by stating that the Institute will 
encourage both airlines and passengers, thereby not aligning themselves on one `side' 
of the debate or the other. For the Institute to describe itself as a source of "reference" 
is also interesting - this is the collection of pure unbiased facts. The way that 
"comment" is listed separately implies that while this may be opinion, the sources of 
"reference" and "information" are not. 
However, there are other issues of stake to be dealt with, particularly relevant for 
VARDA and Airhealth. These groups were set up in the aftermath of ECS, and from 
the very beginning campaigned solely on this issue. Rather than try to deny this and 
pretend to be objective about the issue, these groups engage in "stake confession" 
(Potter, 1997: 129). This may be actually a resource for groups, and a way of 
engaging sympathy and encouraging empathy with their position. They have suffered 
so much because of ECS that they want to do something about it; and how could they 
be expected not to? This both makes ECS seem more serious and constructs their 
position in relation to it as experienced and caring. For example: 
[32] www. aviation-health. org/varda. html accessed 25/11/02 
1 The aim of VARDA, which is chaired by Ruth Christoffersen, 
2 is to campaign for prevention of DVT amongst air passengers. 
3 Her 28 year old daughter died from the condition minutes after arriving 
4 at Heathrow following a holiday flight on Qantas from Australia. 
5 "We truly believe that Emma and countless others have died needlessly", 
6 she said. "Since Emma's death, five others have died at the Ashford Hospital". 
The tragic details here are key; this is a mother talking about her dead daughter, who 
has died in vain. Her daughter was young, and had been enjoying herself on 
"holiday". She died suddenly and shockingly, only minutes after landing, implying 
that there was nothing that could be done to save her. The cause of her death is made 
clear, she died "following" her flight, and the campaign here is about "air passengers" 
only. That her mother chairs this group is presented as understandable. After losing 
her daughter she wishes to prevent others enduring this "needless" suffering. This 
first hand account stresses that the condition is real and serious and has huge 
implications for those that are involved. There is no attempt to deny involvement in 
the issue of ECS here, but to play up their involvement and the associated horror, to 
gain support for the campaign. 
8.2. Emyhasising the seriousness of the issue 
While the airlines attempted to downplay the seriousness of ECS, campaign groups 
emphasise it in a number of ways. Similarly they have a self interest in doing so; 
making the issue seem as serious as possible generates support for them, and justifies 
their existence. There is also the point that, as Hilgartner and Bosk (1984) highlight, 
presenting an issue to the `social problems arena' (which is already overcrowded) 
means making it interesting, novel and dramatic. Groups may try to do this by 
emphasising the scale of the risk: 
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[33] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 31/03/01 
1 There are thousands of times more thrombosis victims each year 
2 than all the turbulence and crash victims in all of aviation history 
The use of `extreme case formulations' can be seen here. These are evaluative terms 
taken to extremes, and Pomerantz (1986) describes how they may be used to persuade 
others of a certain conclusion or legitimise a claim. In this case, repeated use of the 
word "all", particularly when it is not needed twice for the sentence to make sense, 
stresses the magnitude of the issue. "All of aviation history" is a powerful image, and 
use of the contrast is interesting (following Herschel, 2001). Here, contrasting the 
numbers of victims of ECS with those in all aviation history creates a clear impression 
of the severity of the risk. 
The seriousness of the risk may also be emphasised by the idea that no one is safe. 
For example, while pilots may be assumed to have the knowledge to be able to save 
themselves, the risk may seem even more insidious if they are at risk it too: 
[34] www. airhealth. org/pilots. html accessed 21/0701 
1 Pilots, like other victims, often struggle for days or weeks with strange symptoms, 
2 not knowing what is wrong 
The text presents the risk in a particular way by drawing on the associations with the 
position of `pilot'. Potter and Wetherell, (1987: 129) outline that such `membership 
categories' are useful because they have particular activities or features associated 
with them, and they allow inferences to be made. In this case, the category of `pilot' 
carries the associations of being knowledgeable, intelligent, and fully versed with all 
information about flying. Here the risks of ECS are heightened because these 
associations do not apply. Pilots no longer have their superior status, but are reduced 
to being "like all other victims". That they too can "struggle" with things that are 
"strange" and have the fear of not knowing what is happening to them makes the risk 
seem more worrying and more severe still. 
8 . 2.1 
Emotive language 
The airlines studied used very unemotional language to present ECS, and drew upon 
factual, formal terms. In contrast, campaign groups use a variety of terms to stress the 
drama and tragedy of the issue. This emphasises the seriousness of it and the urgent 
need to take action. This is done three main ways. Firstly, the fear that lack of 
knowledge brings is described. For example: 
[35] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 20/02/01 
1 Most victims have no idea what is happening to them. They suffer needlessly. 
2 Medical studies focusing only on people stricken at airports have been missing most 3 of the victims. Compounding this is that fact that pulmonary embolism is, 
4 more often that not, misdiagnosed as heart attack, chest cold, or other conditions. 
5 Many victims die for lack of correct treatment. 
The phrases "most victims have no idea what is happening to them", and "many 
victims die for lack of correct treatment" are horrible and frightening images. That 
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they have "no idea" implies an alien occurrence that the victims could not have 
prepared themselves for in any way. The risk that they suffer is presented as 
something external to the victims - it `happens to them', it is not something that they 
have caused or know about. The image is of a sudden onset of an unknown condition 
and ensuing panic. These people are continually described as "victims", because of 
something as simple as a lack of information, emphasising both the tragedy of the 
situation and the terrifying nature of the condition. Not only are people suffering pain 
but fear as well. 
Secondly, there is emphasis on the waste of life and the senselessness of the suffering, 
because of the ease of preventing ECS. On the VARDA site it states that: 
[36] www. aviation-health. org/varda. html accessed 21/07/01 
1 Emma and countless others have died needlessly 
This constructs the risk in a particular way. It is presented as simple to take action on. 
That the suffering could have been so easily avoided emphasises both the tragic 
nature of the issue, and the urgent need to take action on it. Describing "countless 
others" emphasises the scale of this tragedy; and this gloss on the numbers is an 
interesting contrast to the use of the very personal `Emma' to describe this particular 
victim. This draws on the generation of empathy by making something personal noted 
in section 8.1.5. The horror and tragedy of this case, with the devastating effects it 
has had on her family, are multiplied many many times - too many to even mention. 
Thirdly, giving poignant personal details about the people involved, and how they 
suffered, stresses the tragedy of the issue. For example, later versions of the Airhealth 
home page launch immediately into the traumatic details of an individual's death: 
[37] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 16/05/01 
1 Vacationing in Belize, Karen Perkins was in her scuba gear preparing for a dive, 
2 unaware that during her flight a blood clot had formed in her calf 
3 As she kicked into the water part of the clot passed through her heart to her lung, 
4 and she died. Her husband, Bradley Perkins, Vice President and General Counsel 
5 for Alliance Semiconductor Corporation, tried to save her from the dive boat 
6 but she had died instantly. 
This case is presented as utterly tragic. The details used here emphasise this. As Potter 
(1997: 163) points out, detail in an account can help in "producing a version which is 
`real' and vivid. [It] paints a scene as it might have been observed". In this account, 
detail is used to make the couple seem young and dynamic, and they are fully fleshed 
out. Giving Mr Perkins his name makes him seem more real, rather than just 
mentioning him as `her husband', and additional details about his job add to this. It is 
tragic that he watched her die. He tried to save her but was too late. They are both 
presented as helpless, she had died immediately, had no chance of survival, and had 
no idea that she was at risk. He was helpless and could only look on as she died. 
They are presented as a happy couple, enjoying themselves on holiday when this 
tragedy struck. They had done nothing to deserve this. A clot "had formed", not "she 
had caused" - this is something that happened to her, not something she should have 
prevented. The account details exactly what she was doing when she died; what she 
was wearing, and her precise actions, which adds poignancy to the account. The 
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individuals here are presented as suffering tragically. This serves to enhance the 
severity and injustice of the issue. 
8.3. "Economy Class Syndrome"? 
The term used to describe ECS is crucial. Risks and responsibility may be 
constructed through the use of the term `economy class syndrome' itself. Attempts 
were made by airlines to establish a new term for it, such as `traveller's thrombosis'. 
The campaign groups much more frequently use `ECS' as the name for the risk. This 
is sometimes in a statement of fact: 
[38] www. airhealth. org/index. htm1 accessed 20/02/01 
1 Airhealth is dedicated to reducing the terrible toll of Economy Class Syndrome 
2 (ECS), blood clots formed during air travel. 
Although ECS is explained (line 2), it is still used as a term for the condition. This 
risk of blood clots forming during air travel is unequivocally stated to be known by 
this name; the term ECS is presented as a fact, not a title given to it by the group, but 
the approved and acknowledged name for the issue - this is what it is called. This 
means that the associations that the term carries still apply. Even when it is 
acknowledged that `ECS' might not be the most appropriate description of the risk, 
this is because it might not encapsulate the full danger, and not because it erroneously 
constructs responsibility: 
[39] www. airhealth. org/index. htmi accessed 20/02/01 
1 ECS is a misnomer because while cramped economy class seating may increase 
2 the risk, flight related thrombosis strikes first class passengers and pilots as well. 
3A more appropriate name would be Air Travel Syndrome to include 
4 all classes of passengers plus pilots 
ECS is stated to be a "misnomer". In this presentation however, the risk of a DVT is 
still flight related, not about travel generally as the airlines construct it. Indeed, the 
correlation between the risk and flight is emphasised because "all" passengers on a 
plane are at risk; no one can escape, not even pilots. This makes the risk more 
serious; "cramped seating" is an important factor but even with extra legroom it 
cannot necessarily be avoided, and it effects even experienced and knowledgeable 
pilots. The seriousness of the risk is also emphasised by the autonomy it is given; it 
"strikes", implying a sudden and shocking occurrence on unsuspecting victims. The 
direct causality to flight is still emphasised however. "Cramped seating" is a factor, 
something the airlines are responsible for, and the new name of "Air Travel 
Syndrome" makes the cause clear. This presents little doubt that the airlines can be 
held responsible for ECS, both through the experience of flight, and their failure to 
make passengers aware of the risks. 
8.4. Voluntary or imposed risk 
Finally, I will consider how ECS is constructed as a voluntary or imposed risk. While 
the airlines attempted to make the risk more acceptable by presenting it as part of the 
passengers' (voluntary) choice to fly, campaign groups construct it as an imposed 
risk. This has implications as to who is responsible for the risk. 
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Here, passengers are presented as helpless to prevent ECS, because they have no 
information about it. It is an involuntary risk that they are unwittingly subjected to 
when they fly. Airlines are presented as having the information that could lead to its 
prevention but not giving it to passengers, and therefore deliberately imposing the risk 
on them. This presentation of the risk may be designed to invoke outrage at the 
needless suffering of passengers, and condemnation of the position of the airlines. 
8.4.1 Imposing the risk 
For example, this extract from the AHI constructs the involuntary nature of the risk: 
[40] www. aviation-health. org/health_advice. html accessed 29/09/01 
1 There is no doubt that flying is by far the safest form of transport. 
2 But there will always be a residual risk attached to flying, particularly if you decide 
3 to spend your next vacation in Hawaii or visit your business partners in Hong Kong. 
4 You will be forced to sit in the same place for hours, practically without moving, 
5 and the narrow seats often mean you spend your entire flight with your knees bent - 
6 and that's when the danger of developing a thrombosis arises. 
This is not a risk that passengers bring on themselves through their increased 
propensity to fall ill or their behaviour - it is "forced" upon them. The text presents a 
list of contributory factors, all of which are caused by flight - and moreover, by the 
particular conditions of it. Passengers are forced to sit, they cannot move, they have 
to endure cramped conditions - all of these are the responsibility of the airline. It may 
be a passenger's choice to fly - they "decide", but then are faced with these 
conditions - these are not presented as being part of that choice. They are imposed 
upon the passengers, and the casual link with ECS is made clear - it is "when" these 
conditions have been experienced that a clot develops. The extreme case 
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) emphasise the depravity of these conditions - they 
may last an "entire" flight. Passengers cannot escape them at all. As the type of 
journeys that have been described are long haul (to Hawaii or Hong Kong) this means 
many hours at the mercy of a "danger" because of the conditions of that flight. 
8.4.2 Conspiracy of silence 
The airlines are presented as even more reprehensible because they deliberately keep 
the information about ECS from passengers. It is not that they knew nothing or could 
not help, but that they consciously acted to prevent passengers from finding out the 
truth. The following extract from a VARDA press release illustrates this: 
[41] www. aviation-health. org/varda. html accessed 13/01/03 
1 Mrs Christoffersen accused the airline industry and the government of being 
2 indifferent to the tragic deaths. She cited that fact that neither Lord Macdonald 
3 the Transport Minister or Bob Ainsworth the Aviation Minister attended the 
4 House of Commons meeting. They, as well as Sir Richard Branson of Virgin, 
5 Rod Eddington of BA, and Sally Martin of Qantas were invited. It was been swept 
6 under the carpet by the very people how knew about the risks of air related DVT 
7 and are still in a state of denial" she added. 
The text makes it clear that the airlines do know about the risks of ECS - they are not 
undecided or it is not a topic that the information is not available on - they "knew 
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about the risks". The past tense is interesting here too - the airlines "knew". This 
information is not new or currently being debated, they already have all the facts of it. 
Further, the text presents the idea that the airlines should have been relaying 
information about the risks - they were the "very people" who knew about them - but 
that they have not done so. The issue was "swept under the carpet", a deliberate 
action to avoid doing anything about it, not a lack of knowledge of it. Further, that 
they are "in denial" about the risk presents the airlines both as consciously ignoring it, 
and also gives the risk an existence. It has a reality beyond the airlines if it is 
something that they can choose to ignore. The airlines have been given the 
opportunity to address the issue, but they are presented as deliberately choosing not to 
- the text states that they were "invited" to the meeting at the 
House of Commons; in 
such a venue, this was surely an important meeting. No reason is given why they did 
not attend, and the reader is only left with the impression of their "indifference" and 
"denial". Their non attendance is given as an example of their indifference, and it is 
"cited as a fact" by Mrs Christoffersen. It is not something "that she said" but a 
reference to external facts to emphasise the way that the airlines are deliberately 
failing to address the issue and are making every effort to keep it quiet. 
This attempt to cover up the facts is stressed again in terms of airlines denying their 
importance. This extract from Airhealth describes the extremely minimal number of 
injuries from turbulence recorded: 
[42] www. airhealth. org/index. htnml accessed 01/03/01 
1 Serious injuries from turbulence average five per year. But the airlines want you to think 
2 that this is the biggest risk. American Airlines inflight magazine says that turbulence 
3 is the biggest danger, even though the risk of ECS is at least 8,000 times greater. 
The airline is presented as being deliberately misleading about this in an attempt to 
cover up the truth. Their magazine only "says"; their defence is outlined as merely an 
opinion that they are trying to present as true. In contrast, "the risk of ECS" (line 3, 
emphasis added) is presented as a fact. The group describes the airline as "wanting 
you to think" (line 1, emphasis added) - this implies that are specifically attempting to 
persuade people about their version - this is not the same as their text being 
accidentally inaccurate. The use of quantification and a contrast really emphasises 
this'. Not only is the risk of ECS greater than that of turbulence injuries but it is 
"8,000 times" greater. Putting a figure on this implies they it is a measured fact. That 
the figure is so high, especially compared to "five" turbulence injuries, emphasises the 
reprehensible position of the airlines in deliberately trying to conceal this. 
843 Responsibility 
The presentation given is that while the airlines may deny them, the facts about ECS 
exist, and the responsibility for avoiding it rests with them. The AHI gives a "10 Point 
Plan for Passenger Health" of the actions needed by airlines. This is a list of 
objectives, with further details about each of these. This extract lists the objectives, 
and then, for number 10, the details of the steps that the airlines should take: 
1 Following Potter and Wetherell (1995), and Herschell (2001). 
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[43] www. aviation-health. org/tenpoint. html accessed 29/09/01 
10 POINT PLAN FOR PASSENGER HEALTH 
Objective Detail 
1. Airlines are protected by a 1929 law that 
should be abolished. 
2. Appointment of a regulator on passenger 
health with similar powers as CAA/JAA. 
3. Health warning on air tickets 
4. Conduct aeromedical research programmes 
5. Collection of reliable data on flying and 
related medical incidents 
6. Public inquiry into DVT deaths and 
incidents 
7. Education of public and medical 
professionals on health risks of air travel 
8. Public consultation on all aspects of air 
travel 
9. Compensation for victims harmed by air 
travel 
10. Airlines to take steps to reduce inflight a) Provide advice with tickets on how to 
medical incidents reduce health hazards 
b) Provide advice on board on health 
precautions by video, card, or announcement 
c) Inform the public of high risk passengers 
d) Make medical information form (Medif) 
available to passengers and doctors. This is a 
flying clearance form for passengers with 
conditions. 
e) Aircraft clean air. Monitor air quality 
regularly. 
f) Introduce best practice on air filters and 
fresh air ventilation. 
Responsibility for avoiding ECS rests with the airlines, not the passengers. 
Passengers are not mentioned in these ten points, expect in terms of being "educated" 
(point 7). The actions that are required are all for the airlines to take. Further, it is 
presented that if the airlines took action to avoid ECS, it could be effective - for 
example, objective 10 says that the airlines should "take steps to reduce inflight 
medical incidents". If they take these steps, incidents will be reduced. This 
constructs the airlines as having the knowledge, power, and responsibility to do so. 
The details are all constructed in terms of the actions that airlines can and should take; 
it is their agency that is emphasised here, not that of the passengers. Indeed, it is the 
airlines who have the responsibility to "Inform the public of high risk passengers" 
(point l Oc) - it is up to them to provide information about who might be at risk, and 
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not necessarily the passengers' fault if they are. Airline culpability is further 
emphasised through the range of actions that they can take - all aspects of flight are 
mentioned here, from pre-boarding, to advice giving, to assistance for risky 
passengers, to air quality and ventilation. Listing all these actions makes the airlines 
seem comprehensibly responsible. It is this combination of air-related factors that 
leads to "inflight medical incidents", and the airlines are constructed as responsible 
for all of them. 
8.4.3 Risky passengers and a moral responsibility 
Finally, there is an issue, eluded to in this last extract, about the extent to which 
passengers with `risky' characteristics are to blame if they have a DVT. The airlines 
tend to make these people seem culpable if they smoke or have a medical condition 
that makes them increasingly susceptible. However, when campaign groups list the 
characteristics of passengers that may increase their risk, there is no blame inferred; 
rather these people should be better looked after by the airlines and it is particularly 
tragic that they are not. It is therefore implied that there is a moral dimension to the 
responsibility that airlines have. Groups present them as undermining or ignoring this 
to protect themselves, and this casts them in a worse light still. 
[44] www. airhealth. org/rankings. html accessed 21/0701 
1 We trust the airlines. We trust them to do their best to deliver us 
2 unharmed to our destinations. Instead, US airlines are doing their best 
3 to conceal the biggest danger in air travel. This is especially tragic 
4 for the weakest and the most vulnerable travellers, those with heart disease, 
5 cancer, diabetes, pregnancy, and other risk factors. They trust the airlines 
6 and their trust is sorely abused. 
7 All the needless suffering and deaths could be stopped at the cost 
8 of less than a cent per passenger for a leaflet telling them what they need 
9 to know. Millions are spent to recover and reconstruct crashed airliners. 
10 Millions are spent to foil possible terrorist attacks. If the DVT and PE injuries 
11 were caused by terrorists putting something in the food, there would be 
12 no expense spared to stop them. But when thousands of air travellers 
13 all over the world stagger into hospitals with blood clots caused by air travel, 
14 it is simply business as usual. 
The position of the airlines is constructed through the assumptions of their 
membership category (see section 8.2). The group presents the category of `airline' 
as having the activity of `unharmed delivery of passengers to destination' associated 
with it. Passengers have a right to expect this, and trust that it will be so. This 
disjuncture with the reality presented here makes the airlines seem calculating, 
grasping, and merciless. The continued repetition of the word "trust" makes this very 
clear. The contrast of the weak and vulnerable victims with the massive resources 
available to these huge companies emphasises this, especially in terms of the pitiful 
amount that would be needed to save them. While airlines describe people with these 
characteristics as being more susceptible to ECS, here these people deserve extra care 
because of their vulnerability, which the airlines deny them. Using the phrase "doing 
their best" twice (lines 1 and 2) characterises the airlines as perfectly capable of 
helping these people and keeping their trust, but instead actively choosing not to. The 
scale of the issue makes this seem worse, as "thousands" of people "all over the 
world" are suffering in this way, and the airlines could so easily prevent it if they 
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wanted to. It is clear again that the risk is avoidable. Clots are caused by air travel 
but they could be prevented by a leaflet (line 8). The airlines have a moral duty to 
their passengers that would be so easy for them to uphold, but they are doing 
everything that they can not to. 
In summary, I have shown here that the groups construct the airlines as being 
responsible for ECS. That the airlines deliberately impose the risk on passengers is 
presented as dangerous, disgraceful, and morally wrong. It is not the case that the 
airlines are joining together with the passengers to fight the risk, but by denying its 
existence and severity, they are forcing passengers to endure the risk and its 
consequences. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined the way that campaign groups construct the issue of 
ECS, their position and that of the airlines. It is vital for groups to be seen as 
knowledgeable and presenting proven facts. This is particularly because of the 
contested nature of the issue. There is no Government policy yet, victims and 
relatives lost a British court case in October 2001 to prove airline responsibility for 
the risk, and the medical and scientific communities have not yet agreed on the 
existence or the magnitude of the risk. To some extent then, groups are having to 
fight against prevailing scepticism and lack of established knowledge on the issue by 
arguing that this `new risk' exists. Similarly, groups also have to present themselves 
as effective campaigners on the issue and a `force to be reckoned with' to encourage 
support for them and their claims. 
Groups construct the issue by emphasising its seriousness and tragic nature. Further, 
to argue that something could be so easily done to prevent it adds a very interesting 
angle to the risk. It is not an intractable problem, but one for which blame can so 
easily be apportioned. The airlines are presented as responsible for ECS because it is 
caused by flying, and because they refuse to give any information on its prevention. 
This sets up a classic dualism, of the poor vulnerable unsuspecting passenger, a victim 
upon whom the pernicious ECS stealthily creeps, against the might of the resource 
laden airlines. In the midst of this, the groups are the passengers' champion, 




Consensus, Surprise, and the Nature of Science: Analysis of Medical 
Reports in The Lancet 
This chapter is an analysis of all the articles printed in The Lancet about ECS between 
February 1985 and August 2003. A summary of these is given in the Appendix. The 
earlier articles consist mainly of assertions about an increased risk of blood clots with 
flight, backed up a few highly detailed specific cases. Later articles reported on 
research designed to explore this, and these generated a number of responses. 
Analysis of all of the articles highlights not only the constructions of risk in the 
context of the ongoing debate, but gives some clues about the workings of science 
more generally. 
What I explore here is the difference between what are presented as the ideals and the 
realities of scientific practice. While science is presented as evidence based, revealing 
the truth and building on consensus, authors may argue that this is not always the case. 
Where facts and findings are being debated, it is these principles that may be called 
upon to substantiate or dismiss a claim. 
9.1 Presentation of self 
Firstly to consider how authors undertake self presentation. Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984: 89) state that "scientific speakers seem to be peculiarly able to construct 
accounts in which they appear to have privileged access to the realities of the natural 
world", and Barnes (1984: 22) notes that "for the most part, scientific knowledge is 
initially accepted on authority". How do scientists present themselves to make it 
seem as if they have this `privileged access' to give them this authority? 
One way is to present the knowledge and experience they have that allows them to 
speak on a topic. For example: 
(45] Hart et al., 9/2/85 No 8424 p353 
1 Sir - Working in a hospital on the perimeter of London Airport (Heathrow) we see 
2a steady stream of illnesses which have developed in-flight. 
This is the start to a letter in the journal. Self presentation is one of the first matters to 
be attended to, as it encourages the reader to assess the rest of the text in a particular 
light. The authors immediately emphasise the direct knowledge they have of the 
situation they are describing; it is what they deal with on a day to day basis. Indeed, 
such occurrences are not so rare that it might be difficult for them to generalise or 
draw any conclusions, but there is a "steady stream" of them. The authors describe 
themselves as being right at the centre of what is going on, working near Heathrow, 
and make a causal link between illness and flying clear. Because of their knowledge 
and experience, the presentation of this is as an indisputable fact. The presentation of 
self is thus significant not just for what it says about the authors but in making their 
claims seem more likely to be true. 
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Authors may also adopt an empiricist style of writing (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), 
giving presentation of their article as factual, and thus commanding authority on the 
basis of this: 
[46] Paganin et al., 27/4/96 Vol 347 No 9009 p1195 
1 Sir - We report several patients with severe pulmonary embolism that developed 
2 on long non-stop flights 
3 Passengers without any history or risk factors for thromboembolism should be advised 
4 to stretch up frequently and consume oral fluids during the flight. Passengers with 
5a positive history or risk factors for thromboembolism should seek medical advice 
6 before travelling. 
This is an extract from a letter to the Editor; lines 1-2 are the beginning, and lines 3-6 
are the conclusion. In line 1, "report" is an interesting word to use, for it implies a 
direct link between what happened and the authors' coverage of it; they are merely 
and only presenting the facts, and these are very clearly stated. As will be more fully 
considered shortly, the idea that scientific work discovers facts about the world is one 
of its fundamental principles. As Woolgar (1996: 18) describes, a central assumption 
to the idea of discovery "is that the discovered object is antecedent and that it enjoyed 
an existence before any discovers happened to come across it". This may be drawn 
upon or presented as unrealistic depending on the claim being made. Here, it is used 
to back up the authors' assertion that the risk exists and is serious. Cases have 
occurred, the natural world has yielded these data, and through their work, the authors 
have recognised it. 
Authors may also present themselves as knowledgeable and authoritative on a topic 
by the recommendations that they make; after all, if an author were at all doubtful 
about the claims they were making, they would not be expected to make 
pronouncements on the basis of them. In lines 3-5 above, the authors list the factors 
that are relevant (passenger characteristics, behaviour inflight), and confidently state 
twice that passengers "should" take the actions they describe. This reasserts the 
importance and validity of the `facts' that they have "reported" in the letter, if they are 
prepared to make recommendations following from them, and the reader is therefore 
encouraged to also be persuaded by them. 
9.2. Presentation of the issue 
I will now briefly consider how the risk of inflight DVT is constructed, and the 
position of others presented. No one version of the risk is presented here, and a great 
deal of variation exists between articles. Some dismiss the risk out of hand or play it 
down, while others state both that it exists, and is serious enough to require urgent 
attention. What it is therefore interesting to consider is how these differing 
constructions are achieved. 
9.2.1 Presenting the risk and the position of the airlines 
The first study to use the term `economy class syndrome' was Cruickshank et at 
(27/8/88). While a possible link between flying and thrombosis had been suggested in 
an earlier article by Hart et al., (09/02/85), Cruickshank et al. 's was the first to 
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systematically describe and present evidence for it. It is therefore interesting to 
examine how they attempt to establish the risk as valid and serious. They state that: 
[47] Cruickshank et al., 28/8/88 No 8609 p497 
1 People on long air flights are at risk from deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
2 and pulmonary emboli, even if relatively young and without a past history of 
3 cardiovascular disease. We describe six cases to emphasise the hazards of 
4 long distance air travel. 
This is a very definite construction of the problem, assertively and confidently stated: 
people "are" at risk. This description of the risk, with explicit causal links to explain 
it, presents both the issue and their position on it - they are in no doubt in presenting 
these facts. The authors state that they have cases to describe, thus providing 
evidence to back up these assertions. It is clear that the blame for what happens does 
not rest with the passengers. They are described as being "at risk"; the risk is 
presented as something that are subjected to, that happens to them, not that they bring 
on. The "hazards" are presented as being caused by long distance air travel, not the 
behaviour of the characteristics of the people who take it. This is emphasised by 
pointing out that younger people without a history of health problems are also 
susceptible. Using the word "even" orients to the idea that it might be something 
about people that increases their risk, but dismisses this. This also serves to 
emphasise the severity of the risk, if `even' young and healthy people are at risk. The 
following quote stresses this further: 
[48] Cruickshank et aL 28/8/88 No 8609 p497 
1 However, the hazards of such long trips, often under cramped conditions, 
2 are not appreciated by most travellers, and the airline companies make 
3 no effort to enlighten them 
This constructs the risk in a particular way. That the risk is again described as a 
"hazard" and as something not realised by the passengers gives it an objective status 
beyond their interpretation or perception, as does ascribing a cause (the "cramped 
conditions"). The authors assert that the airlines know about this; this further presents 
the risk as real, if it is something that they as well as the authors can know about. 
While passengers do not appreciate this situation, the airlines not only bring about this 
condition, but deliberately keep quiet about it. This point is reiterated by Hart et al.: 
[49] Hart et al., 9/2/85 No 8424 p354 
1 We understand that air passengers, even those on very long flights, are given no 
2 specific advice to prevent venous thrombosis. While it would be impractical to turn all 
3 such flights into mobile physiotherapy departments, we would suggest that cases such as 
4 we describe might be avoided if passengers were at least advised to walk up and down 
5 the aisle a little more frequently than required for calls of nature. 
This is quite damning, to say that cases could have been "avoided" by something so 
simple, and so within an airline's power to give. It constructs the risk as something 
that exists, but that can be prevented; all that is required is "specific advice" on what 
to do. This also constructs this advice as existing too; it is not the case that the risk 
exists but there is uncertainty about cause and prevention. The idea of the knowledge 
existing is emphasised by the fact that the authors outline some it themselves - to 
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walk up and down the aisle for example. That the advice exists and is not available to 
passengers constructs blame on the airlines for not making them aware of it. And it is 
presented as the responsibility of the airlines to do this - passengers should be "given" 
information, and should be "advised". It is not constructed as being up to them to 
seek out this advice or to make themselves aware of the risks. It is something that the 
airlines should be providing for them; it is because they do not that these cases have 
occurred. 
However, other articles present the risk differently: 
[50] Kraaijenhagen et al., 28/10/00 Vol 356 p1492 
1 In 1998 the term economy class syndrome was coined to describe the association 
2 between travel and thrombosis. A fair risk estimate, however, has not been done. 
3 We report the results of a prospective study, in which we kept the effect of bias to 
4a minimum. We compared travel history in 788 patients with venous thrombosis 
5 with that of controls with similar symptoms but in whom the disease had been excluded. 
6 For air travel alone, the odds ratio was 1.0 (95% Cl 0.3-3.0); also, no association was 
7 recorded for other methods of transportation. We have shown that there is no increased 
8 risk of deep vein thrombosis among travellers. 
I will shortly consider some aspects of this quote in more depth; what I want to draw 
attention to here is how the authors present their claim that the risk does not exist. 
Firstly, they say that ECS was "coined to describe" the association. This detracts 
from this being an accurate term - it was just what the issue was called. To `coin' a 
phrase is to give it a name for convenience, and the authors imply that this is what has 
happened here, not that any of the associations of the term were necessarily accurate. 
Indeed, they immediately imply that they are not by saying that a "fair risk estimate" 
has not been done. This presents any information about the risk as based on `unfair' 
or unbalanced data. Further, they explicitly state that there is no risk - and do so by 
pointing to evidence from their study. "We have shown" implies a direct relationship 
from the facts of the case to their presentation of them, all they have done is indicate 
what the situation is; I will consider how they present their study as being competent 
and capable of producing this information shortly. In the meantime however, this is 
therefore a very confident statement that the risk does not exist, based on (their) facts. 
Other articles also have a different view of the position of the airlines. If the risk does 
not exist or is not known about, then they cannot be held responsible for preventing it: 
[51] Hirsh and O'Donnell, 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1461 
1 It would be premature to legislate that airlines change the seating configuration or 
2 introduce other costly prophylactic procedures until there is more information on the 
3 extent of the problem and on the effectiveness of much simpler preventative measures. 
It is presented as unreasonable to force the airlines to undertake any measures without 
evidence on the problem, especially if they are as dramatic as mentioned. The airlines 
are not being held responsible for the condition here, but are described as being at the 
mercy of potentially costly and premature legislation that may not even be required. 
The idea is given that research will uncover more information - expensive measures 
should not be implemented "untie' such a time as more is known, which implies that 
this time will come. Collingridge and Reeve (1986) describe that one of the ideals of 
science is that it is fact finding and will feed into policy. This is a clear example of 
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such an idea being drawn upon. It is not the case that the airlines should have to do 
anything, but that science will find the answers and form the basis upon which such 
decisions will be made. 
9.2.2 The position of the passengers 
I will now consider in more detail the different presentations that are given of the 
position of the passengers: 
[52] Fitzpatrick, 18/10/03 Vol 361 No 935 p729 
1 Lawyers are now seeking compensation for the thousands of people who claim to 
2 have been affected by this previously unrecognised condition 
This is not a flattering presentation of the passengers. They only "claim" to have had 
a DVT, they did not `suffer' one or are not `victims'. This implicitly casts doubt upon 
whether they have or not. Further, they are only "people", which does not carry any 
associated category associations of having the knowledge to know whether they were 
actually affected by it or not. They were not medical practitioners, and their claims 
are not presented as having been validated by anyone with the qualifications to know. 
They are only represented by lawyers; and worse than this, compensation hungry 
lawyers. This does nothing to substantiate their claims, and has the effect of implying 
passengers are cashing in and taking an opportunity, rather than because a need has 
arisen. Furthermore, it is interesting that the condition is described as "previously 
unrecognised". This might be seen as a tacit admission that the condition does exist. 
However, I think in this context it is used to dismiss the seriousness of it. If it was a 
severe problem, it would surely have been recognised before now. Further, it is 
implied that it is these "people" who have been doing the recognising. The discovery 
is not credited to medical research, or even being a simple statement of fact that can 
be referenced because it has been proved to be true. The implication is that those who 
are doing the claiming have brought attention to this condition, and have done so to 
seek compensation for it. 
However, other articles view passengers in a slightly less mercenary light: 
[53] O'Donnell, 1/10/88 No 8614 p797 
1 Dr Cruickshank and colleagues (Aug 17, p 497) emphasise the thromboembolic 
2 hazards of long-distance air travel in their report on six cases. This hospital has 
3 treated similar unfortunate travellers. 
Passengers are sympathetically regarded in this extract. That they are "unfortunate" 
implies that they are undeserving of what has happened to them. They are presented 
as being at the mercy of a risk; it is not just their timely claims that have brought it 
into existence in this extract. This reality of the risk is stressed by citing an 
`emphasis' on the "hazards", the evidence that has been used to prove this. The 
author's personal experience of this - "this hospital" - substantiates his view. He is at 
the coal-face of treatment, not conducting experiments in laboratories but treating the 
actual consequences of the risk. This draws attention to the effects that the risk has, 
and emphasises his authority to reiterate the clearly presented causal link between 
flight and incidence of it. 
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9.3 Principles of Science: Ideal and pragmatic research 
I will now consider how science is both used and constructed by the articles. It 
becomes apparent from the data that there may be a difference between `ideal science' 
on one hand, and a more pragmatic approach on the other. Both of these concepts are 
used to critique or defend claims. Notions of ideal science are used to criticise a study 
that does not live up to them, or to substantiate how well the study in question has 
been carried out, following Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) account of an empiricist and 
contingent repertoire. However as well, the pragmatic nature of science is brought to 
the fore in debates over what science can and cannot do and what it is reasonable to 
expect. The point is that what science is and can do is used to substantiate favourable 
claims or dismiss unfavourable ones in the same way, whatever those claims are; both 
`sides' in the debate use the same tools. 
9.3.1 Ideal science as evidence based 
It is firstly apparent from the articles that scientific enquiry is based on the belief that 
the facts exist and it is possible to determine them. This concords with what Woolgar 
(1996: 13) describes as the `received view of science'. The first principle of this is 
that objects in the natural world are objective and real, and enjoy an existence 
independent of human beings. Human agency is essentially incidental to the objective 
character of the world `out there'. The second that follows from this is that scientific 
knowledge is determined by the actual character of the physical world. Cozzens and 
Woodhouse (1995) describe this as the "old understanding" which assumed that 
science produced truth. These authors and others have highlighted that science may 
not operate in this way, and the scientists themselves sometimes acknowledge this. 
Barnes (1984: 22) for example points out that scientists "treat their own knowledge as 
valid only in certain circumstances or under certain conditions". What I want to do 
here is illustrate how scientists draw on the received view of science to substantiate 
favourable claims and dismiss unfavourable ones. How they might use 
acknowledgements that such ideas do not exist will be considered in due course. 
Some articles present the view that science is a fact finding mission, discovering what 
exists about the world. It is the evidence from this that determines knowledge: 
[54] Calliard and Clerel, 17/2/01 
1 These 109 cases, currently the most serious emergencies on arrival at Paris airports, 
2 convince us of this pathology, which relates to economy and business or first class. 
These authors have seen the facts of the situation; as Yearley (1981: 418) states, 
"correct belief is textually presented as arising directly from the facts". In this case, 
this evidence is unrefutable enough to have "convinced" the authors and determined 
their knowledge. They are able to make claims - the cases were "the most serious" 
and can happen anywhere in the plane - because they have witnessed what is going 
on. The direct access they have had to the facts validates these claims. 
Drawing on the way science translates the world into knowledge is also a means to 
critique studies that do not demonstrate this. For example, unfavourable studies may 
be criticised on the basis of assumptions they have included. Doing so presents the 
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study as contradicting the principles of science by not adhering only to facts and 
evidence, and of therefore producing problematic results: 
[55] Bendz and Sandset, 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 Sir - John H Scurr and colleagues report a rate of symptomless DVT of up to 10% 
2 in long-haul flight travellers. This incidence was seriously questioned by 
3 Jack Hirsh and Martin O'Donnell in their 12 May commentary. 
4 Based on the assumption that the annual incidence of thrombosis in the general 
5 population is one in 1000 and that air travel is associated with a three-fold excess risk 
6 of thrombosis, they estimate that the absolute incidence of symptomatic venous 
7 thromboembolism within I month is one in 4000. These assumptions might not be valid. 
8 We did a study of a simulated long-haul flight in a hypobaric chamber and noted a 
9 substantial, but transient increase of markers of thrombosis in healthy volunteersi. 
10 1 [Footnote] Bendz, B., Rostrup, M., Sevre, K., Andersen, T. O, Sandset, P. M. 
11 `Association between acute hypobaric hypoxia and activation of coagulation in 
12 human beings. ' Lancet 2000; 356: 1657-58. 
The authors of this article had previously produced a study which found a link 
between DVT and the conditions experienced during flight (Bendz et al., 11/11/00, 
vol 356, no 9242 p1657-58 - see Appendix). The study they are critiquing here 
discusses a much lower incidence rate than they had predicted'. Bendz and Sandset 
construct this view as inaccurate and invalid by highlighting what they present as the 
"assumptions" and "estimates" in it. "Assumptions" is a very unscientific word; it is 
not a `hypothesis' or a `theory'; to `assume' something implies that it has been ill- 
thought through and taken for granted - not concurrent with the way scientific inquiry 
should be. It is clear that the results of the study they are referring to are dependent 
on these assumptions - they were "based" on it. This draws attention to those results 
and suggests that they, as well as the assumptions, may not be "valid". 
9 . 3.2 
Ideal science is renlicable 
Articles present the idea that if science is evidence based, then studies will find that 
evidence. Moreover, if one study has accurately discovered what the true facts of a 
situation are, then such results should be reproducible. Mulkay (1988: 81) notes the 
ideal that "valid claims are supposed to be `reproducible' by other competent 
experimenters" in his analysis. Further, Potter (1983) describes how testability is 
used in scientists' claims. For the scientists' claims he studied, "each variably 
characterises the told of testability; it is a central determinant in the choice of the 
speaker's own theory, while being unimportant or irrelevant in the choices of certain 
other scientists". This is key. Not only is replicability held up as a principle, but 
highlighting its absence in studies that produced unfavourable results is a way of 
dismissing them. For example: 
I am mentioning Bendz et al. 's previous study because I think it is relevant to the analysis of their 
account here. I am however taking into account Taylor's (2(01a: 25) warning about not intertwining 
data and background information; see section 4.6. What I am intending is that the relevance of 
including this comment becomes apparent through analysis of the participant's account. 
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[56] Hirsh and O'Donnell, 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1461 
1 If indeed the results of the randomised trial are valid, they should be easy 
2 to reproduce. If confirmed, they would clearly establish lengthy air travel as 
3 an important risk factor for thrombosis. 
This text draws on the principle of replicability, and uses its construction of this ideal 
to dismiss the chance of these results being valid. Replicability is so important that it 
confirms facts. If the results of this study can be reproduced then they would be true 
- they would "clearly establish" the facts of the issue. Indeed, replicability is such 
that valid results will be "easy" to reproduce; if facts exist then there should be no 
difficultly in demonstrating this again, they will still be available to be assessed in the 
same way. What the article manages to do is imply that the results that were found 
are not replicable. The phrase "if indeed" implies disbelief that they are valid. 
Repeated use of "if' casts doubt on the confirmation of the results. And outlining 
these principles at all, when they are so fundamental to fact development and 
scientific inquiry is interesting. If they are so obvious, there would be no need to 
reiterate them. That they are mentioned here serves to imply that the results could not 
live up to such assessment. The authors are using the idea that replication has not yet 
been achieved to case doubt on whether the risk exists. 
9 . 3.3 Ideal methodology 
Debates about the ideal nature and practice of scientific research arise in relation to 
the methods used. A way of criticising research is to highlight the method used as not 
meeting the standards of scientific practice. Woolgar (1996: 13) describes that in the 
`received view of science', there is a "unitary set of methods and procedures, 
concerning which there is, by and large, a consensus". As he goes on to detail 
however, analysis suggests that "science is not an objective set of activities and 
practices that are readily available and straightforwardly identifiable" (1996: 14). 
Indeed, as Mulkay et al. (1983: 198) point out: 
"Scientists.. regularly present correct belief, which is almost without 
exception taken to be identical with their current views, as arising 
unproblematically from the experimental evidence; whilst incorrect belief 
is explained by reference to the distorting effect of personal, social, and 
generally non-scientific factors" 
Unfavourable studies can therefore be critiqued by pointing to the non-scientific 
factors in their methods (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). To illustrate this, I will focus on 
the debate surrounding two key studies. Kraaijenhagen et al. (28/10/00), and Scurr et 
al. (12/05/01) both investigated the risk of inflight DVT and produced different 
results; Kraaijenhagen et al. found no increased risk of clots among passengers, while 
Scurr et at found that up to one in ten passengers develop them. The publication of 
each of these studies led to a series of correspondence and a number of critiques. 
However, the ways in which these are carried out are remarkably similar. Problems 
with methodology are highlighted and contradictory results explained by pointing to 
these deficiencies. 
For example, the choice of sample is highlighted as a critique: 
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[57] Cates, 17/2/01 Vol 357 p554 
1 Until the relation between travel and the control group is known, Kraaijenhagen and 
2 colleagues' study cannot tell us whether there is an extra risk of thrombosis in travellers. 
[58] Burnand et al., 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 Sir--John Scurr and colleagues (May 12, p 1485) presented some of the data 
2 for their study of frequency of deep-vein thrombosis (DVT) during long-haul flights 
3 at the 3rd Pacific Vascular Symposium in Hawaii in November, 1999, and reported a 20% 
4 prevalence of DVT. No mention was made of a randomised trial at that stage. 
5 An exclusion rate of 248 participants seems excessive in a study population of 419. 
6 In the report, we can find reasons given for only 55 exclusions. This high rate raises 
7a concern about bias within the study. Perhaps they did not intend originally to do a 
8 randomised trial? Was it simply that some patients enrolled at the beginning of the 
9 study did not receive stockings? 
In both cases, deficiencies with the sample are presented as a possible explanation for 
why such (unfavourable) results have been produced. Cates critiques Kraaijenhagen 
et al. 's study by stating that because the relationship between the travel and control 
group has not been expanded upon, the results are meaningless; the use of the extreme 
case formulation emphasises this - the results "cannot" be used. This relationship is 
presented as so crucial that not knowing about it undermines the whole study. 
Similarly, Burnand et al. cast doubt on the validity of the sample in Scurr et al. 's 
study by querying the sample chosen. Quoting the two figures for the numbers in the 
study, and those who were excluded allows the reader to easily compare them, and 
saying that this "seems excessive" invites the reader to agree. Asking "was it simply 
that.. " makes the research seem very unprofessional. This is a straightforward part of 
the study that has not been appropriately or sufficiently dealt with. To ask the 
question about stockings casts doubt on the basis of the study; was it the case that 
certain people were deliberately not given stockings, or was this was a mistake? 
Neither of these associations are flattering because they present a study ill-thought 
through, or one that has made mistakes - or indeed both. For the authors to state that 
they are "concerned" about the "excessive" rate implies that the results produced by 
such a study will be inaccurate. 
However, other authors present a more pragmatic view of the way science operates, 
and cite this to defend themselves and their results. Indeed, Yearley (1994: 249) notes 
that while the rules of scientific method are a useful guide, scientists "reserve the right 
to disregard (in the case of science, even overthrow) them when the need arises". For 
example, Scurr et al. describe the practicalities of carrying out research, and the 
difficulties this may bring: 
[59] Scuff et al. 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1485 
1 The logistics of the study made it difficult for passengers to attend Stamford Hospital 
2 on two occasions before travel and this part of the investigation was abandoned 
3 in the remaining volunteers. 
The authors describe part of their study being abandoned, but for "logistical" reasons. 
While their study was originally ideally designed, practical difficulties meant that it 
had to be altered. Further, it was not their own practical difficulties that were 
encountered, but those outside their control; it is passengers who were unable to travel, 
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and these people were "volunteers", taking part in the study out of good will. Scurr et 
al. present this as entirely reasonable, and suggest that such flexibility is a necessary 
requirement of researchers carrying out scientific study. The difficulties of carrying 
out research are therefore described, but in such a way as to not reflect badly on the 
expertise of the researchers. 
Furthermore, authors may use such criticisms of method offensively and defensively 
(Billig, 1991) not only to attack results but to build up their own study. Yearley 
(1981: 419; 423) describes how pointing out that some important (and often obvious) 
material has been overlooked casts doubt upon the claim; in such a critique, new 
material which should have been seen (but was not) may be supplied. In the data 
studied here, doubt is cast by authors pointing to an important methodological issue 
that was not addressed, but that now has been in their study. In this extract, Scurr et 
al. give a critique of Kraaijenhagen et al. 's study, and then point to where their study 
had overcome such deficiencies: 
[60] Scuff et al. 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1485 
1 Although Kraaijenhagen and colleagues recorded no association of DVT with travel, 
2 many of their airline passengers have flown for less than 5h. These case-control studies 
3 indicate that DVT related to air travel is not a major healthcare problem, perhaps because 
4 only a small proportion of the population undertakes long-haul journeys at any time. 
5 These investigators included people with several potential confounding factors such as 
6 previous venous thrombosis whereas we excluded such individuals. 
The results of Kraaijenhagen et al. 's study contradict those found by Scurr et a1.; 
therefore, pointing to problems in Kraaijenhagen et al. 's method is a means not only 
of dismissing their results, but also of increasing the likelihood of Scurr et al. 's own 
being taken more seriously. Starting off with the word "although" orients the reader 
to the idea that what is being presented here is about to be contradicted, and 
encourages them to view it with a critical eye. Kraaijenhagen et al. 's method is then 
cited as deficient; it included patients who had flown for less than five hours, and 
people with a potentially higher risk. By citing these factors, Scurr et al, construct 
them as being significant in determining the results produced. These are therefore the 
issues that they present themselves as having addressed. The results that 
Kraaijenhagen et al. produced are presented as being directly derived from this 
(flawed) methodology, which casts doubt upon the validity of the results. Indeed, the 
study only "recorded no association", it is not necessarily the case that one does not 
exist, but that this study did not manage to find it. The presentation that Scurr et al. 
give is that their study does note this association, because it did take proper account of 
these important factors. 
9 . 3.4 
Subjectivity in science 
A further issue in debate is subjectivity in scientific research. Ideal science is 
presented as an objective translation of facts into knowledge. Martin and Richards 
describe that "traditionally, the neutral, disinterested, and objective expert has been 
portrayed - not least by scientists themselves - as the rational and authoritative arbiter 
of public disputes over scientific or technical issues. But this old ideal has been [... ] 
eroded by the increasingly obvious limitations of experts and expert knowledges". 
As Woolgar (1996: 15) points out, work in the sociology of scientific knowledge has 
121 
described how scientific procedures and decisions are "highly dependent on local 
conditions, circumstances and opportunities". This leads to the conclusion that 
"scientific practice is much more creative and contingent than is portrayed by 
idealised versions of `science"' (1996: 16). What I am interested in exploring is how 
these idealised and contingent versions of science are used in discourse, and to what 
effect. If any subjectivity can be pointed out in a study, it is a means of criticising it 
and dismissing its findings. However, the debate between the theoretical and 
pragmatic nature of science is illuminated here, as other articles maintain that 
subjectivity is part of the everyday operation of science and removing it is an 
impossible ideal. I will illustrate this by drawing attention to the debate about the 
subjective interpretation of ultrasonography; a method of scanning for blood clots. 
While those in opposition use the principles of science to attack claims, in defence, a 
pragmatic view of the operations of science is used. 
Firstly, highlighting subjectivity is a means of discrediting the results of a study. For 
example, Bumand et al. describe the inclusion of human judgement in Scurr et al's 
study: 
[61] Burnand et al., 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 Scurr and colleagues used duplex scanning to assess the presence or absence of DVT. 
2 Despite their citing five studies in support of the accuracy of this method, a meta-analysis 
3 has shown that it is only 70% accurate in the calf segment in patients with symptomatic 
4 DVTs, and even less so in those without symptoms. Duplex is highly operator-dependent. 
5 What external audit was applied to the sonographers who were obviously not masked to 
6 the exposure to flight? For instance, are the scans available to a third party for review? 
They state of the method for scanning for blood clots in patients' legs that: "duplex is 
highly operator-dependant". The implication is that the results produced by this 
technique are affected by this; it would not be mentioned at all without a reason. 
Stressing that the technique is "highly" operator dependant emphasises the degree of 
subjectivity. It is not just that it is carried out by human operators, but that it is 
dependant on them; the results are determined by the person using the equipment. 
This implies that the results produced may not be valid; good science does not 
incorporates fallible human judgements but deals in objective measurements only. 
However, Scuff et al. present what they see as a more realistic view of science. As 
Yearley (1994: 247) points out, judgement is indispensable in science, and this is 
utilised in this extract: 
[62] Scurr et at, 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 Duplex ultrasound imaging was done by experienced vascular technologists. 
2 We did not confirm these results independently because we rely on technologists' 
3 opinions in clinical practice. 
Scurr et al. both defend what they have done in their particular study, and present a 
different conception of how science works. The findings produced by this technique 
were not simply a `subjective judgement' but a result obtained by competent and 
qualified staff. Giving them the title of "vascular technologists" further confirms this; 
these are people who specialise in this. The activities accorded to such a membership 
category imply that these people are extremely knowledgeable about this particular 
branch of medicine and well able to use the equipment. When Scurr et al. state that 
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they "did not confirm these results independently" this implies that this was because 
there was no need, and they have no doubt about the results produced. The mention 
of clinical practice then goes on to give a different view of science. Rather than being 
an objective fact finding mission, opinions are fundamental to science; it doesn't just 
use them but has come to "rely" on them. Using "we" encompasses more than just 
the authors of the study, and seems to imply that research generally does this. Scurr et 
al. therefore place their research in a much wider context to justify their actions. The 
construction given is that anyone contesting the authors' results would in effect be 
contesting the way that medical research is carried out by everyone. 
9.3.5 Ideal science as free from bias 
Related to subjectivity are ideas about bias. Freedom from bias is crucial; as Nelkin 
(1995: 452) points out, the very "authority of scientific expertise has rested on 
assumptions about scientific neutrality". If science is evidenced based and yields the 
truth, then it should be free from human distortion. What has been pointed out (for 
example by Collingridge and Reeve, 1986: 9; Woolgar, 1996: 23) is that while this is 
asserted, it may not always be the case. Authors use notions of bias and ideal science 
is as an attempt to justify their own study and its result. In this example, the authors 
use this to present their work as what science should be: 
[63] Kraaijenhagen et at, 28/10/00 Vol 356 p 1492 
1 In 1998 the term economy class syndrome was coined to describe the association 
2 between travel and thrombosis. A fair risk estimate, however, has not been done. 
3 We report the results of a prospective study, in which we kept the effect of bias to 
4a minimum. We compared travel history in 788 patients with venous thrombosis 
5 with that of controls with similar symptoms but in whom the disease had been excluded. 
6 For air travel alone, the odds ratio was 1.0 (95% Cl 0.3-3.0); also, no association was 
7 recorded for other methods of transportation. We have shown that there is no increased 
8 risk of deep vein thrombosis among travellers. 
9 Previous work provides evidence and theoretical explanations for the hypothesis that 
10 long-distance travel is a risk factor for venous thromboembolism; however, the actual 
11 risk is poorly quantified and possibly overestimated, since the association is based on 
12 uncontrolled or inappropriately controlled studies. To diminish the effect of bias, an 
13 ideal control group should consist of people with similar signs and symptoms as potential 
14 cases who originally sought care but who, in fact, did not have venous thrombosis. 
15 From April, 1997, to January, 1999, consecutive outpatients older than 18 years and with 
16 clinically suspected deep vein thrombosis (DVT) of the leg only, were eligible for study. 
17 At presentation, the patient's medical history, including specific questions about symptom 
18 duration, presence of malignant disease, recent surgery, immobilisation, trauma, and 
19 family history of venous thromboembolism, was obtained with a standardised 
20 questionnaire. The patient was also asked if they had travelled by air, motorcar, bus, train, 
21 or boat for more than 3 continuous hours in the past 4 weeks. This information was 
22 obtained before diagnostic testing, which was done without knowledge of travel history. 
The authors orient the concept of bias, with the implicit assumption that science 
would not include this; an "ideal" control group would be one that was not affected by 
bias. Indeed, they present the avoidance of bias as one of the key defining 
characteristics of their study by discussing it in the opening sentence of their article. 
Myers (1985a: 596) notes that scientists may "start by making high level claims for the 
importance of their findings", and this seems to be just what the authors are doing 
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here. The mention of bias is a use of both offensive and defensive rhetoric, as it 
builds up their study by outlining how they have avoided it, and implies that others 
that have been done were biased. This idea is given some detail, as is the effect that it 
has. The previous studies that did find a link between travel and blood clots were 
"inappropriately".. "based"; doubt is therefore cast on the findings they produced. 
The authors describe how they have improved on this. They outline what an ideal 
control group "should" consist of - and then how theirs meets these principles. Using 
the word "should" externalises this description of the control group as a universal 
standard, which makes it more commendable that their study conformed to this, rather 
than them setting their own model. To substantiate their study and their claims, 
Kraaijenhagen et al. critique the methods of previous studies in relation to bias, 
describe what ideal science should look like, and then outlined how their research 
achieves those aims. 
9.3.5 Ideal measurements 
A further issue which is used to attack and defend claims, and over which differences 
between ideal and `real' science emerge, is measurement. As Knorr-Cetina (1995: 152) 
notes, what counts as "sufficient measurement" is negotiable in scientific work. In 
the texts studied, answers to the question of what counts as valid measurement are 
again used to back up a favourable study or to contradict an unfavourable one. For 
example, it is apparent that the methods chosen determine the results found and that 
different ways of measuring produce different results: 
[64] Calliard and Clerel, 17/2/01 Vol 357, p554 
1 This number is underestimated, since only symptomatic pulmonary embolisms 
2 on disembarkation were registered. 
[65] Hirsh and O'Donnell, 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1461 
I If one applies strict criteria for causality, as of 1999 there was no good evidence 
2 that long flights are a risk factor for VTE. 
How the phenomenon is measured affects the results; or more aptly in these cases, 
measurements may be selected to fit different results. These quotes also illustrate 
how measurements can be politically useful in attacking or defending a claim. 
Calliard and Clerel highlight how a particular measurement may "underestimate" the 
risk as they attempt to build it up. Hirsh and O'Donnell present a dismissal of the risk 
by arguing for "strict criteria" in measuring it, which would produce a result that it 
does not exist. Calliard and Clerel substantiate their claim by giving a reason why the 
incidence rate has been underestimated, and is actually higher. Use of the word 
"registered" is interesting here; it implies that the rate is higher because it is only 
cases that have been reported and recognised that are being counted; not that other 
cases do not exist. Hirsh and O'Donnell point to the need for "good evidence" of the 
causality. This is very difficult to argue with; if science is based on evidence, how 
could anything other than `good evidence' be required. This also implies that such a 
thing exists as `bad evidence' and it is only this that has led to suggestions that there 
might be a link between blot clots and flights. 
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9.3.6 Consensus 
The final issue I will consider is consensus. As Collingridge and Reeve discuss, this 
is one of the principles of ideal science: "consensus is the normal state of science, 
debate and disagreement marking at best, an inadvertent failure to apply scientific 
method properly, or, at worst, outright bias and distortion by one of the parties. If the 
experts have correctly followed the rules of scientific method and have considered all 
the available data, then they ought to reach the same conclusion" (1986: 9). Potter 
(1997: 150) points out that constructing a consensus and "presenting a description as 
shared across different producers" is a way of establishing the facticity of that 
description. What is interesting is how this is done. 
In the articles studied, agreement in science was maintained as a key principle; 
obviously, if something exists, studies will find it and agree with each other. 
Consensus is therefore used by authors to substantiate their study by pointing out that 
it fits in with wider established knowledge or that others agree. It is also used to 
attack claims, by pointing out that they do not concur with that is known, and so 
cannot be true. A third and interesting way that these principles are invoked is where 
a study is presented that does not fit in with previous work. In such cases, this 
existing knowledge may be redefined, or outlined to be deficient in some way. 
Authors presenting a new claim may argue that it should not necessarily be dismissed 
as not fitting in with the consensus view, if they can show that view to be lacking in 
some way. Moreover, authors may express surprise at what they have found if it is an 
unusual result, in order to present what they have found as fact; even if unexpected, it 
still exists. 
9.3.6.1 Consensus as substantiation 
A way for authors to back up their own claims may be to call on previous research. 
As Potter (1983: 311) says, if it can be demonstrated that everyone agrees, then it is 
easier to present what they agree about as true. Pointing to consensus from a wider 
context may therefore be used to back up a claim: 
[66] Scurr et al. 12/5/01 
1 In our study no symptomless DVT was detected in the stocking group. 
2 In hospital practice there is evidence that graduated compression stockings 
3 are effective at reducing the risk of DVT after surgical treatment. 
The authors state that other evidence confirms their finding, and thus makes it seem 
more likely. What the authors have found exists in hospital practice and that it does is 
stated very definitively as a fact: "stockings are effective" (line 2-3, emphasis added). 
"Hospital practice" is a term that implies the pervasiveness of this knowledge; it is so 
widely acknowledged to be true that it is part of the routine of medical care - and the 
implication is that this is in all hospitals. This is not attributed to any other study in 
particular, which could be critiqued, but is presented as something established and 
well known about. The Scurr et al. are presenting is new and the results contentious; 
backing up their findings with the experience of practice helps to substantiate and add 
credibility to them. 
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9.3.6.2 Lack of consensus as critique 
Just as pointing to a consensus on a view is a way of substantiating it, so highlighting 
that results do not fit in with what is known is a means of criticising a study: 
[67] Ferrari and Morgan, 17/2/01 Vol 357, p553 
1 Roderick Kraaijenhagen and colleagues question a well established concept 
2 in venous thromboembolic disease that is supported by published work. 
3 We do not believe that Kraaijenhagen and colleagues' report invalidates 
4 the established concept. As reported by R Sarvesvaran, pulmonary embolism 
5 is one, and probably the main, cause of sudden death among travellers. 
That Kraaijenhagen et al. 's study does not fit in with what is known is used to critique 
it. It is described as being in contradiction with the "established" concept, something 
that is accepted and agreed upon. A temporal element is added to the establishment of 
this concept, it is "well" established, not something new or unproven, but accepted 
over a long period, and now recognised and reputable. Evidence of this concept is 
additionally given just to emphasise that the current study does not concur. Other 
research is cited and very definitely: pulmonary embolism "is" the cause, and not only 
that, but it could even be the "main" one. That this has been "reported" is also 
significant, it is not an opinion or an assumption, but the relaying of an actual 
occurrence. The word "report" is used in relation to Kraaijenhagen et al., but as a 
noun. When used to Sarvesvaran, it is used as a verb to imply the existence of 
evidence. The current study does not fit in with the established consensus, and the 
implication therefore is that the current study is wrong. 
As has been previously indicated, the same tools may be used to attack or defend 
claims, regardless of what those claims are. So just as the previous authors dismissed 
a report that found no risk of blood clots by pointing to the lack of consensus for such 
a view, so this extract does the same about Scurr et al. 's study that did find a link: 
[68] Burnand et al., 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 Our final concern is the enormously high numbers (one in ten) of passengers 
2 who developed DVT during travel. This rate does not correspond with any previously 
3 published study; prevalence is normally estimated to be 1% or less 
The results here are presented as so different from what is known (producing numbers 
that are "enormously" high) that they cannot be true. The authors express their 
"concern" that results so clearly in contradiction with what is known are being 
presented as accurate. This is emphasised by pointing out that they do not concur 
with "any" previous research; and describing it as "published" research accords 
greater authority to it. It is interesting that the incidence is "normally" only 
"estimated" to be 1 %; the results being presented are so clearly wrong that even 
against an estimation, they are utterly implausible. 
9363 Redefining what is known 
When new findings are being presented that do not fit in with established knowledge, 
the quality of that knowledge may be challenged or re-cast so that the current findings 
may avoid being dismissed. Haggett and Smith (2004) have shown that when 
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controversial claims that are being presented against the prevailing consensus, 
attempts are made to redefine what that consensus is. 
What is interesting is that both `sides' do this. New studies may unpack just how 
previous work was lacking, and how their study has overcome such problems. 
Kraaijenhagen et al., and Scurr et al., whilst presenting different new results, both 
engage in this: 
[69] Scun et al., 8/9/01 Vol 358 No 9284 p1476 
1 As to Burnand and colleagues' wild speculation on one long-haul flight, 
2 every year about 30 people die at London Heathrow from pulmonary embolism, 
3 but an unknown number might die later or develop symptoms of DVT in 
4a lower limb. Frequency of thrombotic events needs to be measured, not guessed 
5 at from indirectly related data. 
Scurr et al. are presenting results that do not fit in with previous studies - so they 
attack the quality of those studies. Calling previous work "wild speculation" makes it 
seem very unprofessional and not based on facts or scientific reasoning. Scurr et al. 
imply that the other research has not been well proved or backed up, only "guessed 
at". This is in contrast with the obvious proper model of what scientific results should 
be - "measured" from "data"- is a way of dismissing the claims of previous research. 
For Scurr et al. to then place their new findings against this means that theirs are less 
likely to be dismissed for not being in agreement, if that research can be presented 
being inappropriately or inaccurately derived. 
Similarly in this extract, what is previously known is re-cast, and how it was arrived 
at critiqued, in a way that may be seen to suit the current results being presented: 
[70] Kraaijenhagen et al., 28/10/00 Vol 356 p1492 
1 Previous work provides evidence and theoretical explanations for the hypothesis that 
2 long distance travel is a risk factor for venous thromboembolism; however, the actual 
3 risk is poorly quantified and possibly over-estimated, since the association is based on 
4 uncontrolled or inappropriately controlled studies. 
The authors dismiss previous studies by characterising them as bad science: they were 
"uncontrolled" and "inappropriate". This led to results that are inaccurate - the 
association of a risk was "based" on these poor studies, which therefore negates any 
chance of it being true. Interestingly, it is not just this explicit reference to these low 
quality studies that diminishes the association. What the previous work found were 
"explanations" for the "hypothesis" that the association existed. They did not `prove' 
it, only presented information in support of it; and a hypothesis is not a fact, just an 
idea. Further, these studies only found that travel was a risk "factor'- not the only or 
even the main risk, again diminishing the likelihood of a causal link between flights 
and blood clots. Now that they have dismissed the previous (contradictory) work, the 
authors can present their study (see extract 65). They imply that they, in contrast to 
these previous studies, are in command of the facts, because they are able to make 
comparisons about the "actual risk" - through their study, they know what this is. 
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9.3.6.4 Surprise 
A final consideration in terms of consensus is the concept of surprise and how this is 
used. Woolgar (1996: 18) notes that "the idea of discovery is central to popular 
conceptions of science. It is the one activity above all other that one most commonly 
associates with scientific activity"; see also Knorr-Cetina (1995: 161). Here I am 
concerned to show how authors presenting findings that contradict other research may 
express surprise about the discovery of their results. Doing so is a way of orienting to 
the possibility that what they have found does not fit in with the consensus view, and 
yet at the same time stressing that they have now found the facts of the issue. These 
facts have presented themselves, they were not as expected, but this is what they are. 
This may also be a way for authors of pre-empting criticism that their findings do not 
fit in with the consensus view. 
For example, Kraaijenhagen et al. state that: 
[71] Kraaijenhagen eta! 17/2/01 Vol 357 p554 
1 Surprisingly, we found no scientific confirmation for the theoretical assumption 
2 that travel increases the risk for thrombosis. 
The authors describe their surprise that their results do not fit with the existing 
knowledge. However, they construct their text to argue that this is because of the 
nature of that previous work. For example, the authors describe it as a "theoretical 
assumption". Not only is it just something that has been ill-thought through, but it is 
theoretical - it has not been empirically tested. The authors use a contrast between 
this and their own study - which was "scientific". Dismissing this previous work 
presents what they have found (through "scientific confirmation") as even more likely 
to be true. That whilst looking for and expecting to find one result they found another 
constructs this conclusion as irrefutably forcing itself upon them. It was a fact that 
was there and could not be ignored. 
Presenting a different view, Scurr et al. use a similar tool. 
[72] Scurr et al. 12/5/01 Vol 357 p1485 
1 About one in ten passengers not wearing elastic compression stockings developed 
2 symptornless DVT after airline travel, which is a surprisingly large proportion 
3 of the study group. The passengers were all aged more than 50 years and undertook 
4 long journeys by air (median 24h), both of which are factors that could increase 
5 the risk of thrombosis. As far as we are aware no other workers have undertaken 
6 such a prospective study. 
The authors express their surprise at their results that one in ten passengers developed 
a DVT after flight. By expressing their surprise, they orient to previous work that had 
suggested the incidence was not this high, and try to avoid having their own results 
dismissed as being too high. However, they then go on to give details to substantiate 
their result. They give factors which are more likely to produce such a result, such as 
the age of passengers and length of journey, thus making it seem more plausible. 
They then also point out that no other research conducted in such a way has been 
carried out before, again making it less easy to dismiss their findings because there is 
nothing to directly compare them against. Therefore, while the authors may be 
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surprised at the unusual result found, they do not believe it necessarily to be 
inaccurate, and present a case that argues that it is not. 
9.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined the construction of the risk ECS from the articles in 
The Lancet. The need to consider how such constructions are achieved has been 
particularly pertinent here because of the vast variation in the views presented. The 
risk is presented in some articles as extremely serious. Causal links are made, and the 
`facts' of the issue are clearly stated. Similarly, the risk is equally definitively stated 
not to exist in other reports. The responsibility of the passengers and airlines are also 
differently constructed, depending on whether the risk is being built up or dismissed. 
In this chapter I have also considered how scientific research is both used by and 
constructed through these articles. What has been discussed here is a divergence 
between (using Collingridge and Reeve's 1986 terms) the myths and realities of 
science. These `myths' are: it is possible to find facts, and science will make 
discoveries about them; science is determined by the nature of the world; science is 
replicable; scientific methods are principles which should be upheld; science is 
neutral and not subjective; and consensus is a necessary determinant of fact. In 
contrast, the `realities' are sometimes also presented. These are that there are 
practical difficulties to scientific work; methodologies are not straightforward sets of 
procedures that may be uncontroversially applied; a lack of subjectivity is an 
impossible ideal and judgement is essential; and an existing consensus can be 
redefined. What I have attempted to show in this chapter is that the myths and 
realities of science are constructed and presented to substantiate and dismiss claims - 
whatever those claims are. 
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Chapter Ten: 
Facts in the Making: Debates and Discussions in Internet Forums 
This chapter is an analysis of two online aviation and health discussion forums. One 
is a mail-based list, the other an Internet forum. I outline how members use a number 
of devices to present their version of ECS. Messages often present entirely 
contradictory views but use the same tools to do so, and it is these methods that will 
be highlighted here. I discuss how members present themselves, to achieve authority 
for their claims, and to attack other accounts. I consider how other groups in the 
debate are presented (including passengers, airlines, and the media), how this is 
achieved, and how it impacts on the wider constructions of the risk. I then consider 
how science is used and how scientific work is constructed through the debate. While 
the opinions presented may vary considerably (and indeed it is often the moments of 
heated contradiction and debate that may be most illuminating), the point to be made 
is that convincing claims are constructed in the same way. 
The two groups being analysed here have been described and discussed in sections 
5.2.2.4, and 6.2; additional comments are relevant here. In the mail-based list, email 
addresses are clearly displayed and full names, titles and signatures are frequently 
used. In the Internet discussion forum, messages are commonly signed from 
pseudonyms or nicknames. This means that it is very difficult to discern anyone's 
position, authority or occupation. Clearly the Internet is a forum where false 
identities can be assumed with ease; and in these forums members and guests are not 
encouraged to reveal any personal details about themselves. This may mean that 
members feel more able to leave honest, open, relaxed posts, without fear of any 
comeback. It may also mean of course that members have to work harder to give any 
authority to their claims. 
In this research, the details and the addresses of both the mail based list and the 
Internet forum and all individual members have been anonymised. Dates have been 
given as these may be relevant to the content of the message. I have given initials to 
each member so that they may be distinguished from one another. 
10.1. Presentation of self 
In this chapter I consider how members persuade that their account of ECS is 
credible. Similarly to the other groups considered in this research, how authors 
present themselves is key. What is interesting and different here is that members may 
be anonymous, and can assume any identity that they wish. This is more easily 
accomplished in the Internet forum where members use pseudonyms and registration 
requires very few personal details. The mail-based list gives more details about 
members (an email address for instance) and members sign each post with a name and 
usually have a signature at the bottom of their email, but there is nothing to say that 
these are genuine. This anonymity may mean therefore that members have to work 
harder to establish their authority. Just stating that they are a doctor or expert may not 
carry much weight - it may have to be `proved', a point made by Herring et al. (1998) 
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in relation to presenting oneself on the Internet. For the purposes of this research, it 
may not matter whether they are doctors or not; what is important is how they present 
themselves as having the authority to speak on this issue, and the same devices might 
be employed by doctors or those masquerading as medics. 
10.1.1 Knowledge. experience and concern 
As members are not automatically accorded any authority, they may have to work to 
establish it. When Potter argues that "certain categories of actors are treated as 
entitled to know particular sorts of things, and their report may be given special 
credence [.. ] participants can work up their category entitlements in a number of 
ways" (1997: 114-115) members have to prove that they are in these `certain 
categories'. In the examples that follow it can be seen that they do so in a number of 
ways. These include reference to medical experience, demonstrating a knowledgeable 
command of the issues, or using highly specialized language. 
Members may present themselves as having sufficient experience to speak on the 
issue: 
[73] Member DJ, mail based list, 25/04/02 
1 Sitting down for a long time and not moving is a risk, and I have noted, 
2 in my clinical practice, that sitting in front of the TV for hours on end, 
3 taking all-day car trips, and being extraordinarily inactive have been 
4 associated with DVT and PE in my patients. 
In terms of experience, reference is made to what ".. I have noted in my clinical 
practice.. ". The member gives a presentation of self as well-informed because of their 
direct experience - they have seen things for themselves that are relevant here. That 
this is in "clinical practice" implies that they are a qualified medic and may therefore 
hope to assume the associations of this membership category, of educated, 
knowledgeable, and with the authority to speak on medical issues. Furthermore, that 
they have worked in "practice" implies a day to day working experience of the issues, 
not just a theoretical grasp of them. 
Being accorded sufficient authority to have claims taken seriously may be established 
by using very technical medical language. A message to the mail based list responds 
to the previous quote: 
[74] Member IF - mail based list - 29/04/02 
1 Your TV set does not shoot you up to a virtual 8000ft altitude, 
2 in a relatively low %02 (let alone pO2) environment, with the inherent stress 
3 of flying, the typical tourist class uncomfort, and other amenities. 
4 Ask your digital microcirculation, your myocardial syncitium, your nephrons, 
5 neurons and glia, your 02-deprived aggregated platelets and rbc and 
6 its viscous environment, the blood. Those are the silent majority in this scenario. 
The message describes the scenario using a range of complicated medical terms. In it 
the member refers to the environment of the aircraft in technical language and list a 
number of biological expressions. The terms used are complicated and specialised, 
and the minute detail given substantiates the claim. As Potter says, people will 
provide increasingly technical support for positions as a way of "giving a basis to 
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their claims" (1997: 158). In doing so, the member gives a presentation of self as 
extremely knowledgeable, both about the relevant pathology, and specifically in 
relation to a flight. They are therefore presenting their view on the issue as one that 
should be taken seriously. 
What is significant about such posts is that the presentations of self that members give 
construct their views of ECS in a particular way. They give a presentation of self to 
substantiate their view, or to avoid having it dismissed: 
[75] Member MK - Internet forum - 9/11/00 
1 "DVTs/PEs are a significant problem in hospitals, mainly because few of us 
2 will ever forget the patients of ours who (after surgery/trauma ranging 
3 from the trivial to the severe) unexpectedly dropped dead from a massive PE. 
4 Much attention has been given to preventing DVTs/PE, ranging from aspirin 
5 to heparin to early mobilisation to compression stockings, etc., etc" 
6I wholeheartedly agree that we need further studies (doesn't everything? ), 
7 but the current evidence really does not point towards airline passenger DVTs 
8 being a major epidemiological phenomenon. 
This is interesting because the member gives a presentation of self as caring, 
concerned about DVT and patient care, and knowledgeable about the topic. They are 
aware of and have tried a wide range of treatments and preventatives for DVT, so 
many that they are forced just to put `etc., etc' to save having to list them all. This is 
significant in light of Fahnestock's (1989: 37) comments about copia, especially when 
applied to lists. Copia refers to "fullness or amplification [.. ] but can also be applied 
to the technique for enumeration or listing, creating a series that suggests a large 
number of things, too many for the speaker to specify. This stylistic device is 
especially useful when the arguer's purpose is to appeal to quantity". In this instance, 
the appeal to quantity is not only about the large number of preventative methods, but 
the author's extensive knowledge of them. It is also an appeal to shared knowledge, 
presenting an assumption that others will know what this `etc etc' stands for - it 
places the member within a wider community of similarly knowledgeable people. 
Furthermore, use of the terms "burs" and "us" is interesting in also doing this 
(following Herschell, 2001 on pronouns). Here, the use of "us" not only aligns the 
member with the rest of the medical profession (thus strengthening their claim) but 
personalises the account and makes the member seem very much in touch with the 
situation. These patients were real people who they cared for, and the author was 
very much involved in their cases; they were not just statistics or patients that they 
had just heard about. The member portrays the sense of the tragedy that the patients' 
deaths had occurred, in spite of everything that they, the doctor, had done for them, 
and that they had tried to do everything they possibly could. The tragedy is such that 
the member will not "ever forget". The member is not dismissing the issue, indeed, 
they state that it is a "serious problem", but this emphasis here is on "hospitals"; it is 
not a serious problem generally, or outside of this context, so, by implication, on 
aircraft. This serves to dismiss the seriousness of the risk of inflight DVT. Because 
this member is knowledgeable, it cannot be because they are not fully aware of the 
issue that they are dismissing it; they present as a medical practitioner with a great 
deal of experience of treating DVTs. It cannot be because they are unsympathetic and 
consider a DVT to be trivial, they very much care about patients, and become 
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involved personally in their treatment. Their dismissal of the issue is presented as 
being because the risk of an inflight DVT is simply not worthy of consideration. 
10.1.2 Using authority to substantiate or counteract claims 
Comments about personal status are also used to attack other posts, and to provide the 
authority to do so. As Billig (1991: 143) notes, justifying an attitude also involves 
criticising the counter position. For example, in the second post below, the member 
uses their position to substantiate their claim and to disprove a counter argument: 
[76] Member CO - Internet forum, 18/07/01 
I So the ambulance-chasers are finally moving in. 
2I realise this is essentially a medical issue but the consequences could affect 
3 the whole industry, so I'm posting here... 
4 >DVT `VICTIMS' SUE AIRLINES 
5 >BBC News Online 17 July 2001 
6> An Australian law firm has launched legal action against three international 
7 >airlines over blood clots suffered by passengers on long-haul flights 
[77] Member HD - Internet forum, 19/07/01 
I What a load of codswallop! In 33 years of flying, sitting 20,000hrs+ 
2 in various cockpits and simulators, I have never encountered DVT 
3 amongst my colleagues or my self. What a pity ambulance chasing 
4 has finally caught on amongst the legal professions in Australia! 
Considerable personal experience and the authority that may be accorded to this are 
used in the second message to counteract claims about the risk in the news report. 
This is done very forcefully, and putting figures on the claims adds extra weight to 
them (noted by Potter and Wetherell, 1995: 50). For the member to state that they 
have "33 years" of experience is more persuasive than saying `very many' and is 
presented as a fact, whereas describing `many years' of experience could be dismissed 
as a judgement only. The member also uses forceful terms such as "never", an 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986). Here it is used to emphasise how 
unlikely the risk is. The member also shows how relevant their particular experience 
is, by talking in terms of "sitting", and discusses the range of experience they have in 
"various" different circumstances. The reference to "cockpits and simulators" of 
course implies that this member is a pilot, and so naturally extremely knowledgeable 
about flying. They are using the category of `pilot' to imply that they have the 
knowledge and experience associated with the membership of it (see Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). The member also describes their "colleagues" who are presumed to 
be similarly experienced and knowledgeable, adding weight to the idea of the lack of 
evidence. The effect here of the presentation of self is to dismiss any link between 
blood clots and flying and to provide an authoritative claim that it does not exist. 
' The full text of the article is given in the post; it is a long article and is not relevant to the point I am 
wishing to make here about the establishment of authority in the message that responds to it, so I am 
not reproducing it here. 
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10 1 .3 Managing stake 
Presentations of self can include stake management: 
[78] Member MB - mail based list- 26/4/02 
1 And without any commercial intent, many airlines (including BA) 
2 have given in-flight advice on exercise in relation to `improving circulation' 
3 for many years (in the case of BA at least 10 years). Also there is information 
4 available to the travelling public on the airline web sites 
5 (eg www. britishairways. com/health) 
Although the post is stated to be about "many airlines" it can be read as being about 
British Airways, and the member signs off as an employee of BA. Couching the post 
in terms of other airlines may be an attempt to avoid having the content of this 
message disregarded as a product of stake - why would a member of a rival airline 
want to praise the actions of others? Of course, the details are all about BA, but 
starting the post with the statement that the advice given is "without any commercial 
intent" orients to these matters of stake, by confessing them (Potter, 1997). In this 
extract, mentioning "information" is significant. It subtly implies that the information 
is there, the airlines (particularly BA) are providing it and it is up to passengers to find 
it and take it, constructing the risk and the responsibility for avoiding it in a particular 
way. 
10.2. Political Motivations 
Having addressed how and why members portray themselves in certain ways, I will 
now consider how others are presented. One way for members to do so is to highlight 
political motivations behind the behaviour of others being described. This can also 
emphasise the authority of the member. The presentation of a well considered case 
makes their construction of the risk more plausible. For example, this quote assigns 
political motivations to the airlines for their behaviour: 
[79] Member DL - email based list - 25/4/02 
1 However, I suspect that one of the reasons why the airlines don't do this 
2 is legal - if they openly admit that flying is hazardous to your health, 
3 at least in the US they increase their liability to be sued 
4 by anyone who develops a DVT or PE in time-relation to any flight. " 
This quote points to the legal reasons why airlines may have adopted this particular 
stance. Pointing to the motivations behind their behaviour constructs the risk and the 
behaviour of the airlines in relation to it in a very particular way. It also implies that 
the risk exists - the message states that airlines could "admit" this, which constructs 
the risk as real but hidden by the airlines. The reality of the risk is emphasised by the 
possibility that "anyone who develops a DVT" could sue - this is not those who 
`claim' to have a clot, or who `think' they have, but those who have actually 
developed one. The causation with flying is made clear - clots occur after "flight". 
This stresses that it is being on board a plane that causes a clot. Nothing else is 
mentioned, and that it can happen after "any" flight, implies that flying is the common 
denominator in occurrences. The member constructs ECS as real, as known about by 
the airlines, but as not being revealed by them because of the risk of being sued. 
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However, highlighting political motivations can also be used to counteract a particular 
construction of the risk: 
[80] Member QA - Internet forum - 20/07/01 
1I was sickened the other night to watch a DVT 'victim' burst into tears on 
2 television, obviously for the sole purpose of getting the public's sympathy. 
3I am not a cold person, and my sympathy goes out to those who have DVT, 
4 however, in most cases, the 'victims' are not living healthily anyway! 
5 The majority of cases have been smokers, or had other unhealthy habits 
6 that largely contributed to the onset. 
This quote draws attention to the motivations of passengers. It does not encourage 
sympathy for them and their plight. Rather, it presents them as calculating individuals 
acting in emotive ways purely to elicit compassion, but who have brought the 
condition on themselves. Such acts are their way of presenting themselves as 
"victims", but the author quashes this idea out of hand. The exclamation mark after 
"not living healthily anyway" stresses what a ridiculous notion the passenger as 
victim is (as does the use of `victim' in inverted commas). This is a title the 
passengers have attempted to assume, not one they have warranted or deserve. It can 
also be observed that the author also uses a `disclaimer' (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975). 
They state that "I am not a cold person and my sympathy goes out to those who have 
DVT, however.. ". The author is taking care to ensure that their ascription of the 
passengers' motivations is not dismissed as a measure of their own hard heartedness. 
Furthermore, by stating that they are sympathetic if a DVT does occur, the 
implication is that they would be if a `genuine' case occurred, and that this is not the 
case here. Instead, passengers only have themselves to blame, but then manipulate 
the media and the public to generate sympathy for what has happened. Attributing 
these motivations to their behaviour is a persuasive construction of the issue. 
10 3. Taking things out of context 
Another device used to substantiate or contradict a claim is engaging with issues 
about context. This may be used to encourage sympathy and consensus with a 
particular view. For example: 
[81] Member GV - Internet forum - 29/10/01 
1 From today's Scotsman - as if our industry doesn't have enough 
2 to worry about, here's something else that will drain it of millions... 
3 >AIRLINES FACE LEGAL DVT ACTION 
4 >Tanya Thompson, Home Affairs Correspondent 
5 >HIGH Court writs are to be issued against two major airlines over alleged cases of 
6 air travel-related deep vein thrombosis. 
This post then gives the rest of this news story2. Placing the legal action within the 
wider context of airline industry difficulties (and this message was written just after 
September 11th) de-emphasises the seriousness of it and categorises it just as 
something that will "drain" the airlines, not as an issue that is important or serious or 
that people will need to be made aware of, and certainly not in comparison to other 
z Again, this is a long story, and not relevant to the analytical point being nude, so I have not 
reproduced the entire text here. 
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problems. "Drain" is also an interesting word to use, rather than just "cost" because it 
implies that it may take everything that the industry has, and has a very negative and 
demoralising tone to it. That this may be in terms of "millions" does not only imply 
that the issue is innately important or serious, but encourages sympathy for the 
continued predicament that the airlines are unjustifiably having thrust upon them. 
There is also an interesting externalising device here (Woolgar, 1988: 75). The 
detrimental effect of ECS claims is not presented as the member's speculation or 
opinion. It is firstly something that they have found from a source independent to 
them (The Scotsman), and it is presented as a factual occurrence ("here's 
something"). If the risk exists beyond the member's presentation, then it is more 
serious - it is a recognised issue, and they are only relaying the information about it. 
Placing calculations of risk in a wider context is also a way of minimising the risk: 
[821 Member TG - Internet forum - 12/11/00 
1 You state that `at no stage do the airlines inform passengers of the health risks 
2 associated with flying, and that is where the difficulty lies'. Good God man, 
3 are you wanting `this flight could kill you' stamped on your ticket? Or 'BEWARE 
4 you have a 99.9999% chance of walking away from this aircraft without a scratch' 
This message is responding to (and quotes from) a previous post, and counters the 
construction of the risk used in it; again, it is employing both offensive and defensive 
rhetoric. Describing the risk in the terms here detracts from the seriousness of it, and 
has the effect of making those stating that it is serious look foolish. The phrase 
"Good God man" really emphasises the incredulity of the author about this alternative 
view. Instead, they present a different conceptualisation of the issue. Rather than 
focusing on the responsibility for a clot occurring, the member puts any risk into 
context by constructing a probability of it happening. They present this chance is an 
extremely small one; their hypothetical statistic makes it seem ridiculously 
insignificant. Using a wider context effectively serves to minimise the risk. 
Bringing issues of wider context into consideration is also a tactic employed by those 
in opposition to such views: 
[83] Member BS- Internet forum - 3/12/00 
1 To do a bit of research and require airlines to stick warnings on 
2 airline tickets, it doesn't cost the government much money 
3 (certainly less than it would cost to fix NHS problems). 
This message was posted in a debate about the amount of government money being 
spent on ECS research, contrasted with what was viewed as an extremely small 
amount on the NHS and hygiene problems. This message uses notions of this wider 
context to maintain that the money spent on ECS research need only be relatively 
minimal, and it presents ECS as a simple and contained problem that might be easily 
addressed with only a little time and effort compared to problems in the NHS. The 
use of a contrast is interesting here; these can be used to show the naturalness of one 
side, against the wrongness of the other (Herschell, 2001: 1245). Here the 
`naturalness' of addressing ECS is worked up by presenting it as something that could 
quickly and easily be dealt with -a "bit of research" and to "stick warnings on 
tickets" is all that is required, compared to what fixing NHS problems would cost. 
Using this contrast is a way of seeking support for this view. 
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10 4. `Economy class syndrome': misnomer or medical snobbery 
The name is chosen for the risk and how it is used constructs both the existence of the 
risk and the responsibility for it. For example: 
[84] Member TG - Internet forum - 1/11/00 
II hope the idiots who believe in 'economy class syndrome' 
2 keeping taking the brain cell replacement medicine 
In the message and others, where members are persuading that ECS does not exist, the 
term is given in speech marks. This detracts from it being a normal term used in 
everyday language, and implies that it is only what this issue is called, not actually a 
description or a very appropriate name for it, and indeed, that it doesn't exist at all. 
The author of the message uses stark language to present their position on the issue; 
that those who advocate that the risk exists require "brain cell replacement medicine" 
is damning indeed. Emphasising the strength of this opinion is a means of persuading 
about it. Use of the word "believed" is interesting here as well. To believe 
something, rather than to know it, carries an implication of blind faith that may or 
may not be rational or justifiable. This is drawn on in this message to further discredit 
`ECS'; it is `believed', and not described in terms of having an objective reality. As a 
concept, only "idiots" would subscribe to it. It is clear from this message that the 
member does not assign much credibility to the risk and using the term in this way is 
a means of detracting from it. 
More direct challenges to the meaning of ECS detract from the unfavourable 
implications that the term has: 
[85] Member CM - Internet forum - 24/7/01 
1 `Economy Class Syndrome' is a complete misnomer in that it affects people 
2 subject to prolonged immobility be they in economy, business, first, on a bus, 
3 or in a hospital bed. The problem has nothing to do with seat design and 
4 everything to do with people not leaving their seat for 12 hours. There are very 
5 simple ways of avoiding DVT on a flight such as taking a walk if possible, 
6 and if not then carrying out simple in-seat stretching exercises regularly" 
This post challenges the term to construct the issue in a very particular way. It 
constructs the blame away from the airlines; for how can they be held responsible 
when it is nothing to do with "seat design" or being on board a plane; and firmly onto 
the passengers. Preventative measures are phrased in terms of the passengers, with 
"people" being the object of the sentence. There is also a stress on what they do, in 
terms of "people not leaving their seats", rather than `people not having the 
opportunity to leave'. Interestingly, the message does orient to this possibility, but 
still maintains the responsibility of the passengers. Where walking is not "possible", 
then passengers should carry out exercises in their seats, "simple" enough that no one 
has an excuse for not doing them. Unpacking the associations of the term `ECS' is a 
way of highlighting how invalid they are. 
The seriousness of the issue can further be built up or detracted from by providing 
reasons for why such a term is used, as these two messages highlight: 
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[86] Member BS - Internet forum - 6/11/00 
1 Calling DVT from flying `economy class syndrome' is just an easy way 
2 of talking about (deep breath! ) deep vein thrombosis occurring due to 
3 flying in cramped seating on commercial aircraft. I really do not see 
4a phrase like this as a problem (medical snobbery anyone? ) 
This message contends that there are no inaccurate associations with the phrase ECS, 
it is just a more manageable phrase. The member stresses the ridiculous and unwieldy 
nature of the full term they give, especially with the comment "deep breath! ". They 
emphasise this by giving a very detailed name for the issue, thus contrasting it with 
the ease of `economy class syndrome'. Doing so constructs the issue in a particular 
way. ECS does not falsely describe the issue as other members have pointed out; the 
issue is about "cramped seating", not inactivity or laziness. The message is also 
rhetorically oriented at some of the previous messages that have challenged the term. 
"Medical snobbery anyone? " casts doubt on their difficulties with the term; it is not 
that ECS is an improper term that builds up the issue into something it is not, it is just 
that its headline friendly quality is distasteful for those who do not wish to be 
associated with such non-expert terms. 
This second message was posted in response to the previous one, and again, 
highlights the motivations behind the use of the term, but this time to discredit it: 
[87] Member AD - Internet forum - 6/11/00 
1 >Calling DVT from flying `economy class syndrome' is just an easy way of 
2 >talking about it 
3 Accurate terminology is very important when you're dealing with 
4 medicine or science. To simply make-up a fanciful, media-genic, 
5 if wholly inaccurate name is thoroughly inappropriate. 
The message cites the previous post (lines 1-2) that uses the term `economy class 
syndrome'. The author here makes clear that such a term exists because it is `media 
friendly', and not because it accurately describes any risk. The post is quite definite 
that the name is not descriptive, does not have a factual basis, and has been `made- 
up'. It is so lacking in substance as to be "fanciful". This detracts from anything that 
the term purports to describe, for example that it is caused by flight and cramped 
conditions. Indeed, the member stresses the importance of "accurate terminology" in 
relation to such serious issues, and this implies that they have a thoroughly proper and 
appropriate approach to such matters. This constructs the issue as something that 
should not be taken seriously by anyone who cares about such things. 
10.5. Presentation of other groups 
I will now outline how some of the main groups in the debate - passengers, airlines, 
and the media - are constructed by members of the discussion forums. The 
motivations of all these groups are questioned, and aspersions cast on their position, 
whatever that particular position might be. I will consider how this impacts upon the 
construction of the risk. 
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10.5.1 Media as friend and foe 
In messages studied, comments about the media, the way it operates, and the effect 
this has, were a common theme. There is the idea of `good' and `bad' media 
coverage; and this depends on the particular construction of the risk being presented. 
A way of counteracting the media's construction is to present it as hype and 
speculation. When reporting on the `facts' of the issue, the media is a useful 
information giving tool, and is not constructed to be subject to biases and errors. 
Examples of how the media portray information are therefore given to substantiate or 
dismiss the risk. For example, it is implied that no coverage of something means 
there is nothing to report on. This is used to reject the risk of ECS: 
[88] Member GC - mail based list - 12/2/02 
1 Given the indifference of the UK press to the quality of medical research 
2 and their infatuation with the opinions of Mr Farrol Kahn, 
3 it is inconceivable that a VTE occurring on the VERY SAME DAY as a flight 
4 would not be widely publicised as being casually related to that flight. 
The workings of the media are constructed in such a way to dismiss the reality of 
ECS. Contrasts are set up between facts and research, and dramatic events and 
"opinions". The media are presented as only interested in the latter. Part of this 
involves an "infatuation" with a link between flight and blood clots. Farrol Kahn is a 
spokesperson for the Aviation Health Institute, and has discussed widely the risks of 
inflight DVT. This is a very unprofessional term to use to describe the relationship of 
the media to Mr Kahn. They are not presented as drawing on the information 
provided by him, or carefully evaluating it, but being obsessed by it and only able to 
focus on this aspect of the issue. This image of the way the media works is used to 
dismiss the risk. Because the media are seeking to highlight the risk, any occurrences 
of it would be given coverage; that they are not means the risk does not exist. 
It is also argued that there may not be such a direct relationship between the facts and 
accounts, which can be used to support a particular view. For example, this message 
alludes to the idea of such a divergence: 
[89] Member FD - Internet forum -12/5/01 
1 DVT is a very high profile `in' condition which has just been brought 
2 to the general public's attention only just relatively recently. 
3 Cases are now fairly media-hyped but in relation to the actual number 
4 of passengers flying, the risk of having a DVT is low. 
It is the way the media operates that has led to the coverage and the belief in the 
widespread nature of the risk. The risk exists outside of the media exposure, it existed 
before it was "brought to the public's attention" but it is a smaller risk than such 
"hyped" coverage could lead one to believe. Describing it as an "in" condition 
implies that the issue has the characteristics that make it media-friendly, but that the 
focus on it is transient and may not last. A focus on the operations of the media 
counteracts the claims made, and describing the difference between coverage and the 
real situation allows for a construction of that situation as less serious or important. 
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However, when the risk is being emphasised, the press are constructed in a less 
unflattering light, and more benign motivations are ascribed. For example, one 
member states that "the press highlights" what is going on (TG, Internet forum, 
4/12/00). Using the term "highlights" implies that what is being described exists, and 
that the media are merely relaying information about it. Similarly, the media may be 
constructed as working to obtain facts, information and answers: 
[90) Member MK - Internet forum - 22/11/00 
1 Living where I do, I'm very very glad that our press is still free 
2 to ask embarrassing questions 
This constructs the media as part of the right of freedom of speech. The phrase 
"living where I do" carries an implicit comparison to other places where free speech 
might not exist, or suggests that given all the bad things happening where the member 
lives it is essential that they have a press who are free to report. The press is not 
presented as sensationalist or manipulative, but as working for the people to provide 
them with information; it can be seen that (following Herschell, 2001), use of the 
pronoun "our" constructs this image. The idea is presented of the media actively 
investigating issues by asking "questions" about them, which implies that the issues 
exist, rather than being merely `hype' or written about to increase circulation figures. 
10 5.2 Passengers and blame 
I will consider how messages construct the position of the passengers, and how blame 
may be ascribed to them for the incidence of ECS. In the forums studied, whether 
blame can be levied and on whom depends on two key factors: information, and 
behaviour. Do passengers know about the risks of ECS and how to avoid them? Do 
they choose to behave in such a way to avoid ECS or is such a choice denied to them? 
How these issues are framed constructs the risk in a very different way. 
10.5.2.1 Knowledge 
Some members argue that airlines need to take an active role in investigating DVT, 
and that even though passengers may have characteristics that make them more 
susceptible to a DVT, the airlines are to blame for the lack of information they give: 
[91] Member BS - Internet forum - 6/11/00 
1 What is interesting is that some people are predisposed to DVT either due to 
2 medication or some other disease process. The reason for media and passenger 
3 interest in this is that at no stage do airlines inform passengers of the health risks 
4 associated with flying, and that is where the difficulty lies. 
This message takes the blame for ECS away from the passengers; it is not about their 
behaviour but about health factors. Use of the word "predisposed" constructs ECS as 
something latent in passengers, triggered by air travel, rather than being their fault 
because of what they do. That people may be taking "medication" and that this 
increases their likelihood of ECS further takes the responsibility away from them; an 
incident caused by someone's medication cannot be their fault. Diseases are 
presented as things that happen to people; there is no element of their own agency 
here. The message also offers an explanation for the interest in the issue - this is not 
media sensationalism or passenger hysteria but a legitimate interest perpetuated by a 
140 
lack of information from the airlines. The media are cast in a relatively benign light 
here, acting in the interests of uninformed passengers, seeking to spread the word on 
the issue, and compensating for the lack of information from the airlines. The author 
is very clear about this, as at "no stage" do the airlines reveal this information. 
The issue of knowledge is key and much in debate, and other messages present this 
differently: 
[92] Member TG - Internet forum - 3/12/00 
1 If passengers indulge in known activities that encourage overt symptoms, 
2 then is that the fault or negligence of the airline? 
It is made clear that these are "known" activities, there is no doubt here that these 
passengers are informed and know what they are doing - even their symptoms are 
"overt"; no symptomless clots stealthfully creeping up on unsuspecting passengers 
here. It is also significant that they are described as "indulging", implying that 
passengers are making a deliberate behavioural choice. It also implies a conscious 
decision to treat themselves to more enjoyable, even slightly selfish and decadent, 
activities, rather than the sensible straightforward activities that they know they 
should be engaging in. 
10 522 Voluntary or imposed risk: Risk as a passenger's responsibility 
The second key issue in the construction of the passengers is whether any risk is 
assumed voluntarily or is imposed upon them. Do passengers knowingly subject 
themselves to the risk of a DVT or is it something they are held hostage to by a 
secretive and uncaring airline? Messages use similar tools to construct this idea in 
different ways. 
[93] Member TG - Internet forum - 12/11/00 
1 If you were ill or harbouring some ailment prior to your flight, then don't fly- 
2 nobody is forcing you. The 'lack of leg movement' is as much your fault for not 
3 getting your bum off the seat and having a wander about; you are not tied in or 
4 handcuffed you know - there is no extra charge for taking a walk up and down 
5 the aisle. The `lack of exercise' is a bit thick; 99% of people do not take proper 
6 `exercise' anyway, never mind having the facilities for such 'exercise' anyway. 
7 I'm sure there are some good books you can buy on seated exercise manoeuvres. 
In this message, avoiding an inflight DVT is presented as passengers' responsibility, 
not the airlines'. Not only do passengers voluntarily assume the risk when they 
choose to fly, but they could take precautions against it if they wanted to. It had 
previously been stated that the airlines make this difficult or impossible (such as not 
giving passengers the opportunity to move about), but these reasons are summarily 
dismissed and causes are instead couched in terms of passenger laziness. The 
message is structured in terms of the passengers' agency to emphasise their 
responsibility: "if you are ill"; "getting your bum off the seat"; "you are not tied in". 
The member also puts the issue into a wider context to detract from the seriousness of 
it. Instead of it being a scandal that the aircraft does not permit room for sufficient 
exercise and the crew actively discourage it, this is a ridiculous criticism when people 
do not exercise anyway, especially when they point to a situation in which they 
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perceive they are being deliberately prevented. The reference to books on exercise 
states very clearly that it is the passengers' responsibility not only to avoid a DVT, but 
to find out the information themselves that they need to be able to do this. 
Passengers are also presented as assuming the risks of ECS themselves because they 
choose to sit in cheaper seats where the risk is greater. They could have more room, 
but deliberately decide not to. The airlines cannot be held responsible for this: 
[94] Member TG - Internet forum - 12/11/00 
1 If it's more leg room that you're really after, then buy a seat in a class which gives 
2 you the leg-room that you want. You pay for what you get. How much leg 
3 movement/exercise area does your car give you? Do you spend more time in your car 
4 than on an aircraft? Dehydration is self induced- if you do not drink, what do you expect? 
5 Does the airline you are talking about not give you a cup of tea or coffee, or a glass 
6 of water every time you ask for one? Be prepared is a good old motto. 
The author presents the airlines as doing all they can, but that it is up to passengers to 
be prepared - and it is reasonable to expect them to be: a "good old motto" is an 
interesting phrase. This is an interesting use of what Edwards and Potter (1993: 37) 
describe as the `vagueness of idioms'. They note that such phrases may be used 
because they are difficult to challenge whilst giving the impression of a "distillation 
of a common wisdom". Here, the phrase implies that being ready for eventualities is 
something that people should think about, this is not a new or controversial idea. This 
also makes it harder to undermine, as it is presented as something that no one could 
argue with. This therefore also applies to flying. The duty of care that an airline has 
is also brought into question here, but it is clear that the onus rests with the 
passengers. They choose where they sit, and how much they would like to pay. They 
put a price on how much they value their health and comfort, and it cannot be up to 
the airlines to do anything more about this, if passengers only value their safety up to 
a certain point. The leg room on an aircraft is compared to that of a car, and the point 
is made that these things are comparable. It is not the case that when someone is 
onboard an aircraft, the airline assumes responsibility for how much room they have, 
how comfortable they are, and what arrangements there are for them. These are all 
still the choice of the passenger, and how much they choose to pay for them. 
tn523 The imposition of the risk 
However, other members use ideas of voluntary and imposed risk to argue that 
passengers have little choice over the service they receive or the behaviour they can 
engage in. This post describes the impracticality of exercising during a flight: 
[95] Member FP - Internet fonun - 28/07/01 
I For those who are very tall, the notion of being able to do `at the seat' exercising is a joke 
2 (and the airlines know it), when the knees are pinned hard against the seat in front. 
The member is clear that there is little choice over whether to take exercise or not, and 
it is not a case of laziness or ignorance but the physical confines of the aircraft 
restricting any movement at all. It is made clear that exercising is simply not possible 
- it is ridiculous enough an 
idea to be "a joke". As a `notion' it is only a view or 
opinion, and is only vague and insecurely based - not a `possibility' or even an `idea'. 
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The member presents the image of having no choice about carrying this out. Further, 
knees are "pinned hard", an `extreme case formulation' (Pomerantz, 1986) that carries 
a lot of force. "Pinned" is a word that implies being fixed in that position without any 
choice or possibility of movement - it is not just that conditions are `cramped' or 
`uncomfortable'. It is also phrased in terms of being something that happens to one's 
knees - the passenger has no agency here in what happens to them or to do anything 
about it. This is contrasted with the image of "being able to do" exercises - the ability 
that passengers have to do something has been taken away from them. What makes 
this worse is that this situation is presented as a risk definitely imposed by the airlines, 
who are well aware of this problem. The presentation given is that the airlines say 
one thing but know another - they may advocate exercising but this is contrasted with 
their actual attitude. The implication of course is that they choose to do nothing about 
it. 
Personal experience is also used to challenge the constructions about passenger 
behaviour and their ability to avoid DVT: 
[96] Member PR - Internet forum - 23/01/03 
1 On a recent flight I tried to stand in/near the back galley because I had leg cramp, 
2I was told to sit down, the stewardess told me I was in the way and there was 
3 nowhere for me to stand on the aircraft. I refused, and an argument ensued 
4 to the point where I was afraid that I will become accused of instigating 
5 an air rage incident, and I decided to sit down, still with leg cramp. 
The member describes trying to take action to avoid a DVT, and being very clearly 
prevented from doing so. The member was prohibited from standing and describes 
being told that there was "nowhere" to stand - so the airline allows passengers no 
opportunity to move about at all. What is more, the airline will make determined and 
continued efforts to ensure that passengers do not move about - staff will instruct 
passengers, explain to them, `argue' with them (in what is implied to be a heated 
manner), and make them feel intimidated enough to sit down. The member presents 
this as passengers being "in the way" if they try to look after themselves - the airline 
does not value them and their concerns. Passengers are denied any opportunity to 
help themselves. They can "try" but this agency is taken from them and the only 
decision they are allowed to make is which is the greater risk - accusations of air rage 
or cramp and possible ECS. The member therefore presents the issue as a case of an 
imposed risk that passengers are not given any opportunity to avoid. This particular 
post opened up an interesting thread of messages. The following is a message that was 
given in response: 
[97] Member BS - Internet forum - 23/01/03 
1 Unfortunately, the legal situation is that you must obey the lawful instructions 
2 of the Flight Crew. I would imagine that they had work to prepare or carry out 
3 and that you would have been in the way. 
While this message is seemingly sympathetic to the plight being described in the 
previous post, it carefully dismisses any blame being directed at the airlines. It does 
this subtly, for as Potter (1997: 109) says, actions that are delicate or sensitive may 
often be carried out indirectly. The member describes `imagining' that the crew had 
work to do. This has the effect of softening the comment, rather than baldly stating 
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, the crew had work to do'. The member also starts off with "unfortunately", implying 
support and sympathy for the plight of the passenger, but very quickly construct the 
airline crew as behaving exactly as they should have done, stressing twice the "legal" 
requirements behind their actions - something that is hard to argue with. The 
message goes on to emphasise that the crew were trying to carry out procedures as 
part of the airline service ("they had work to do"), so the member's behaviour was 
interfering with the operations of the crew. Interestingly, the staff are called "flight 
crew" here, in contrast to the "stewardess" in the previous message. `Stewardess' 
implies someone who only serves refreshments to passengers, while flight crew is a 
more generic term and could encompass the pilots, inflight staff manager or any 
member of the team. While refreshments might not be a priority if someone has a 
cramp, the safe flight of the aircraft might be. Using this term, a more modern one for 
inflight staff, brings with it assumptions about the importance of their role and the 
need to obey their instructions. The presentation in this second message is of the crew 
not being difficult or unusually awkward but merely trying to get on with their job, 
issuing "lawful" instructions - and the passenger as preventing that. 
Other messages also attempt to counter claims about DVT being the fault of 
passengers because they are not prepared to pay for what the service costs: 
[98] Member JN - Internet forum - 12/11/00 
1 And I'd be happy to pay a little more for human conditions, but don't necessarily want 
2 (and can't always afford) Business Class. We're talking about expecting a reasonable, 
3 tolerable degree of comfort and safety when we travel, not luxury. The last time I flew 
4 to the West Coast with BA, I had even less space than I've ever had in a bus, train, 
5 or even the back seat of many cars, and that simply isn't good enough. On that 
6 particular route (Phoenix) there is no competition, and £520 should have bought 
7 me something closer to a proper standard. 
This message invokes ideas about what it is reasonable to expect and to pay for on a 
flight. It talks in terms of "human conditions", clearly emphasising that what is 
available at the moment does not even reach this most minimal of standards. The 
member also uses terms such as "tolerable" implying that not much more is being 
asked for here; and in terms of such basic things as "safety", requests that can hardly 
be dismissed as unreasonable. Using such `extreme case formulations' (Pomerantz, 
1986) as "less space than I have ever had" really stresses the poor quality of the 
service in relation to other forms of transport, and this comparison is used to 
emphasise the reprehensible position of the airlines. This is compounded by mention 
of the cost of the flight, on a route where "there is no competition". This implies that 
the airlines are not charging what the service costs but the highest price that they feel 
they can get away with. It is not therefore a case of passengers being too 
irresponsible to pay for a service which gives them decent conditions, but that the 
airlines charge prices that most people would not be able to "afford" to pay and give a 
substandard service for it. 
10.6. Science 
Having considered how airlines, passengers and the media are variously constructed, I 
will now turn to science. Analysis of messages reveals how members use science to 
back up or dismiss a claim. The way science is constructed is also revealing about 
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members, their perception of the issue, and their view of the operations and principles 
of science itself. 
I have so far indicated that messages attempt to create a particular construction, and 
while these constructions may be radically different, the same tools may be used. 
Messages may use science to do this in a number of ways. They discuss the need for 
science, how science proves their case, and how it can highlight the deficiencies of 
other claims. What is key here is that whilst making different claims, the ways in 
which this is done are remarkably similar. 
Useful to note here is Gieryn's (1995) discussion of the construction of boundaries, 
and how the border between science and non science is built, maintained, and 
defended. As he describes, these boundaries are not fixed by logic, rather they are 
drawn up by local actors and are temporarily specific. What I am interested in is how 
the members of the forums use claims about boundaries to discredit others, and to 
substantiate their own claims. Gieryn goes on to describe that one of the critiques of 
essentialism is that it defends a boundary around science because of the special nature 
of scientific inquiry and knowledge. As Woolgar (1988: 18) points out, this is a view 
that has been roundly dismissed. In this chapter I want to highlight how the members 
use essentialist ideas in their claims - so in Gieryn's terminology, be a constructionist 
watching the essentialists at work (1995: 394). As Wynne (1995: 375) says, social 
constructionist research has a "commitment to avoiding a priori assumptions about 
what science is". I want to explore how others define this. 
10.6.1 The need for evidence 
A common theme in many posts is that for a final decision to be reached about the 
risk of ECS, evidence is needed. Some authors have already reached this decision, 
and this is because they have the evidence that it does or does not exist. Therefore, 
pointing to evidence is a way of backing up the claim being made, whatever this claim 
is. For example: 
[99] Member RK - mail based list - 01/05/02 
1 With all due respect and deference, I am not aware of any scientific proof that air travel 
2 and DVT are causally related. Instead, I believe that the only real evidence we have is 
3 that patients with risk factors are at risk of developing DVT/PE any time that they travel 
4 (any mode, any time, anywhere) for a prolonged period of time. There is not a single bit 
5 of defensible proof that suggests that normal passengers will experience DVT/PE at any 
6 rate greater than that expected for the general population. 
This member forcibly makes the point that no evidence equals no risk. This is 
interesting in light of what Fahnestock (1989: 39) notes about scientific rhetoric: the 
"absence of evidence is presented as evidence of absence". The member uses a 
number of extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) to emphasise this - there is 
not "any" and "not a single bit" of proof. In the message, the member is using both 
offensive and defensive rhetoric; the member's claim is presented and other 
contradictory ideas are oriented to at the same time. The member implies that there is 
a distinction to be made between evidence which is "scientific" or "real", and that 
which is poor or improper. The rigours such evidence can withstand are also 
described, and if evidence is genuine it will be "defensible". This orients to the other 
`evidence' that exists on the topic, and implies that this would not stand up to scrutiny 
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and is not real. The notions of what proper scientific evidence is are called upon here 
to maintain that the risk does not exist. Further, a contrast is built up between the 
evidence that exists and that which would be needed by use of the word "instead". 
There is no proper scientific proof about air travel - the only evidence that is available 
is that risky passengers are at risk. This is "real evidence", and it is emphasised, again 
by use of extreme case formulations - risky passengers are at risk any time they 
travel, anywhere, by any mode of transport. This is contrasted with the situation for 
"normal" passengers for which no such evidence exists. Because they are normal, the 
risk of ECS from air travel for them does not exist, and there is no proof of it. 
However, when the link between DVT and flying is being supported, a lack of 
evidence does not necessarily indicate no risk; merely that not enough research has 
been carried out: 
(100] Member FP - Internet forum - 30/7/01 
1 As any medic/scientist would tell you, the reason for a lack of scientific evidence 
2 showing a link is due to a lack of good studies, and the inability to get reliable results 
3 because of the number of factors involved. 
This again draws attention to `good' and `bad' science. Not enough good studies 
have been carried out, the ones that exist and found no link are unreliable and clearly 
not good science. A reason is given to substantiate this claim - there are a "number of 
factors" involved, and scientific inquiry is difficult. This is why studies have not 
found a link yet, not because it does not exist. The message implies that, because the 
-link" exists, reliable studies would - and will - prove it. This idea is backed up by 
presenting it as something "any" person from the membership category "medic or 
scientist" would say. The activities of these people include being qualified to speak 
on such topics - and furthermore, all of them would say the same. 
Discussions about evidence may be used to build up claims; the substance of the 
claim may be different but the means to substantiate it the same. From examining 
members' accounts, a difference becomes apparent between the principles and 
practicalities of science (as Woolgar, 1996; and Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, have 
noted: see section 9.3). Pointing to a disjuncture between theory and practice is a way 
of substantiating the particular claim being made. For example, while it may be 
useful to state the evidence based nature of knowledge, acknowledgements are 
presented that there may not be such a linear progression of information leading to 
certain knowledge. In the messages that follow, arguments about the nature of 
evidence are used to substantiate the views being presented: 
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[101] Member BS, Internet forum, 6/11/00 
1 Re DVT 
2I agree with the ideas expressed about the lack of definitive studies into this problem. 
31 disagree therefore that DVT due to flying does not occur. 
[102] Member AD, Internet forum, 6/11/00 
1 [BS's] response raises some very interesting points. 
2 As I wrote in my earlier posting the data that is available and credible indicates that 
3 air travellers are NOT at an increased risk of DVT. Reading the papers mentioned 
4 earlier should allay your concerns in this matter. 
5 As for `definitive studies'... we all live in hope but so little of our scientific knowledge 
6 base is built on definitive studies. Our knowledge tends to develop bit-by-bit as myriad 
7 not-so-definitive studies are interlinked and cross referenced. 
The second post highlights a divergence between a theoretical ideal of the way 
science works and a more pragmatic view. That we "live in hope" stresses the ideal, 
but "hope" does not imply that this is very likely to happen; it can be desired and 
maintained as an ideal, but is unlikely to be fulfilled. This is something that occurs 
not just to the knowledge about flight and health, or even medicine, but to "scientific 
knowledge" generally, so the author aligns to a view that is widely applicable and 
accepted. 
What is particularly interesting about this message is the variation in it. The text here 
is just as it appeared, nothing has been deleted. In two consecutive paragraphs, the 
member seems to be presenting different views of how science works. In lines 5-7, 
the member gives a pragmatic view of science and the impossible ideal of definitive 
studies to determine knowledge. In lines 2-3 however they seem to be asserting that it 
is possible to know something from the data - not only do data exist but they can be 
used to determine the risk of inflight DVT. The member even lists the studies that 
prove this. The way to consider this is to try and understand the effects that these 
paragraphs achieve. This may be similar to Potter's argument that "people can make 
strong statements about what should or ought to be the case in principle, while still 
accepting that this is unrealistic in practice" (1997: 208). In the message, the member 
is suggesting that there will never be anything that is "definitive". Therefore, the only 
option is to look to the studies that have been done; and these have outlined that the 
risk does not exist. The member is also responding to the previous post (extract 101), 
which had assumed that lack of studies did not necessarily mean lack of risk. The 
second author is using a pragmatic construction of the workings of science to dismiss 
the call for "definitive" work and at the same time presenting the evidence that 
contradicts the view of the risk they are constructing. 
tn 6_____ 2 The good the bad. and the anecdotal 
The use of `evidence' and what can be included in this term is also interesting. This is 
both in terms of the need for `good science' to form the basis for evidence, and what 
types of knowledge or data can be considered as proper evidence. 
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Firstly, while evidence is required, this must come from `good science'. Only good 
science is presented as being able to find the answers. Details are also given of 
exactly what this might entail: 
[1031 Member MD, Internet forum, 30/10/01 
1 In order to establish a definitive causal relationship, a large controlled study 
2 with statistical validity would have to be performed. 
The idea is presented that it would be possible to establish a "definitive" relationship; 
science could find the answer. However, it is apparent that this would depend on 
what sort of science that was. The results of a study depend upon the method, and 
only a particular sort of method would be able to address this. The criteria that this 
method would have to meet are stated - it would have to be large, controlled, and 
statistically valid. It might therefore be difficult or idealistic to perform such a study 
- but it would "establish" the relationship if it were carried out. 
The idea of good science of course implies that `bad science' exists. This is used by 
members to counter unfavourable claims which are based on bad science - 
highlighting unreliable methods casts doubt on the results. For example, the 
following message was written about a study that conducted a number of experiments 
and concluded that there was an increased risk of DVT from flight, and it describes 
some of the conditions of the study: 
[104] Member TG, Internet forum, 12/11/00 
1 The doctors conducting this very limited experiment which could be said barely related 
2 to normal airline ops admit "despite the lack of an adequate control group at normal 
3 atmospheric, our study suggests that RAPID exposure to an air pressure encountered 
4 in aeroplane cabins activates coagulation". On a similar footing, a diver RAPIDLY 
5 coming from the depth to the surface faces the `bends' - so what does these rapid 
6 exposures to simulated airline passengers count for? 
The author is clearly very disparaging about the results of the study, and uses a 
critique of the method to construct this view. Extreme case formulations emphasise 
this; it is described as being a "very limited" study, and one that was "barely related" 
to the normal conditions of flight. The author emphasises that the conditions that the 
experiment were conducted under were not the same as in an aircraft and make the 
knowledgeably presented point about speed again to emphasise this. The author even 
put the word "RAPID" in capital letters in the quote from the authors to make this 
particular deficiency stand out. The reference to diving stresses this still further, and 
taps into everyday knowledge to substantiate the point. It may be assumed to be 
widely known that divers become ill if coming to the surface too quickly; it is not 
surprising then that the people in the study also fell ill when subject to such 
conditions, but these conditions were nothing to do with those on a plane. This casts 
doubt on the applicability of the results to the actual experience of flying. The doctors 
are quoted directly, but the author describes what they are saying as an admission, 
rather than a statement, implying that they are conceding that there were problems in 
their study. 
What is also interesting to consider is what is constructed to count as evidence. For 
example, some `information' is discounted as being `evidence'; it can therefore safely 
be dismissed if it is contrary to an argument: 
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[105] Member MK, Internet forum, 9/11/00 
1I would agree, that by published articles alone, the evidence `con' is slender, 
2 but on the other hand we do not actually have much evidence 'pro' either, apart from 
3a few anecdotes of people who have presented with DVTs after flying. 
This is an interesting denigration of what are called mere "anecdotes". It is not the 
case that there is evidence; the only data are these anecdotes. The contrast between 
"evidence" and "anecdotes" is interesting. Evidence is something that appears in 
"published articles", and it is what is used to make decisions. "Anecdotes" are not part 
of this decision making process. This constructs the risk of inflight DVT as negligible 
and not something worth taking seriously, when what matters are facts and rigorously 
proved evidence. It is interesting also that people "present" with DVTs, they do not 
`suffer' them, or they do not `occur'. This would be to grant the condition with an 
independent and real status. That a DVT is "presented" implies that passengers have 
decided for themselves that they have one, it is their opinion only, rather than 
something that happened and unavoidably came upon them. Also, there is an 
emphasis here on clots being presented "after" flying. This detracts from the 
responsibility of the airlines and from the direct causation of flying with the onset of a 
DVT. Instead, people decide afterwards that they may have one, when the cause is far 
more in doubt. The `evidence' of passenger accounts is dismissed as invalid in a 
debate where evidence is key, and of course, presenting such input as unworthy of 
consideration undermines much of the argument supporting the link, thereby 
detracting from its urgency or importance. 
The debate over what counts as evidence is also something that is discussed by those 
with a different claim to make. While in the previous message, anecdotes were 
classified as not being evidence and were dismissed, this message argues that they 
should be counted. They argue that the risk is serious, and for what they consider to 
be compelling evidence (that backs up their case) to be included: 
[106] Member JN, Internet forum, 21/11/00 
1 The tendency of the scientist to ignore all anecdotal evidence as being invalid is just stupid. 
2 Young, healthy, fit people have died as the result of DVTs after long-haul economy flights. 
The author contrasts a political debate over what should or should not be included 
with what are presented as the stark facts of the situation. This detracts from 
discussions over whether passengers' accounts can be considered and what form good 
evidence might take, and boldly presents elements of the risk that are important 
enough to overcome all of this. It is acknowledged that anecdotes might not be part 
of scientific inquiry - it is "scientists" who ignore them - but this does not mean they 
are not important. Whether such cases are `anecdotes' or not, such is the urgency of 
the issue that they cannot be ignored. 
The response to this message highlights the debate over the nature of what counts as 
evidence: 
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[107] Member TG, Internet forum, 22/11/00 
1 You say `Young, healthy, fit people have died as a result of DVTs after long haul flights'. 
2 Forgive me, but I cannot recall any reported post-mortems nominating such passengers 
3 who have allegedly died of DVT post long haul flights, as being "Young, healthy, fit... ". 
4 Can you give me the data (who, when, where, how, why) on half a dozen of whom you 
5 pledge died in such circumstances please? 
The stark assertions in the previous post are countermanded. In order to discredit 
them, this author implies that the claims are both improbable and not proper evidence 
to be included in the debate. If they were, it would be feasible to provide the 
accompanying factual details. However it is implied that this will not be possible 
because they do not exist, and because such cases are so unlikely. The pseudo- 
politeness of the tone is particularly cutting, as is the direct quoting of the "young, fit 
and healthy" description. This is an attempt to show up such a phrase as a sweeping 
generalisation, not something that can be proved or that carries any weight in the 
evidence based world of medicine, science and research in which the debate is being 
played out. This debate over what counts as evidence clearly constructs the issue in a 
very particular way, and here it is damningly used to counteract any `evidence' that 
the risk exists. 
10.6.3 Difficulties with measurement 
A further way of supporting, but more frequently countering an argument, is to 
examine and critique the measurements it uses. Knorr-Cetina (1995: 152) notes that 
what counts as sufficient measurement is negotiable in the making of scientific 
knowledge, and Yearley (1994: 247) describes how this can be particularly pertinent in 
the study of a controversy. Measurement is a particularly contentious topic in relation 
to the risk of inflight blood clots. Can the incidence rate be measured, and if so, will 
the rules for measuring shape the result? How long after a flight can the cause be 
identified as the flight? What if the condition goes unnoticed? What if the condition 
is found by the patient but not diagnosed medically? Or if it is misdiagnosed? Debate 
rages on these issues. The points made are interesting to consider not just as a way 
that members critique each other but for what they say about scientific work more 
generally. For example, there are certainly different ways of measuring: 
[108] Member BS, Internet forum, 6/11/00 
1 Indeed, one of the difficulties with patients suffering from DVT is that 
2 the most severe effects may not become apparent until some time has elapsed 
3 after the patient has gone home. 
This post attempts to increase the seriousness of the risk by pointing to the passengers 
with a DVT who may not be included in current calculations of its incidence. This 
message builds up the risk; the risk 
is real, patients are experiencing it. They are 
described as "suffering from DVT". This not only portrays them sympathetically, but 
presents a clot as something that 
happens to them, not that they have brought on 
themselves. It is a serious enough issue that it has "severe effects". There is no 
indication that only some patients suffer these; the presentation is given that DVT is 
something that causes these. Ideas about measurement are therefore used to build up 
the seriousness of the risk. What is interesting is that they are also used to dismiss it: 
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[109] Member TG, Internet forum, 03/12/00 
1 How exactly are airlines/doctors going to pin the entire blame on an airline for DVT 
2 when the life threatening condition takes weeks sometimes to manifest itself? 
3 ".. between the development of the initial small thrombi and such an embolism may be 
4 anything from days to weeks". The airlines have thus become an easy scapegoat 
5 for the "weeks" of a pre-existing condition to develop through the patients own 
6 contributory pre or post flight actions, which are unmonitored and covert. 
The difficulties of determining the incidence of DVT and what may count as a DVT 
caused by flight are used here to construct a ridiculous notion of the airlines being 
blamed. The member states that because DVTs manifest weeks after a flight it is 
quite absurd to maintain that the flight is the reason for it. Such measurements are 
constructed as deficient because they do not take account of crucial factors such as the 
behaviour of the passengers in the intervening weeks. The message is very clear that 
such calculations will lead to passengers being absolved of any responsibility yet all 
the time engaging in irresponsible behaviour. At the same time, the airlines are 
having the "entire" blame "pinned" on them. They have not been proved in any way 
to be responsible but have been chosen as easy "scapegoats" instead. Therefore, 
criticising a method is a way of presenting a different construction of the risk, and the 
position of different groups in relation to it. 
10.6.4 Consensus 
The messages studied considered a further necessary requirement for good research - 
consensus. If facts do exist then surely everyone can agree about them (Fahnestock, 
1989; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Potter, 1983). To point therefore to a consensus 
on a finding is a way of substantiating it. Pointing to a study seemingly without this 
is a way of criticising it. 
For example, a way of authenticating a claim being made is to place it in the context 
of widely established facts: 
[110] Member IF, Mail based list, 02/05/02 
1 But I am not the original proponent of this theory of the causative effects of 02 deficiencies 
2 in acute and chronic diseases and conditions. I believe that the basic science behind it has 
3 been firmly laid some 20 years ago and more, mainly by German, Austrian and Russian 
4 scientists, some of them not physicians but physicists and physiologists. 
This post backs up its claim by pointing to the longevity of the knowledge it uses, and 
its wide range of proponents from different disciplines and different countries. The 
member gives details of how well established the knowledge is, and implies that these 
are only the bare facts; the knowledge is twenty years old or "more", developed 
"mainly" by Germans, Austrians and Russians. The knowledge is actually even better 
established than the member has mentioned, so much so that there is no need to add 
any further details, it is so obvious as to not require any additional description 
(Fahnestock, 1989). The facts of this issue have been "firmly laid" and because it is 
the "basic science" this is presented as being even more difficult to argue with. The 
member is not going out on a limb or even trying to claim credit as being the "original 
proponent". Instead, the member backs up the claim by placing it in a long and 
agreed history. 
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Highlighting a consensus is used to substantiate a claim; and pointing to a lack of 
agreement is a means of dismissing one. The following message was posted in 
response to a number of points made by a member in support of a link between flying 
and DVT. This member attacks this assertion by highlighting the lack of agreement 
on such ideas: 
[111] Member AG, mail based list, 30/4/02 
1 If Dr [name of member] thinks his points are valid, could he possibly provide us 
2 with a substantial body of evidence to provide a little support for his theories? 
3 They do seem to fly in the face of generally perceived knowledge. 
Stating that these ideas do not fit in with what is described as "generally perceived 
knowledge" is used to threaten their validity. The tone of this message makes it very 
clear that such claims, in support of a DVT-flying link, are not maintained, and it 
emphasises their lack of grounding in current knowledge. It asks for a "substantial 
body of evidence", implying that it would need to be so large to counteract the huge 
amount that exists in contradiction; and even then, such an amount would only 
provide "a little" confirmation. The member calls on the principles of science here - 
of course claims cannot be taken seriously unless there is evidence to support them, 
especially if they go against what is known - to make the desired point and in order to 
counteract the previous claim. 
10.7. Conclusions 
The constructions of the risk of ECS and the positions of the passengers and the 
airlines in these forums are in many ways a microcosm of the views presented by the 
passengers and airlines themselves. In the messages here, the responsibility of the 
passengers is presented in terms of their risky characteristics and behaviour, or in 
terms of the information given or agency allowed by the airlines for them to protect 
themselves. Similarly, airlines are presented either as being responsible for the risk, 
or at the mercy of litigious claims from disingenuous passengers. Whether the risk 
was voluntarily assumed or imposed is also differently constructed. Messages 
presented these opposing views, but did so in remarkably similar ways. For example, 
a presentation of self as knowledgeable and authoritative was given regardless of the 
claim being made. Contexts and contrasts were used by both `sides' in the debate. 
The media was invoked in the same way to support and dismiss claims by authors 
presenting different views. 
This chapter has also included an examination of the use of science in messages. This 
has highlighted how members invoke principles of scientific work to attack or defend 
claims. Firstly, for example, science is deemed to be evidence based. This is used to 
present a view that lack of evidence means lack of risk; but also that lack of evidence 
means that science has not found the answers - yet. Secondly, there are debates over 
what counts as evidence; anecdotes can be included if they back up a particular view, 
or disregarded if they do not. Thirdly, scientific inquiry is deemed to be based on a 
proper methodology; so critiques of the methods used can be used to build up or 
dismiss results. Fourthly, consensus is deemed necessary; so demonstrating 
consensus can defend a claim, while an absence can be used to attack it. The point is 
that this is done by members in remarkably similar ways. 
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A final point is a comparison of the view of science presented here, and in Chapter 
Nine. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984: 5 1) have described the systematic and meaningful 
differences which often exist between scientists' formal and informal accounts. What 
I have shown here is that the same principles of science are invoked to support or 
dismiss claims, and that how these are used is similar between both formal accounts 
in published journals, and in informal internet discussion forums. In both, science is 
held up as evidence based, capable of finding the facts of the issue, and being based 
on a number of key principles. In both, those principles are highlighted where a study 
does or does not demonstrate its correspondence with them. In both, some of the 
"realities" of scientific practice were discussed as well and the "myths" (using 




Conclusions, Comparisons, and Constructing a 'Model of Risk' 
This research has been an analysis of discursive constructions of risk. I have 
demonstrated this through the case study of ECS. In this chapter, I draw some 
conclusions about the construction of ECS, by making some comparisons between the 
groups studied. I also discuss how the processes of construction take place. 
I then move on to consider whether these conclusions are applicable beyond ECS, by 
reflecting on whether they apply to a case study of another risk. I then discuss the 
significance of the findings of the research, and the wider resonance of the aspects of 
risk construction documented here. 
What I am able to conclude about ECS and any other risks is obviously dependent on 
the method used to generate the conclusions, and whether DA is a method through 
which it is possible to make conclusions at all. This will be more fully discussed in the 
next chapter. 
11.1. Key conclusions about the construction of ECS 
11.1.1 Risks do not `just happen' 
A fundamental part of the construction of the ECS by all groups is that incidences of it 
do not `just happen'; they are not constructed as unforeseen, unpredictable, random 
events. For example, part of the passenger groups' presentation of the issue focuses on 
the conspiracy of silence by the airlines - the risk existed, they knew about it, but 
chose not to tell passengers. There was a risk even before passengers knew about it, 
before it became an issue; so even when clots were happening without the 
`recognition' of what they were, they were still not coincidental. That the risk is not 
`an accident', and that it can be discovered, quantified, and known about is the whole 
ethos of medical research on the issue. The risk exists, and it is science that will find 
the answers about it. All groups also emphasise the discriminate nature of the issue. 
Certain passengers are more likely to contract a clot than others. Pre-existing medical 
conditions may make it more likely. Behaviour onboard a flight is a crucial factor. 
Immobility increases the chance; so it cannot be randomly distributed. What these 
factors are, and who these risky passengers might be, is part of the debate over the 
issue; but the point is that it is possible to identify these people - and to know about the 
risk. 
11.1.2 Measuring the risk 
While all the groups presented the idea that it is possible to know about the risk, very 
different constructions of it, its frequency, seriousness and prevention were given. 
Issues about measurement, and what the rules for measurement are, were key. 
Two issues were crucial - conceptions of timing, and conceptions of diagnosis. 
Conceptions of timing concern the degree of temporal specificity both of the 
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occurrence and causality of the clot. A clot might occur while a passenger was 
onboard a plane, immediately afterwards, or three weeks later. Differing conceptions 
of timing were therefore applied either to link the clot directly to the flight, or to 
dismiss any causality at all. Further, if a passenger develops a clot some time after a 
flight, the construction might focus on what they have been doing in the intervening 
period. It might also focus on what they did before the flight. These issues were 
therefore used to determine both the incidence rate for flight related blood clots, and 
the culpability for those that do manifest. 
Conceptions of diagnosis concern the differing experiences of a clot, and how a clot is 
`discovered'. Presentations may stress that the condition can be symptomless and go 
unnoticed; that it might be found by the patient but not diagnosed medically; that it 
might be misdiagnosed altogether; or that if it exists it will be diagnosed and measured. 
How these issues are treated has implications for the measurement of ECS that is 
reached. Further, differing presentations are given of the incidences that are measured. 
Clots may be described as being discovered, diagnosed or believed to exist. If they are 
`discovered' this implies that they existed independently of the passenger and are real; 
if they are `diagnosed', this implies an authority to be able to do so and substantiates 
their existence; if they are `believed to exist' (or `reported' or `presented') this casts 
doubt on whether they an `objective fact' and presents them as a subjective opinion 
only. 
Extrapolations of the risk are also used a way of measuring it; and again, these are 
contentious and differently used. Figures may be presented for the number of people 
who are diagnosed with a blood clot each year. These may be compared to the number 
of people who fly and an estimate of the proportion of flyers who would be expected to 
get a blood clot is reached. But this is fraught with difficulties. Are flyers the same 
cross section of the public who are diagnosed with clots? Many people are frequent 
flyers, how does this affect their risk? How are the other stated risk factors built in? 
Answers to these questions, and questions about timing and diagnosis, shape the 
existence, frequency, and seriousness of the risk, and have implications for who can be 
blamed for it. 
11.1.3 Prevention is better than cure 
A simple presentation is maintained in the texts analysed - if the risk can be known 
about, it can be managed and prevented. How that might be done is contested by all 
groups - because how the risk can be prevented depends on what causes it. Knowledge 
is presented as key, but again, what knowledge that is, and moreover, whose 
knowledge it is, is crucial. Prevention is also closely related to presentations of the 
seriousness of the issue. If the risk is something that can be avoided with a few simple 
measures, then this can be used to dismiss it. It cannot be that serious, and does not 
need much action taken, beyond just making people aware of what those measures are. 
Conversely, the risk may be constructed as a needless risk and easily avoided - and 
this makes it more tragic that people are not given the opportunity to be able to do so. 
Indeed, it may be possible to avoid it all together. The key point is that because 
incidents of ECS do not just happen, and knowledge exists on causal and contributory 
factors, this can be used to manage the risk. 
How the risk can be prevented is dependent on its cause. Whether the risk is 
voluntarily assumed by passengers or imposed upon them by airlines is a crucial and 
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highly contested part of the debate. If it is assumed by the passengers, then it is their 
responsibility to prevent it. If it is imposed by the airlines, then avoidance is their 
responsibility. Prevention may be constructed to be in terms of actions that are 
required. For passengers these may include doing in-seat exercises, drinking lots of 
water, and walking around the cabin. For the airlines these may include improving 
seat pitch, giving out lots of water, and allowing passengers the chance to move about. 
Prevention may also be constructed in terms of knowledge. If passengers voluntarily 
assume the risk they should make them themselves aware of it and the measures to 
combat it. If the airlines impose it, they should provide passengers with the 
information they need and dispel the `conspiracy of silence'. Prevention may finally 
be constructed in terms of a `moral responsibility'. If passengers assume the risk, then 
they have a responsibility to themselves. They only have themselves to blame if a clot 
occurs - especially if they do have one of the risky characteristics, and ignore the 
advice on prevention. But if airlines impose the risk, passengers are helpless against it. 
They are at the mercy of the airlines to tell them the risk exists and what can be done to 
avoid it. In particular, if certain people are at greater risk, then it is particularly 
important for the airlines to protect them, and especially tragic if they do not. 
11 14 Naming and blaming 
One way of apportioning responsibility is through the name that is used for the issue. 
Debates over the `correct' terminology are a key characteristic of the construction. 
The name of the risk is crucial in presenting whether it exists or not, how serious it is, 
what causes it, and of course, who can be blamed. 
The term `ECS' can be used to present or dismiss a risk. `ECS' has a number of 
associations; that it is a condition caused by flight, and caused by the particular 
conditions of that flight. It is something to do with being in economy class that causes 
it. This focus on location therefore focuses attention on the airlines, and away from the 
passengers. It is not what they are doing but where they are that causes it. It can 
therefore be used to imply that the airlines are responsible, and can be blamed. `ECS' 
is a term therefore variably used by different groups who may either want to adopt 
these associations, or disregard them. 
Interestingly, both British Airways and Airhealth describe `ECS' as a "misnomer". 
BA may be trying to avoid the implications outlined above. For Airhealth however, 
the risk is still flight related. Indeed, describing the term as inappropriate is used to 
emphasise the risk, because anyone on a plane can suffer. Blood clots are therefore 
directly connected to the experience of air travel and are presented as even more 
serious and insidious. 
Other terms for the issue are also used. It is frequently referred to as `the risk of DVT', 
or just `DVT'. This is a medical term and means the focus is much more on what 
happens, rather than where it happens or why. This does not of course mean that this is 
therefore a more `neutral' term. Use of `DVT' has effects that may be drawn on, such 
as this removal of focus on the conditions and experience of air travel. 
Another term that is used is `traveller's thrombosis'. This was developed by British 
Airways, and they use it as the name for the issue. It has very different associations 
than `ECS'. With `traveller's thrombosis' the focus is on the passengers, and away 
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from air travel. It is something that anyone who is travelling or who sits still for a long 
time may contract. It is not location specific, but about peoples' actions and agency. 
The very phrasing of the term portrays it as belonging to the passengers; it is their 
responsibility. 
As well as which name was used, how it was used was also key; this could be either 
defensively or offensively. If the term being used was unproblematic, then little 
attention was drawn to it, and the assumptions and associations with it were not 
questioned; they were either explicitly or implicitly drawn upon. If a term that had 
undesirable associations was being referred to, then the term was problematised. For 
example, where it is being suggested that ECS does not exist, the term may be given in 
speech marks. This detracts from its meaning as a normal term used in everyday 
language, and implies that it is only what this issue is called, not actually a description 
or a very appropriate name for it. Additionally a different name for the issue altogether 
may be used, either explicitly or implicitly as a replacement for `ECS'. More direct 
challenges to the meaning of ECS therefore detract from the unfavourable implications 
that the term has. The name that is used for the issue therefore constructs the existence 
and nature of the risk, and who can be blamed for it. 
11 2. Comparing Constructions 
As the analysis in the preceding chapters and this summary demonstrates, ECS is 
constructed quite differently by different groups. What is notable, however, is that 
groups actually construct these different images in very similar ways. I will now 
explore four main processes by which this is done. 
11.2.1. Presentation of if 
For each of the groups studied, presentation of self was crucial. If claims are to be 
taken seriously, then the author has to establish themselves as competent, 
knowledgeable, and with the authority to speak on the issue. The status that a group or 
individual has may have to be `worked up'; it may not automatically be accorded. This 
was particularly pertinent for individuals in the discussion forums. They are 
anonymous, and can assume any identity. This may mean that they have to work 
harder to establish this authority because just stating that they should be accorded it 
may not be effective. While very different views were being presented, these means of 
authoritative self presentation were remarkably similar. 
Authors portray themselves as having access to the facts of the situation. While 
rumour, controversy, and incorrect versions of the issue exist, they are able to report on 
the truth. They give an impression of having a thorough command of the knowledge 
of the situation. They present the facts they have as proven and beyond doubt. Of 
course, this is exemplified by the medical researchers. Not only do they have access to 
the facts, but it is through their investigations that those facts are determined. 
Externalising devices may be used so that the group or individual seems unbiased, 
independent and distant from their accounts. For example, a common procedure was 
to use an `active voice' and present the views of an expert to substantiate the particular 
claim being made. An empiricist repertoire was also adopted to make it seem as if the 
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facts were `speaking for themselves', rather than having been `narrated into being' by 
the author. 
As well as a presentation of self as knowledgeable and having access to the facts, a 
presentation was given of self as responsible and caring. This was regardless of the 
claim being given, but was used to substantiate it. It was also a way of engendering 
support for the group themselves as well as their construction of the issue. Similarly, 
presenting the proactive role being undertaken was used to gain support for self and the 
view of the risk. Groups and individuals presented themselves as addressing the issues 
and taking action on them. 
11.2.2 Management of stake 
Issues of stake were similarly key for all groups. No group or individual wants to have 
what they say dismissed as a product of their interest in the issue. The groups studied 
here cannot pretend that they do not have an interest. For example, airlines have a 
commercial interest in playing down its significance. Campaign groups were set up in 
the aftermath of ECS. They both use two processes here; stake management and stake 
confession. 
To manage stake, both groups try to appear as if they are presenting the facts; but of 
those facts being independently established. The implication is that because facts are 
value neutral, the group cannot be biased in their presentation of them, as they are 
merely outlining what is already known and proven about the issue. Different groups 
may also present themselves as being on the same side as the passengers. For the 
airlines this manages stake because it makes them seem as if the information they are 
presenting is in the interests of passengers as well as themselves. The implication is 
that the information provided is reliable and accurate because they have a self interest 
in making it so. For campaign groups, stake is managed by presenting themselves as 
acting on behalf of passengers, and doing everything they can to improve things for 
them. Of course therefore the information they present will be accurate because it 
would be entirely contradictory to their aims and ethos if it were not so. 
Both groups also engage in stake confession. To acknowledge that the risk exists and 
their involvement in it is a way of disarming criticism. An airline cannot be accused of 
being involved in a conspiracy about ECS if they are stating that it exists and providing 
advice on how to prevent it. Once this has been established however, the risk that is 
stated to exist can be minimised and factors other than the flight be blamed for it. For 
campaign groups, stake confession can be used as a powerful appeal for support for 
them and their view of the issue. To describe themselves as formed to fight ECS is a 
way of engaging sympathy and encouraging empathy with their position. They know 
people who have suffered because of ECS, they know how serious ECS is, and it is 
because of this that they want to take action on it. 
11.2.3 The use of science 
Scientific fact and research is drawn on by all the groups, in both their presentation of 
the issue, and of themselves. Texts may use science to do this in a number of ways. 
They discuss the need for science, how science proves their case, and how it can 
highlight the deficiencies of other claims. Of course, different scientific facts are drawn 
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upon, and they are used to give very different presentations of the issue; but the way 
that science is used is very similar. 
For example, to characterise themselves as authoritative and responsible, groups may 
quote from scientific figures and studies - but those that support their case. The 
airlines examined emphasised research findings which bolstered their course of action. 
For example, BA state that they have supported a recent scientific study, that showed 
an association between long journeys and the occurrence of DVT - but no evidence 
that flying is a specific risk. They cite a consensus view from research that it is 
immobility rather than the environment which is a factor. By appealing to what is 
accepted, and pointing out that they have taken part is research and have nothing to 
hide, they use science to confirm the idea that they cannot be held to blame. Appeals 
to medical research are used as proof of the airlines' lack of liability, yet responsible 
attitude towards the issue. 
Campaign groups want to seem to be in command of the facts of the issue and as 
presenting accurate information, and scientific research is drawn upon to do this. 
Assertions are referenced to scientific sources. Where scientific research has found no 
link between blood clots and flying, the research carried out is denigrated so that the 
conclusions it draws cannot be taken seriously. Research that gives findings in 
keeping with a group's aims may not be subject to the same methodological scrutiny, 
and the results are taken as `proof of the existence of the risk. 
The use of science in the construction of the issue is exemplified by examining the 
accounts produced by online discussion groups. These highlight the way in which the 
principles of science are used asymmetrically both to attack and defend claims. 
Different ideals about science are invoked to demonstrate that a study did or did not 
live up to them; or the ideals of science are questioned if this supports or dismisses a 
claim. Because science is presented as evidence based, translating information about 
the world into knowledge, and dealing only in facts, then using science to back up the 
argument being made can be a powerful tool. 
11.2.4 Offensive and defensive rhetoric 
The use of offensive and defensive rhetoric was pervasive. As has already been 
indicated, it was part of all the processes identified here. Groups present themselves as 
giving the facts on the issue; contrary to the rumour, speculation, and false information 
that exists or is presented by others. Stake may be managed by admitting that the risk 
exists, but presenting it as someone else's responsibility. Scientific research is 
described in ways that support studies and simultaneously critique others. 
There are many other ways in which offensive and defensive rhetoric is employed. 
For example, airlines acknowledge that the risk exists, thus warding off critics who 
might accuse them off ignoring or hiding it; yet they discuss it in terms of the influence 
of immobility not of flying per se. British Airways redefine the issue both to 
emphasise their own pro-active role and to orient to their critiques; they describe 
themselves as providing information, not responding to panic. Campaign groups 
present themselves as giving the information on the risks of ECS; with the implication 
that the airlines have not done this. The positions of the passengers and the airlines are 
often juxtaposed with one another. Defensive rhetoric may be used to describe the 
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measures that passengers can take to avoid ECS. This may also mean offensive 
rhetoric is used to construct the position of the airlines and the degree to which they 
make it possible for passengers to carry these measures out. 
Offensive and defensive rhetoric is also pervasive in accounts of science. For example, 
where authors point to aspects of a study as being biased, this can be to both criticise 
that particular study, and to imply that others that have been carried out were free from 
bias. Authors may use criticisms of method offensively and defensively. They can 
cast doubt on particular results by pointing to a methodological issue that should have 
been addressed, and then describing how it was in their study. 
It has therefore been possible to identify the same discursive patterns being used to 
justify or dismiss very different views. This suggests something of the universality of 
some of these patterns, if they can be analysed as performing diverse substantive tasks 
but achieving similar effects. The generalisability of these conclusions will be further 
considered now, and in Chapter Twelve. 
11 3. The apnlicability of analysis - developing a `model' of risk construction 
One of the key questions raised in Chapter Three concerned generalisation, and the 
extent to which the analysis from one study was comparable or useful in another. This 
theoretical issue will be re-considered in more depth in the following chapter; here I 
will consider the applicability of the analysis of this research for another case study. 
I am proposing is that it may be possible to develop a `model' of the construction of a 
risk which is applicable to other cases, using the four themes that I discussed in 
relation to the ECS data. While it will not be possible to expand on this in much depth, 
the example I will focus on is the controversy surrounding wind farms. 
11 4. Tilting at Windmills?: The risks of wind energy 
11 4.1. Risks do not `iust happen' 
The development of wind energy is complex and controversial. While opinion polls 
consistently report high levels of public support for wind energy, applications in 
particular locations are often met with vocal and vociferous opposition. What I intend 
to show here is that elements of the issue are constructed using similar processes to 
ECS. From the ECS data, I discussed how the risk of a clot was constructed by all 
groups as patterned instances that could be predicted and prevented. There are aspects 
of the debate over wind energy that are similarly constructed. 
The most commonly cited risk from windfarms is the risk of damage to the landscape. 
There are other associated risks, such as the risk to birds, the risk to house prices, the 
risk of noise pollution, and so on. All of these are balanced against the global gain of 
generating renewable energy and reducing the use of fossil fuels. These issues are all 
differently constructed by the stakeholders in the debate - such as developers; local 
and national opposition groups; environmental groups (such as Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth and WWF); local and national government; and the media. 
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Those in favour of windfarms present these risks as things that can be known about, 
that can be prevented, or indeed, construct them as not being an issue at all; however, 
the point is that it is possible to know whether they do pose a risk or not. Indeed, the 
whole ethos of environmental impact assessment (EIA) is that it is possible to know 
about and take account of risks. At the same time, those opposed to wind farms also 
construct the risks as something that can be known about. What is interesting is that 
even risks that are acknowledged to be subjective, such as landscape impact, can still 
be assessed and evaluated. 
For example, the following is from the summary of the EIA produced by a developer 
for an off-shore windfarm: 
[1] Extract from AMEC: Lynn Offshore Wind Farm Environmental Statement Non-Technical Summary 
[http: //www. amec. com/uploadfiles/LynnNTS. pdf downloaded 24/06/03] [line numbers added] 
1 The following document is a Non-Technical Summary (NTS) of a full 
2 Environmental Impact Statement (ES) that has been produced for the development. 
3 The ES provides the results of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
4 the process of predicting and evaluating the impacts of a project on the environment. 
5 The ES is submitted, with the application for consent, to be taken into account by the 
6 competent authority in forming their judgement on whether the development should proceed. 
7 The ES covers all the potential significant impacts caused by the development proposals. 
8 The EIA has been managed by AMEC, with independent experts commissioned for specific 
9 studies. Specialist consultants deal with land/seascape and visual impact, ornithology, marine 
10 ecology, archaeology, coastal processes, hydrology and geology, commercial fishing, shipping 
11 and navigation. All other areas have been assessed in-house by the developers' own specialists. 
In this opening to the document, the company makes it clear that while there are a 
number of issues when building a windfarm, they have all been assessed. This not 
only presents the risks as measurable, but presents the company as responsible and 
knowledgeable in having addressed them all. They state that "all" (line 7) the impacts 
have been taken into account - this extreme case formulation emphasises that nothing 
has been excluded. Furthermore, that it is all the "potential" (line 7) impacts that have 
been considered is a indication of just how comprehensive their approach is; it is not 
just impacts that are likely or are certain to happen, but everything that could possibly 
happen has been addressed. This constructs the risks of the impacts in a very particular 
way. Even those that are only `potential' can be assessed and known about. The 
company goes on to make it clear that these impacts have been properly assessed. They 
address issues of stake in the results by describing the "independent experts" (line 8) 
they have employed, thus distancing themselves from the work and its findings. That 
they employed experts for "specific studies" emphasises that these consultants really 
were authoritative in the particular field they were addressing, which reflects well upon 
the company for having gone to this effort to find them. The word "results" (line 3) is 
interesting as well. The EIA process does not just produce opinions or conclusions, 
but `results', factual findings of the expert-led studies. Therefore, the risks of a wide 
variety of different impacts can be known about. 
Opposition groups also persuade that the risks of a windfarm can be described and 
taken into account, and not need be dismissed as merely being subjective. The 
following is from the opening statement on the website for a campaign group set up to 
oppose a windfarm in Whinash, Cumbria: 
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[2] Extract from `Say No To The Whinash Windfarm' campaign website 
[http: //www. nowhinashwindfarm. co. uk/ downloaded 24/06/03] [line numbers added] 
I An unspoilt stretch of Cumbrian countryside, itself worthy of National Park status, 
2 would be sacrificed for a politically correct fad which experience has shown 
3 gives small return for an immense cost. The landscape has been acknowledged 
4 by central government organisations and committees as being of national significance. 
The group make their intentions clear; they are opposing the scheme because of the 
value of the landscape. That the landscape is valuable is emphasised. It is "worthy of 
National Park status", a high honour indeed, and it is "unspoilt" which of course 
implies that turbines would `spoil' it. Indeed, it is stated that the turbines would do 
more than this, and the area would be "sacrificed" by a windfarm; implying the loss 
that would be incurred and what would have to be given up and destroyed. Crucially, 
the group distance themselves from their description of the value as merely their 
opinion and instead point to both "central government organisations and committees" 
(line 4; emphasis added) who have determined this. The use of the word 
"acknowledged" implies that the committees realised what was already known; it is not 
even just their opinion that the landscape is valuable, it objectively and unarguably is. 
It is also not just the opinions of the group and their local concerns that the turbines 
would be unsuitable; they point to "experience" that has proved this. The landscape is 
valuable because it is of "national" significance; this is not a debate about local or 
selfish interests but preserving the assets of the nation. 
11 4 2. Measuring the risk: invoking the global is 
With ECS, while groups maintained that the risk existed, they presented different 
constructions of the seriousness of it. Issues about how to measure it were key. 
Similarly, measuring the risks of climate change (and the necessity therefore of 
building wind farms) is a highly debated aspect of this issue. 
The implementation of wind power is taking place within the broader context of claims 
about climate change, global warming, and the need to address these issues. One 
interesting aspect of the debate therefore concerns the seriousness of global warming, 
and how this is assessed and measured. If climate change is imminent and deadly, then 
actions to tackle it may be more readily accepted. If it is doubtful, then windfarms not 
only sacrifice the landscape, but do so needlessly. 
For example, developers may place considerations about windpower in the context of a 
global environmental crisis, and present themselves as being motivated by concern to 
take action on it. For example: 
[3] Extract from National Wind Power website [http: //www. natwindpower. co. uk downloaded 24/06/03] 
[line numbers added] 
1 As environmental protection and sustainable development are now 
2 top priorities worldwide, we all need to consider carefully 
3 how the energy that we consume should be produced. 
4 National Wind Power is committed to developing and promoting 
5 wind energy as a major renewable energy source for a sustainable future. 
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This is the opening of the text from National Wind Power, and immediately sets the 
tone for their approach. They are developing wind energy as a response to the 
"environmental protection" (line 1) that is required. It is not their judgement of the 
situation alone, but something that has been acknowledged "worldwide"; these are 
global issues, and moreover require urgent attentions; they are "top priorities" (line 2) 
that the company are therefore taking action on. A causal link is implied between 
protecting the environment and energy production, and the responsibility for 
addressing this is made clear - this is not just something that the energy companies 
need to consider, but something that "we all" (line 2) need to do. NWP therefore 
present themselves as proactively taking action on this, and state that they are 
"committed" (line 4) to developing windpower as a direct means to achieve this 
necessary environmental protection. 
The commonsensical nature of the benefits of renewable energy and windfarms are 
evoked in the documents produced by supporters. For example Linley-Adams for 
WWF (2003), in a report about off-shore renewable energy potential, states that: 
"there is wide acceptance of the need to reduce our national reliance on fossil fuels 
for well-rehearsed geopolitical and environmental reasons". 
Who accepts this is not stated; it is so obvious that this consensus exists and that the 
information it is so well accepted it does not need even to be stated there; the 
arguments can be summarised as being "well-rehearsed" because they are so familiar. 
However, opponents of windfarms may seek to redefine what is known about this 
`global crisis'. Data from the national campaign group `Country Guardian' highlights 
this: 
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[4] Extract from Country Guardian website [http: //www. countryguardian. net/ [downloaded 24/06/03] 
[line numbers added] 
The Case for Wind "Farms" Examined 
2 Those who advocate wind "farms" base their arguments on three propositions: 
3 1) that they produce energy without the problems associated with nuclear power 
4- risk of accident, problems of waste storage; 
5 2) that they do not deplete fossil fuels, which are finite; 
6 3) that they produce energy without harmful emissions - C02, S02, 
7 gases associated with global warming and acid rain. 
8 Fossil fuels are certainly finite resources. The question is whether they are in such short supply 
9 as to cause us concern. A Club of Rome report in 1972 predicted that they would run out by 1990. 
10 The burning of fossil fuels is a major source of C02 emissions, which have risen dramatically 
11 over the last twenty five years and been linked by many scientists to global warming. 
12 Estimates vary about how much the world will warm over the next century, about what the effects will be 
13 and the extent to which human activity rather than natural cyclical effects are the cause of climate change. 
14 According to The New Scientist there is broad agreement that the global average temperature 
15 will rise by 1.5 degrees by 2100. It is a welcome phenomenon that governments are beginning 
16 to look at the issue and to form polices to head off potential dangers. 
17 There is a risk, however, that governments will avoid the more difficult political decisions. 
18 If we accept that global warming is a major threat to human kind, why did the UK government 
19 impose a moratorium on the move to relatively clean gas-fired power stations 
20 and offer a large cash subsidy to the coal industry? Why has it avoided measures to deal 
21 with traffic growth (emissions from cars are our fastest growing source of C02 
22 and air travel is becoming a serious contributor)? 
In each paragraph of their response to the propositions, the group present themselves as 
being in agreement with knowledge about environmental concerns, and concur with 
them enough so that their claims will not be dismissed as ridiculous; and yet at the 
same time they subtly undermine them. For example, they agree that fossil fuels are 
"certainly" finite (line 8). They then change the emphasis of this issue so that it is not 
about if they will run out, which they can afford to agree with, but when. They cite a 
seemingly reputable report, one that could be expected to be afforded credibility, and 
highlight how wrong its predictions were. The implication is of course that any 
evidence produced today that stresses that fossil fuels will run out soon enough "to 
cause concern" (line 9) may be similarly flawed. 
In the second paragraph the group state that fossil fuels are a "major source" of carbon 
dioxide emissions, that these have risen "dramatically" and that "many" scientists have 
agreed about this (lines 10-11). Yet C02 has only been "linked" (line 11) to global 
warming, not `proved' or definitely stated to be a causal factor. Indeed, agreement 
about this is downgraded to mere "estimates" in the next sentence (line 12), educated 
guesses only rather than proven knowledge. This uncertainty is not only about what 
will happen, but also what effects it will have, and additionally about the causes of it; 
the state of the knowledge is very under-developed. This issue about causes is crucial. 
Rather than stressing human responsibility for damaging the planet and having to take 
action, this all may be down to "natural" environmental effects (line 13). The group 
then cite "broad agreement"(line 14) that temperatures will increase, but again then 
detract from the seriousness of this by stating that this is 1.5 degrees, and that this 
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change will take a hundred years. This is not presented as an urgent or pressing 
problem. Again, they seem to concur with the initial propositions when they state that 
they "welcome" government action on this; who could not? And yet by saying that 
governments are only "beginning" (line 15) to look at the issue and that the dangers are 
only "potential" (line 16) further detracts from their seriousness. This is emphasised 
by the motives that are ascribed to the policies of the UK government; they are not an 
attempt to address concerns about global warming. At the same time, suspicion is cast 
on the actions of the government, and the "threat" (line 18) (not reality) of global 
warming is detracted from. 
What the group have done in this text is attempt to redefine what is known about the 
state of the global environment and fossil fuels. In doing so, they have created a 
different background of accepted knowledge in which the windfarm debate is played 
out. If the group can present global warming as not imminent, fossil fuels as not about 
to run out, and government policy as suspect, then in this light attempts to site turbines 
become at best unnecessary and at worst the cause of "social and environmental 
damage" themselves. 
11 4 3. Prevention is better than cure: voluntary and imposed risk 
If a risk is known about, then whatever its scale, it will be possible to prevent it. With 
ECS, a key aspect of this was whether the risk was felt to be voluntary or imposed. 
Texts about windfarms show a similar phenomenon. 
For example, developers may present themselves as taking action on global problems - 
on behalf of the people. This text is from a public information leaflet produced by 
United Utilities for a proposed windfarm off the coast of South Wales: 
[5] United Utilities public information leaflet `Scarweather Sands Offshore Wind Farm Swansea Bay' 
(2003) [line numbers added] 
1 We are committed to working with communities that will be directly influenced by 
2 the Scarweather Sands project. We aim to deliver significant value 
3 not only to these local communities but to Wales as a whole 
The project is presented as being about the delivery of "significant value" (line 2) by 
the developer; they are working to benefit not even just the local community but Wales 
as a whole, such are the beneficial `influences' that the project will have. This use of 
the word "influenced" (line 1) is interesting, because it is more neutral than `impacts' 
or `affects', which might imply that the influence would be negative. Using the word 
"influenced" with the following sentence about value implies that this may be 
advantageous. The company present themselves as working "with" (line 1) the 
community, for the community, and for people everywhere in tackling global 
environmental problems. 
However, opposition groups present wind farms as something unwanted that is being 
imposed upon their communities by outsiders: 
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[6] Extract from Meikle Carewe Windfarm Action Group website [http: //mcwag. members. beeb. net 
downloaded 19/07/03] [line numbers added] 
1 The Meikle Carewe Windfarm Action Group was formed in 2000 as the voice of a 
2 small rural community concerned with the plans of a large developer to construct a 
3 wind energy power station in the N. E. of Scotland near Stonehaven (south of Aberdeen). 
4 Our primary concerns include health & safety issues, damage to the environment, 
5 visual impact and noise disturbance. 
The contrasts are clear - the group represent a "small" community against a "large" 
developer; they represent a "community" of local people against an outside interest; 
and they are "rural", based in the countryside, against a company who want to build a 
"power station", something that jars with this notion. The text serves to highlight the 
disparities in power that the two groups have. That the group has been formed to 
provide a "voice" against the development implies that if this is necessary, local people 
are not being listened to, and they are having to fight to have their views heard against 
the might of the developer. When the group describe that "Our primary concerns are.. " 
(line 4), this implies that these issues are not being addressed by the developer, and 
heightens the need for them to represent the community on such important issues. The 
developer is presenting as constructing a development that is of major concern to local 
people, and being unconcerned about the impact that it will have on them. 
11.4.4. Naming and blaming: Down on the `farm' 
As with ECS, the name of the issue is crucial. To describe a group of turbines as a 
`windfarm' seems uncontroversial enough, but is a key part of the debate. 
The British Wind Energy Association, the trade body for the UK wind industry, uses 
the terms "wind farm", "wind power", "wind energy"' . These are interesting terms. Both `power' and `energy' are positive terms, and present the issue in terms of the 
benefit it brings. A `farm' is an obvious and fitting part of the countryside. The term 
has connotations of working with nature, and of productivity. `Farms' will be a part of 
the rural landscape, not an alien imposition upon it. 
Opposition groups describe the issue differently. Country Guardian always put 
inverted commas round the word farm - wind "farm"2. This problematises the term 
and draws attention to the use of the word. Describing turbines as `wind "farms"', they 
draw attention to the assumptions about countryside acceptability, and suggest that 
while the word is used, these added assumptions are not applicable to wind energy. 
Other groups are even more explicit about this, and groups of turbines are given very 
negative terms. While in the previous extract, the Meikle Carewe campaign group 
described the turbines as a "wind energy power station", others do not even include the 
word wind. The headline of a story by a campaign group in Mid-Wales states: 
Massive Power Station Planned for Cefn Croes3 
'http: //www. bwea. com/index. html; and http: //www. bwea. com/ref/whywind. html, accessed 17/10/04. 2 http: //www. countryguardian. net/index. htm, accessed 17/10/04 
3Extract from Cefn Croes Campaign Website, http: //www. users. globalnet. co. uk/--hills/cc/ downloaded 
17/10/04 
166 
Using the phrase `power station' is a very different idea to `wind power'. A power 
station conjures up images of large factories with chimneys belching smoke and 
pollution. It is a effective contrast with the usually rural locations where turbines are 
planned and opposed. The negative associations of `power stations' are used by 
groups to construct the issue of wind turbines in a very particular way - as a real 
imposition, not something that fits with or will blend into their location; as a major 
development; and one that may even damage the environment. 
It 5. Case study conclusions 
In these examples I have illustrated the wider applicability of some of the conclusions 
about ECS. Even though ECS and wind energy are ostensibly very different issues, I 
have shown that the themes in the ECS data are not necessarily exclusive to that data. 
All language use is occasioned by its context; but some similar constructions may be 
used in the different contexts in which they are developed. 
As well as the four themes in the ECS data having relevance for the case of wind 
energy, the rhetorical processes identified in ECS case also had relevance beyond it. 
The wind energy texts also included features of self presentation for example. Authors 
engaged in stake management; both developers and opposition groups stress that they 
are involved because of the importance of protecting the environment, at a local scale 
for local groups, and a global one for developers. Not being dismissed as 'NIMBY's' 
is key for opposition groups, as is not being accused as motivated solely by profit for 
the developers. Different views, but constructed in similar ways. 
In this chapter I have discussed the common themes in the data from ECS, and the 
processes used to present these constructions. I have then applied these conclusions to 
another case. Of course, two case studies does not a generalisation make. The 
confines of this thesis (word limits, reader patience) meant that it has not been possible 
to consider this case or any others in any greater depth. Nevertheless, other studies 
have been conducted on much less data than this, and I do not wish to call for `more 
research' as if that could find the `answer'. What I would like to do is point to areas 
that might be interesting to explore. 
What I am proposing is that it may be possible to develop a `model' of the construction 
of risks and issues which is applicable to other cases. I think that examples as diverse 
as floods, GM foods, parenting, train crashes, and Gulf War syndrome would display 
comparable characteristics. I use the term `model' in the loosest sense of the word to 
imply some similar constructions that may be used by participants who identify a risk. 
I think that there may be some. It would be very interesting to find out more. 
167 
Chapter Twelve: 
Discussion - Discourse Analysis as a Theory and a Method Revisited 
In this chapter I (re)consider some issues raised in Chapters Two to Six (particularly 
Chapter Four) in the light of the analysis presented. I briefly summarise these issues, 
and how they were managed. This leads to conclusions about how to carry out DA 
that may have wider applicability beyond this research. 
12.1. Research on risk 
In Chapter Two I briefly outlined some previous research on risk. This included work 
on the objectivity or subjectivity of risks, lay and expert knowledges, whether risks 
are voluntary or imposed, apportioning blame, and their management and control. 
What I have attempted to do is show how these classifications and categories are 
issues for the participants. 
For example, the literature discusses the increasing management of risks. This was a 
key theme highlighted by analysis, because participants themselves oriented to it. The 
campaign groups present ECS as a manageable risk. For them, this was a crucial 
characteristic, because they present the airlines as deliberately avoiding their 
responsibility. Similarly key was the voluntary assumption or imposition of ECS. 
This was discussed in Chapter Eleven; and what I have done differs from previous 
research because I leave the drawing of this dichotomy to the participants. I have 
shown that the classification of ECS as in/voluntary is itself a highly contentious 
issue, and how groups themselves go about presenting it. This research was not 
intended to assess the magnitude of the risk of ECS but to consider issues to the extent 
that they have been relevant for those studied. 
_12.2. 
Antaki et al. 's critique 
I will now reconsider the difficulties of carrying out DA. Chapter Four drew on a 
paper by Antaki et al. (2003) and their critique of work that purports to be `discourse 
analysis', and I have attempted to address their comments in carrying out this 
research. For example, while I tried to avoid `under-analysis through summary', I 
have used summaries of data to make the text more readable, to introduce and 
conclude sections, and to guide the reader through the argument. I have intended this 
to be in addition to analysis however, rather than as a substitute for it. In some 
instances, this may also be because I am trying to comment on the construction of the 
topic. For example, comparing the constructions of ECS between two online-authors 
may be relevant for the narrative structure of the chapter and the conclusions being 
drawn. In some cases, analysis of the text may include attempts to comment about the 
topic (rather than just the structures of language use). 
Ideas about summarising are associated with ideas of what analysis is. This may 
mean unpacking the construction of a sentence, considering what each word brings, 
how it adds to the presentation. It can also mean noting what is said, the absence of 
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another phrase, and noting that the very fact that a phrase is present is meaningful 
(following Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 76, when they describe the construction of 
characterisations through (amongst other things) the "appropriate selection of 
descriptive phrases"). This is not taking the content of an account at face value, nor 
summarising (although it may sometimes seem like it); but examining the use and 
effect of language. 
For example, in Chapter Eight (p 106), I used the following phrase to lead into 
analysis of the text: 
[39] www. airhealth. org/index. html accessed 20/02/01 
1 ECS is a misnomer because while cramped economy class seating may increase 
2 the risk, flight related thrombosis strikes first class passengers and pilots as well. 
3A more appropriate name would be Air Travel Syndrome to include 
4 all classes of passengers plus pilots 
ECS is stated to be a "misnomer". In this presentation however, the risk of a 
DVT is still flight related, not about travel generally as the airlines construct it. 
While this may appear to be summary without analysis, it was intended to lead into 
analysis highlighting how this was done. I have also attended to the constructive 
features of such summaries. Had I used the phrase "ECS is described as a misnomer" 
this would have given a different interpretation of the group's action. It might have 
implied that ECS had existence beyond the group's construction of it, and this was 
just their interpretation of it. Of course, using the word "stated" to appear neutral is 
not a simple reflection of what is there, but a deliberate device of factual construction. 
The point is that I have tried to avoid summarising without analysing, and of 
summarising at all because it can reinterpret what the participants may have intended. 
At times when it was necessary I have tried to do so as carefully as possible. In 
Chapter Four I noted how DA texts are not immune to analysis and deconstruction 
themselves, and of course that these texts could then be deconstructed, and so on - 
and that this potential for an infinite deconstructive spiral is one of the criticisms of 
DA work. While there are many other examples of summarising and language use in 
this thesis that I would like to highlight and justify here, lest I be accused of 
descending into this spiral, I will move on. 
A second shortcoming that Antaki et al. identify is "under-analysis through taking 
sides" (2003: 4). To take a position of not taking a position is, of course, to take a 
position. But this is the nature of academic work, and of any use of language. To say 
one thing is to not say any of the other infinite possibilities (following Schegloff, 
1972, and Wooffitt, 1992). The point is to be explicit about this and not to subsume a 
participant's orientation with analysis of it. In this research, I have attempted to 
remain agnostic to the data, and indeed, did not carry out interviews as I felt their 
analysis might compromise this principle. I have also attempted to use `neutral' 
language (with the caveats listed above) to remove any implication of adopting a 
position -I tried to avoid phrases such as `the airline appreciates that action needs to 
be taken' for example. I discovered how difficult this could be, and it meant a 
balance between not attributing intention, mental processes, or the necessary existence 
of phenomena, and not being too verbose ('the presentation that it seems as if the 
member may be trying to give... ' or `the member views'.. ).. 
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Thirdly, Antaki et al. describe how a reliance on quotations may be a substitute for 
analysis. While it is tempting to list a number of different examples of the same 
phenomenon to substantiate a claim, I have used one extract for each point being 
made, and only used two quotations to make a comparison between them. Antaki et 
al. (2003: 15) also describe `under analysis through false survey', sometimes implicit 
in demographic categories used to refer to people. I have tried to avoid this, and for 
example tried to refer only to the `airlines studied' rather than necessarily to the whole 
of the airline industry. I have also tried to avoid under-analysing by allowing 
quotations to stand for themselves without any further analysis. In short, this has been 
research using DA, and the aim throughout has been to use and to demonstrate the use 
of analysis. 
12.3. Intention 
I will briefly re-consider some of the other issues raised in Chapter Four. The first of 
these was whether participants deliberately use constructions in their accounts. In this 
research, I have tried to avoid implying that authors intended the effects achieved. 
My aim has been to study these effects, without recourse to a theory of underlying 
cognitive processes. The analysis of airlines, and campaign groups, included a 
section on changes made to their texts; but I aimed to show the effects of these 
changes, rather than make assumptions about whether they were intended or not. The 
account produced by participants was the focus, not their motivations or intentions. 
12.4. Generalisation 
I noted in Chapter Four a difficulty between the principle of interaction as context 
dependent, and claims about the applicability of analysis. I have concluded that 
while all language is occasioned by context, it is possible to give examples of where 
similar themes and usage occur, and my analysis suggests that the same patterns of 
language were used by different groups to achieve similar effects. Discourse is not 
generalisable, and the interactional context has to be examined for it to make sense; 
but from this it is possible to observe processes (and tools and strategies) that are 
generalisable. 
This tension may be due in part to a theoretical emphasis on the context of language 
use, and a practical need to have work valued. Increased interest and academic 
credibility may result from not only describing a significant rhetorical feature, but 
highlighting its applicability. Indeed, I briefly considered a second case study in 
Chapter Eleven, in order to demonstrate similar themes and language use in another 
risk. These are not necessarily universal processes or generalisations, but they can be 
observed in different accounts; so while the specific contexts that rhetorical features 
are identified in are unique, those features are perhaps not. 
12.5. Participants' orientations 
To elucidate common occurrences of language use, I have focused on participants' 
orientations - what an author seemed to be doing at a particular time with a particular 
piece of language. Doing so, it was possible to understand apparent variations and 
contradictions within the data. For example, both British Airways and Airhealth 
describe ECS as a misnomer. Focusing on their orientations highlights the effects of 
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this. ECS is a `misnomer' because it applies to all travel; or because it is not 
restricted to economy class. Similarly, the campaign groups construct two images, 
one of the universality of ECS; and one of a dichotomy between passengers and 
airlines - `them and us'. Examining participants' orientations allows an 
understanding of this. The first image presents the seriousness and pervasiveness of 
the risk; the second constructs blame onto the airlines and away from the passengers. 
I have therefore used the "intractable methodological liability" of participants' 
interpretative variability as a "productive analytical resource" (Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1984: 13). 
In Chapter Four I noted a tension between the emphasis on participants, and the 
imposition of categories and terms. While I have aimed to focus only on issues as 
they are of concern to participants, describing them for an academic audience requires 
certain terminology. It is unlikely that participants would identify with an `extreme 
case formulation' even while being observed to be using one in their account; and yet 
to highlight this feature and not use the term `extreme case formulation' or cite 
Pomerantz (1986) might imply ignorance or plagiarism. Perhaps the way to address 
this is to focus on participants' orientations as far as possible and then, in Potter and 
Wetherell's (1987: 182) terms, "simply get on with it", indicating where and how the 
categories, classifications, and analysis were used. 
There is a further point. McGhee and Miell cite Billig (1991) to argue that the analyst 
can "attempt to be sensitive to what is not written because the absence of references 
to certain events or relationships may be significant" (1998: 70, emphasis added) - but is this going beyond the data? 
Considering absences from texts is certainly common. Mulkay (1988: 94) for example 
states of his texts: "there are no examples in my material where such denials are self 
referential". Potter and Wetherell argue that they are "comparing actual variation but 
also potential variation" (1995: 56, emphasis added). And both Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984: 76) and Te Molder (1999: 256) argue that `selective omission' can be revealing 
and should be studied. 
This is a difficult issue. In this research I have attempted to analyse only what was 
present in a text, and what was oriented to by participants. However, comparing a 
phrase with an hypothetical alternative highlights the effect of the former - because 
any word or phrase does not simply present itself but is chosen from myriad other 
possibilities. Comparisons are a way of highlighting that this choice has taken place, 
and the effect that it has. I have adopted this approach in this research because of 
these analytical benefits. 
Similarly, at times the absence of a feature is notable - for example a question left 
unanswered. This is more difficult to address in texts than spoken interaction, where 
texts may not be written in direct response to each other. I have addressed this by 
only considering it when texts were direct responses (for example, when online 
messages refer to each other). The aim throughout has been to not impose ideas about 
what should or should not be in a text, but to understand how and why participants 
address this. Potter (1997: 184) states that in texts "one realm of entities is constituted 
in the description while another is avoided". I have tried to demonstrate how this is 
done. 
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12.6. Imposition or unmotivated looking 
In Chapter Four, I noted that 'unmotivated looking' for features in an account has to 
be balanced against building on existing studies. I have taken a specific topic and 
analysed it using DA. This research is therefore part of an increasing trend, as Potter 
(1996: 6) points out, of studies examining the accomplishment of specific actions, and 
the construction of factual discourse. I have intentionally placed this research within 
empirical research and theorising on DA. To do so is part of good academic 
scholarship; and certainly necessary for writing a thesis. 
But does this mean imposing ideas and categorisations upon the data? It is certainly 
necessary to acknowledge the relevant author when describing a feature; Edwards and 
Potter (1992) for dilemmas of stake, Hewitt and Stokes (1975) for disclaimers and so 
on. But are features `discovered' in the text and then related back to the literature, or 
recognised because they are known about? Of course DA is more than just the 
identification of tools and processes (what Antaki et al., 2003: 16, describe as "feature 
spotting") - but themes and features are still searched for in the data. 
In this research, it was hard not to recognise how data might fit into classifications for 
analysis. However, I made efforts to show that participants were orienting to these 
issues, if not to the labels that these classifications have. To be able to do research, it 
seems necessary to strike this balance between `unmotivated looking' and a focus on 
participants' orientations, and imposition of categories. If this is done, what seems 
important is to acknowledge it. 
12.7. Context 
I discussed issues of context in Chapter Four. Presenting all the details of a context is 
problematic because of reader patience, space, and the impossibility of knowing or 
capturing `all the data'. To give extracts of data is to take them out of context. 
Describing the context of an extract means moving beyond the data, will be 
constructed version, and not open to validation. 
A decision was necessary on how much data to present, and how much contextual 
detail was required. The size of each extract I gave depended on the amount required 
to give a sense of it. I aimed to make it large enough that the meaning of the extract 
could be addressed; and yet not too large that it became dull for the reader, or had so 
many other interesting features that the importance of the one being addressed was 
lost'. As was discussed in Chapter Four, this is not to imply that is possible to know 
the `meaning' intended. But what I have done is to give an extract, from which an 
understanding of meaning can be gained, through an examination of the participants' 
orientations in it. It can also be difficult to find extracts which neatly present the 
feature being described, which led to a careful selection that I deemed best 
demonstrated the feature. This may be a consequence of trying to address an issue 
I It was hard at times to `ignore' features of the text and focus on those that I have made relevant to the 
analytical point being made; indeed, Yearley seems to have experienced similar difficulties when he 
states of his analysis that "there is much of Kirwan's text that has gone united" (1981: 425). I noted 
these on occasion in the analysis chapters. Alternatively I also noted points in the analysis chapters 
where I had not reproduced a full extract because it seemed too long and unnecessary for the point 
being made. 
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through different data extracts, rather than focusing on the structure of one or two 
accounts only - being able to do this seems at this particular time to be a real luxury. 
Addressing a topic means attempting to comment on it, even while not aiming to find 
the `truth' about it. To analyse only one or two texts means being able to comment on 
discursive construction, and while this is extremely valuable, is perhaps less 
meaningful to those without an understanding of DA, or practical in a thesis where 
analysis, however in-depth, of more than one text might be expected. 
There are times when it is however also necessary to give some background 
information from beyond the data. In the Introduction, I described the issue of ECS, 
the different groups and the data sources. These descriptions were included to make 
the data meaningful. However, I do not pretend they are objective summaries. What 
seems important is to acknowledge the contingent, constructed nature of such 
description, to avoid the impression that the `facts' of the issue can be accessed, or 
that some language is neutral and may be unproblematically used. I have therefore 
described a wider context where necessary but drawn on Potter and Wetherell's 
comment that "it would be counter to our practice as discourse analysts not to be self 
conscious about our own methods of constructing a factual account" (1995: 51). This 
`self consciousness' will be elaborated on shortly. 
12.8. Validation 
Because DA analysis cannot be compared to `the truth', alternative methods of 
validation exist. To summarise sections 4.7, and 5.2.6, these are: coherence; an 
emphasis on participants' orientations; fruitfulness; presentation of deviant cases; and 
the presentation of the research report. How these methods might be implemented in 
practice, and what they imply about the nature of DA work needs consideration. I 
will therefore briefly outline how they were addressed in this study. 
Firstly, efforts were made to make the analysis as coherent as possible, and I have 
already discussed issues about ensuring a clear argument and logical narrative 
structure - even when this meant summarising text; see section 4.1.1. Secondly, I 
attempted to ensure an emphasis on participants' orientations; I think probably 
enough has been said about this already. Thirdly, I have addressed the need for 
fruitfulness. The balance between the need to acknowledge existing research, and to 
find new and interesting concepts has already been considered; see section 4.5. In this 
research I attempted this by applying some of the previous DA work to a new topic 
(ECS) and a seemingly under-developed area (risk), using multiple data sources to 
draw out interesting themes through their comparison with each other. 
The fourth process is deviant case analysis. The benefit of addressing what seems to 
be deviant has been noted (see sections 4.7, and 5.2.6). For example, articles in The 
Lancet seemed to suggest contradictions in authors' views of medical research 
practice. Their critical approach to methods did not seem to fit with the presentation 
of self as providing factual and reliable results; how could it, if the methods that 
generated those results were seemingly flawed? However, closer examination of the 
texts revealed two things. First it showed the benefit of trying to understand the effect 
of each piece of discourse rather than reading for the gist; if this was being done, 
decisions would have to be made about what the apparently contradictory accounts 
were `actually' trying to say. Second, following Potter and Wetherell (1995), 
173 
examination of `deviant cases' served to strengthen the argument being made. Close 
analysis revealed that scientific methods were critiqued when they had been used to 
generate results that were unfavourable to the author. The process was a way of 
supporting their own view and denigrating the opposition, and thus fitted into and 
confirmed the original analytic argument. However, continual searching for deviant 
cases could mean a constant redefinition of the analytic categories; analysis has, at 
some point, got to stop. 
Finally, validation is possible through presenting and opening up research. Issues 
about the amount of data that it is possible and practical to give - and whether it can 
be "rich and extended" (Potter, 1996: 12) - have already been discussed see sections 
4.7, and 5.2.6). In this research I managed these issues by presenting as much data 
related to the analysis as was practically feasible. The reader is therefore invited to 
read the data and consider whether they concur with the analysis of it. Of course, the 
extracts chosen are a good example of the point being made, and of course I am 
inviting the reader to reach the same conclusions as me. But it would also seem 
almost a little foolish not to do this. However, assessing the validity of analysis also 
requires, according to Taylor (2001a: 41), Wetherell and Potter (1988: 183), and Tuffin 
and Howard (2001: 200), the analyst to present not just the `finished product' of data 
and analysis, but reveal how they reached their conclusions. As this is a thesis, it has 
been easier to open up the research than it would be in an article; as well as presenting 
data and analysis, it has been possible, in this Chapter and Chapters Two to Six, to 
give a comprehensive consideration of the research. I think the heavily annotated data 
extracts, covered in highlighters, shorthand, crossings out and general scrawl can 
remain safely in a drawer. 
There is a final issue about validation: does saying that analysis can be substantiated 
by presentation of the data it is based on amount to a realist claim about the existence 
of textual features? It certainly seems clear that, as Wetherell says, "findings is the 
wrong word. The results are not found, they are narrated into being" (2001b: 396, 
emphasis in the original). There are two points to make here. The first is that it is 
actually very difficult to write about research without using words that imply that 
things exist: `the analysis reveals.. '; `I have identified.. ' and so on. Wetherell is quite 
right that `findings' is the wrong word, but perhaps it is not always intended to imply 
that features exist in a text, regardless of their interpretation by analysts. Thinking 
about this implies it is possible to separate what is said and what is actually meant. Of 
course, I have no wish to do this. It also illuminates the constructive power of 
language, and the impossibility of using `neutral' words. 
Second, I think it is useful to consider validation as a means to assess the particular 
claims being made - rather than it leading to a presumption that the analyst is saying 
that what the claims are highlighting, actually exists. In this research I have attempted 
to avoid implying a realist orientation to the analysis, and presented my analysis, 
albeit as convincingly as I can, as one possible interpretation that may be highlighted 
by the data. I am therefore not excluding the possibility that there may be others. 
I drew on Potter et al. (1999) to consider this. While it seems as if they are making 
realist style statements - "most of the descriptions of relativism in Parker's article are 
wrong" (1999: 81) - they state that "relativists make judgements (such as judgements 
that relativism makes sense, that this article's account of relativism is wrong, and that 
the article is confused); relativists make assumptions about the world, but they hold 
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these to be permanently open to examination and critique" (Potter et al., 1999: 8 1). 
This is what I have attempted to do. 
12.9. Considerations of reflexivity; or reflexive considerations 
In this research, I have addressed three reflexive issues (see section 4.8). First is 
ontological gerrymandering, where an issue is selected for study, and referential 
language is used to be able to do so. Second is the recognition that all (and therefore 
this) research is constructed. Research draws on the analyst's identity and 
competence. Data are only data when they are selected as such by the researcher. 
Accounts are deliberately constructed to be as convincing as possible. Third is the 
potential for an endlessly deconstructive spiral, where the texts that DA produces can 
themselves be deconstructed; and so on, infinitely. 
In Chapter Four I asked: are any of these issues a problem? And if so, what can be 
done about them? While not wishing to adopt a realist mode of argument and attempt 
to find `solutions', I will discuss how a position was reached on them in this research. 
12.9.1 Ontological gerrymandering revisited 
Firstly, `ontological gerrymandering': problematising the claims made about an issue, 
but not the issue itself (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985a, 1985b). To address this, I have 
tried to avoid creating a disjuncture between ECS and claims about it. I have focused 
only on what participants say about ECS, making clear that none is any more valid 
than another, and stating no position on the `reality of ECS'. I am still left feeling that 
I may be ontologically gerrymandering in the very selection of an issue, but take 
comfort from the fact that Woolgar and Pawluch's comments seem to be aimed at 
those who do not acknowledge that they might only be problematising the claims 
rather than the issue. Woolgar and Pawluch also state that a way of moving beyond 
this is to adopt an awareness of the process of research. As Potter says, we should be 
encouraged to "consider the reality producing practices of social scientists and the 
tropes that they (we! ) use to establish versions as solid" (1988: 40), and Woolgar and 
Ashmore describe this as "an awareness.. of explanatory practices" (1988: 1-2). This 
is what I have attempted to do, and I will detail this awareness now. 
12.9.2 An awareness of `explanatory practices' : awareness of topic selection 
I am aware of the selection of ECS as a topic. This incorporates an awareness that 
choosing a topic implies that it exists, `narrates it' into being, and makes decisions 
necessary about data to include and exclude. I have tried to avoid implying anything 
about ECS myself, whilst at the same time acknowledging the comments by Myers 
(1985a: 595): "I tried to avoid privileging my own outsider's perspective, but that 
perspective is the basis for my narrative": and Wowk (1984: 75) that we use our 
cultural concerns and values when making sense of accounts. Of course, I have done 
this. Further, there may be a need to ontologically gerrymander for the research to be 
about a topic. Gilbert and Mulkay orient to this: "we have compiled our own history 
of oxidative phosphorylation in order to introduce some of the terms and issues to 
which participants will constantly refer in subsequent chapters" (1984: 38). Indeed, 
Ashmore (1987: 140) outlines a description he gives as "a gloss on a highly 
generalised version of the immediate local history of discourse analysis". Identifying 
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the topic of ECS, writing a description of it in the Introduction and at the beginning of 
each analysis chapter, were all examples of this. The need to provide a context for the 
data meant this seemingly realist presentation of the `story' of ECS. This is what 
Horton-Salway (2001b: 250) describes as the "scene setting", making relevant 
particular parameters which shape what follows. MacMillan and Edwards (1999: 152) 
describe such summaries as "pseudo-neutral"; I take this to mean they conform to the 
(necessary) conventions about telling a story, but acknowledge the active construction 
in making it seem real. This is what I have done in this research. 
12.9.3 Awareness of data collection 
Just as Billig says that the analyst brings presuppositions about the nature of the 
phenomenon to the data before the analysis is conducted in detail (1999b: 574), I have 
similarly collected data that I deemed to be significant (following Taylor, 2001: 42), 
and analytically manageable (following MacMillan and Edwards, 1998: 325). I have 
also given descriptions from outside the data, and chosen extracts to best illustrate my 
analysis. There seems little point in arguing against doing this, especially because it 
is not clear that such practices are detrimental - they are certainly designed to be 
helpful to the reader in guiding them through the argument, and to the analyst in 
substantiating their account. The point instead perhaps is to be aware of the processes 
of doing this. 
I collected data from four groups - from a choice of many others. The most obvious 
is the media; all the groups studied acknowledged the media coverage of the issue, 
and airlines, campaign groups, and research from The Lancet are all included in media 
reports. The role of the media in the shaping of social problems has been well 
documented (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Hansen, 
1991; Stallings, 1995; Schoenfeld et al., 1979). And although some work does make 
a distinction between media reports, and what `actually happened' (for example, 
Anderson, 1997; Kitzinger, 1999: 55; Ungar, 1992), DA studies have highlighted that 
this need not be a necessary focus. They have examined the rhetorical construction of 
media accounts, and produced a wealth of interesting findings; MacMillan and 
Edwards (1999) for example studied how reporters asserted their independence and 
undermined the credibility of a rival source. Clayman (1992) applied Goffman's 
(1979) concept of `footing' to news reports to illustrate how speakers distance 
themselves from, or present as factual, the account they are telling. Antaki (1988: 12- 
13) documents the construction of newspaper accounts so that they are easy to 
understand and familiar. 
Indeed, the wealth of studies on the workings and impact of the media, and those 
more specifically on discourse was a reason why I did not include media analysis. 
Media analysis is important; and because of this, it has been done before. Therefore, 
when selecting data, I concentrated on other sources, and made decisions about them. 
Airlines and passengers I deemed crucial as the two main `sides'. The Lancet I 
included as the main source of scientific research, the use of science being a key part 
of the constructions of other groups. The Internet forums were included, not 
necessarily because of their importance, but because of the value of analysis. They 
were an opportunity to access `facts in debate', and a multi-vocal discussion of the 
issue. I have discussed that no interviews were analysed in this research (see Chapter 
Six). This meant a key focus of DA, consideration of interaction, could not be 
176 
applied. Analysis of the online forums gave some opportunity for this. Including 
forums was also a way of making this research original and fruitful, and applying 
existing DA work to a new and interesting topic area. 
There were other data sources that is was not possible to include. One interesting 
category are merchandisers of ECS preventatives - such as flight socks and inflight 
exercisers - and analysing how they persuade ECS is serious enough that people will 
buy their product, but not so serious that they will be put off flying altogether. Other 
sources include Department of Health documents; Hansard records; data from court 
cases where victims and relatives sued airlines for compensation; and international 
comparisons. For example, in October 2001, a UK court found that airlines were not 
liable for ECS; on the same day as a court in Australia announced that they were. 
Further, the work of Latour and Woolgar (1979), and Myers (1985b), on scientists' 
negotiation of their claims in the review process is interesting, and would be useful to 
explore here. I have studied the final articles that were published in The Lancet: how 
the claims in them were "moved along the scale towards factual status, trying to avoid 
mitigation and hedging in the endeavour to increase the certainty of claims" 
(Fahnestock, 1989: 32) would also be interesting. 
Of course, it would be possible to collect and analyse data ad infinitum. At some 
point it has to stop. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 161) point out that a successful DA 
study does not depend on the quantity of data analysed, but should be determined by 
research question. I have sought to understand how groups construct both the risk of 
ECS, and their account as accurate. I have attempted to include sources of data of 
sufficient size and relevance to address this and provide interesting and justifiable 
analysis. 
12.9.4 Awareness of language 
This may seem a little obvious; this whole thesis has been about an awareness of 
language. But this also means being aware of the language used to write it. Doing so, 
I have moved between the two states outlined by Taylor (2001b) - of assuming that 
language is both constructive and referential. For example, even in this chapter and 
Chapter Four, quotations about the importance of studying discourse have been used 
and taken at face value, and presented as justification for such a study. They have not 
been deconstructed to understand how they present the view that discourse is valuable 
for research, and have been unproblematically seen to reflect the underlying belief 
that this is true. 
Considering this, it may be interesting to draw on Gergen (1998: 152), who points out 
that if a social constructionist screamed "`Run, there's a fire! ' he or she would not 
wish others to look with suspicion and retort `Oh, that's just your construction"'. As 
well as always bringing a wry smile, is there an important point here necessity of 
referential language? This is not assuming it cannot be deconstructed, but just that it 
is not being at this particular time. Although referring SSK studies, Collins and 
Yearley seem to be making a similar point when they describe the possibility for 
`meta-alternation'. They state that while SSK brings an awareness of knowledge 
quality and content - 
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"in spite of this achievement, all of us, however sophisticated, can switch to 
modes of knowing that allow us to catch buses and hold mortgages. We all 
engage as a matter of fact in what we might call `meta-alternation'. Our 
argument here is that social studies of science ought to erect meta-alteration as 
a principle, not treat it as a failing" (Collins and Yearley, 1992a: 301-2)2. 
I think that research has to engage in assuming a referential quality to language. This 
may mean switching between the two modes described by Collins and Yearley - so 
being a super-aware super-sophisticated discourse analyst with a confident grasp of 
the constructive nature of all language, while being able to but `overlook' this to be 
able to catch buses and write theses. It is clear that the two modes (while being of 
course a constructed division) overlap a great deal - it can be very difficult to `switch 
off from being a discourse analyst, and to stop deconstructing the news, 
conversations with friends, advertisement hoardings and so on, almost without 
realising it3. The point is that both are possible - to have a conversation and at the 
same time be thinking `that was an interesting way they phrased that'; in fact, there 
are times when being able to do so almost seemed like an unfair advantage. 
The alternative to `alternation' seems to be to choose a new literary form. I described 
the practical difficulties of these in Chapter Four, and ultimately they may only 
demonstrate what has been described about the constructed and referential nature of 
academic writing. The position I have adopted is to acknowledge using language as 
referential, and not assume that any language is beyond being deconstructed. 
There are other aspects of language use that are important. The style of writing used 
is one particular style, deliberately chosen, and does not simply `reflect' the data. For 
example, I was helpfully told to change the third person writing style used in early 
drafts of this research, and that I should acknowledge my work by writing about it in 
the first person. I had intended an aura of professionalism; to adopt an empiricist 
repertoire, and use as many externalising devices as possible. I am now using the first 
person (albeit through gritted teeth) to achieve a different effect. Further, writing a 
thesis also requires certain sections, features, and styles. For example, I am aware 
that Chapter Two may not be very exciting. Would it be boring for an experienced 
discourse analyst, and unfathomable for a newcomer? But such things as the 
definition and scope of DA have to be described, to introduce the topic; and more 
importantly to demonstrate competency and understanding about these issues. 
12.9.6 Awareness of names and labels 
Of particular significance for this research are names and labels. I have called the 
issue `economy class syndrome', but of course, this is hardly a neutral, factual label. 
Summarising constructionist work on social problems, Woolgar and Pawluch 
(1985a: 216) state through naming "authors inevitably give definition to the putative 
behaviours and conditions they discuss". The name given to an issue is hugely 
2 The irony of including in a section about how some language is used referentially, a quote which is 
used referentially, is acknowledged. 
3 Similarly, Gill (1996: 144) describes that, "from my own experience, doing DA fundamentally 
changes the way in which you see and hear language and social relations; it involves the development 
of an `analytic mentality' (Schenkein, 1978), which does not readily fall away when you are not sitting 
in front of a transcript". 
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significant, for it can construct its very existence. But this applies to analysts, as well 
as just the participants. 
Deciding which term to use for the issue was difficult; and very difficult to write 
about. Even the last sentence implies a difference between `the issue' and its label, 
implying that the issue exists beyond whatever name. Whether it does or not was left 
as a matter for participants. But this does highlight that whatever term was used has a 
powerful constructive effect on how the issue is perceived. To draw on other 
research, Horton-Salway (2001 a: 179) interestingly describes how she used the term 
`M. E. ' in her research because much of her data were collected from members of an 
M. E. self-help group and it is a "participants' category". She used this instead of 
`CFS' (chronic fatigue syndrome), a term that "it is clear many researchers and 
clinicians prefer". She does not explain how she chose one group of "participants" 
over another, when her research involved talking to both sufferers and doctors, but the 
resonance of these issues beyond this study is clear. 
In this research, a decision was necessary on which term to use. It was not practical 
to say `the contended and possible risk of a blood clot forming in the lower limbs after 
remaining seated for long periods in flight' or any other such phrase every time to 
refer to the issue. Neither of course would any phrase be neutral and uncontentious. I 
used `economy class syndrome', shorted to `ECS' for readability, in preference to 
`Deep Vein Thrombosis' (DVT), `Traveller's Thrombosis', or any other name used 
by participants. This was firstly because ECS was a term recognised and 
acknowledged by all participants, even if not used by all of them. It was also the term 
that first turned the possibility of a link between flights and blood clots into an 
'issue'4. ECS is very often not a participants category - it is described as a 
"misnomer" on occasions; but they would understand it; and all names are contested, 
and there is a need to choose one. 
12.9.7 The value of a reflexive approach 
In Chapter Four I outlined some benefits of a reflexive approach. Final comments are 
relevant here. Potter argues that "far from being futile and circular, this sort of 
reflexivity is required if we are to critically address our own constructions of the 
social world.. the alternative would be to claim a special privilege: a position beyond 
the sorts of questioning and criticism that our research participants undergo" 
(1988: 63). This is similar to Mulkay's (1988: 99) description of the "arbitrary 
interpretative asymmetry" that gives sociologists a privileged discourse to deconstruct 
participants' discourse, but which is not accessible to them. If adopting a reflexive 
approach at the very least avoids adopting a privileged position, then it has to be 
explored. It certainly has more appeal than Burman's way out of the "circularity of 
warranting an interpretation via simply re-describing what is said in the text", which 
is to "elaborate the analysis or categories to relate to structures outside the detail of 
the text" (2003: 4). Indeed, Potter (2003: 788) points out that "[s]urely the widespread 
failure to consider reflexive issues in other analytic approaches is more of a worry for 
them than DA's consideration, however far from ideal it is". Even while reflexivity 
raises more issues than it addresses, an awareness of the sorts of topics considered 
4 This was in a research report in The Lancet in August 1988 
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here is clearly beneficial; and surely the only way to proceed (especially if, according 
to Ashmore, 1989: 143, the alternatives are giving up or pig farming.. ). 
In this research I have used discourse analysis to study the topic of ECS, and to make 
some comments about the constructions of risk, blame and responsibility. I have 
identified some of the discursive features in the texts, and highlighted the effects that 
they have. I have demonstrated that these features may be applicable beyond the 
cases studied here. I have also tried to deconstruct what it means to carry out DA, 
what the principles of DA study are, and how these might be applied. Tensions have 
been noted, and attempts to resolve these made. Throughout this research I have tried 
to adopt a reflexive view on the processes of research and their constructive effect. I 
have therefore intended this research to make both a substantive and a theoretical 
contribution to discourse studies. 
So that's really it then? 
Yes. Well no. I mean, there's an awful lot more to say, that could have been said, 
and that will probably be said in the future. This is just a 92,000 word thesis, and 
there are only so many things that one can do in that. I think she's tried to say 
something about a topic, about method, and grapple with big questions about 
epistemology and ontology and the differences between theory and practice. 
That's rather a lot. 
Quite. Her supervisors must be sick of reading it all by now as well, especially as she 
doesn't know when to use `effect' or 'affect, and has been banging on about ethics 
for three years already. 
And if this text were to be subjected to DA, what do you think the contextually 
situated, ethically developed, methodologically relativistic focus on the orientations of 
the participant would lead the analyst to say? 
Over to you... 
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